Volume 3, Issue 1

The aim of this article is to revisit Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus 2.5.45-8 discussing whether Clement holds a moderate position οf laughter or, like most early Christians, tends to an “antigelastic” position. Some scholars, such as Stephen Halliwell and Laura Rizzerio, have concluded that Clement holds an intermediate position between an optimistic approach to laughter and its condemnation. However, in this essay we argue that while Clement’s position is not a straightforward antigelastic one, his apparent acceptance of laughter is so narrow that his moderate view ends up being compromised. Ultimately, he is strongly inclined to condemn laughter and to prescribe an ascetic life devoid of laughter.

This article outlines a new theory of humor. The concept of humor is developed in the sense of five dialectical levels, respectively, sequential phenomenalities of humorous consciousness. These range from a level of most inferior (hurtful) humor up to a stage of most sublime humor. Systematically speaking, humor is viewed from an enhanced perspective of transcendental philosophy, namely as a medium of self-unfolding practical reason. It is considered as a complementary potency to the practical force of the latter’s regulative principle, and it fulfils several important functions. The first section provides basic definitions of concepts like humor, sublimity, comicality, etc. Here, the five phenomenalities of humor are introduced. The second section explores and develops these contents more in detail. Some references to the German-speaking tradition in the philosophy of humor provide further input for discussion. The third section presents a thought experiment. Imaginary humorous reactions of Socrates to ridicule and hostility are analyzed in the sense of the present theory.

It is common for stand-up comedians to tell stories as well as, or instead of, jokes. Stories bring something extra to the performance, and when presented as true add a further layer of appeal. However, most stories told as if true by comedians are not true. A categorizing of forms of comedic story is presented involving the dimensions of grammatical person and truthfulness. Some advantages of comedians’ employing true first-person stories are discussed, and these considerations are then explored through the role of autobiography in the work of Doug Stanhope. Many aspects of Stanhope’s (highly unusual) life find their way into his shows, and true stories and his personality more broadly are folded into other elements of his act (such as his political views). Links are made with Søren Kierkegaard’s notion of “inwardness,” and it’s argued that authenticity is a prerequisite for the quality of self-disclosure that is basic to Stanhope’s excellence.

In his 1990s studies of visual humor, Noël Carroll left to “future researchers” the laborious task of developing a “comprehensive and rigorous classification of the phenomena” pertaining to “the sight gag.” Carroll contributed five possible items belonging to such a taxonomy, i. e., “the mutual interference gag” (e. g., a character’s perspective vs the viewer’s one), “mimed metaphors” (e. g., Chaplin’s bread rolls as dancing feet), “the object analog” (e. g., a tuba used as an umbrella), “the switch image” (i. e., reinterpretations forced by montage) and “the solution gag” (e. g., the character’s inventiveness surprises the viewer). Following the implicit reference to rhetoric built in the very names of some of these items, this article shows how the well-established tropes of classical rhetoric, indeed three hundred of them, can be employed, with a modicum of analogical creativity, in order to address the visual component of comedic sketches, as exemplified by Monty Python’s famous Flying Circus.

Humor is unlike other forms of communication because its content is not meant literally. Like acts of play, humor is not intended to be taken at face value. As a consequence, the assumptions and rules that govern normal conversation do not apply. Humor therefore depends upon both the speaker and the audience fully understanding that what was communicated should be treated in this unique way. The play frame refers to this shared understanding about the nature of the communication. Analyzing whether a communication falls within the play frame may help us better understand not only whether the communication can be deemed non-serious or serious, but also whether it can be treated uniquely as merely the speaker’s attempt at play or as a typical instance of literal speech for which the speaker can be deemed ethically responsible.

In two very influential papers from 2008, Tamar Gendler introduced the concept of “alief” to describe the mental state one is in when acting in ways contrary to their consciously professed beliefs. For example, if asked to eat what they know is fudge, but shaped into the form of dog feces, they will hesitate, and behave in a manner that would be consistent with the belief that the fudge is really poop. They alieve that it is disgusting, while they believe it is not. This paper investigates laughter from self-proclaimed egalitarian, tolerant folk, in response to oppressive jokes that might fit the alief-model. If I merely alieve the content of a joke at which I laugh, will that constitute morally exculpating reasons for such laughter? And what else might it imply? This paper will provide insights at the intersections of humor studies, ethics, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of mind, all while being moderately and appropriately amusing.

In most academic works laughter is praised because of its social, religious, and psychological benefits. However, when laughter’s morality has been historically discussed it usually has been condemned. To assign human responsibility to the act of laughing, it must be acknowledged as voluntary. However, studies indicate that laughter is not a voluntary action, but rather a neurophysiological reaction. If this is so, there is no basis on which to ground the moral relevance of laughter. In this article, I will put forward an argument that can help to ground the ethics of spontaneous laughter at least. I claim that humans have the power to avoid laughing or suspend it because they can voluntarily prevent some of the circumstances that are necessary for it to happen. If humans fail to do so when they are expected to, laughter becomes relevant as a kind of negligent omission.

Android understanding of laughter is limited even when robots have become self-motivated and understand frustration. Laughter is one of four ways to cope with upset. The others are detachment, suffering, and escape. Detachment is natural to androids as they originally had no stake in any outcome. Suffering takes two forms: grief and anger. Grief often needs to be faced before turning to other means of coping. Humor can often deflect anger by revealing it has either no basis or a common one. Escape is the flight from troubling affairs into an imaginative world. Laughter may start in mockery but is best when selfdeprecation yields greater respect. Jokes are stories designed to induce laughter. Professionals have developed routines that don’t employ them, but as androids grasp structure quickly, they may find jokes the best place to start building their own sense of humor.

This paper reconsiders a well-known Diophantine problem-“the coconut puzzle”-with two philosophically humorous motives. The first motive is methodological; the second, ontological. First, different methodological approaches to solving this problem, namely those of the stereotypical engineer, physicist, and mathematician, are informed by different conceptualizations of the mathematical puzzle itself. This is illustrated by comparing stereotypical solutions by an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician. Second, ontological implications of Dirac’s unorthodox (negative) solution precipitate heuristic questions concerning correspondence between mathematically admissible answers and physically possible states. An anecdotal history of this problem is also cited, in order to prepare the ground for a concluding satirical solution by an erstwhile Carlylean economist.

Most Americans believe that higher education is heading in the wrong direction. In Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, the eponymous heroine’s tumble into a rabbit hole immerses her in a bizarre, surreal, disorienting universe. Has higher education fallen down the rabbit hole? This paper will examine the many ways that academe has become a peculiar, illogical, and topsy-turvy world where things are often the opposite of what we call them and of what we expect them to be. To restore the credibility of our education system and make it of value to most students, it must be completely reimagined and, in fact, totally rebuilt from the ground up.