Volume 1, Issue 1

This article attempts to provide a basic characterization of stand-up comedy—that is, a minimal portrait of what comes to mind when one learns that one is about to see a stand-up comic. To that end, the focus will be primarily on the relation of stand-up comedy in terms of themes of temporality, including the structure of stand-up comedy, its rhythm, its delivery, and its contemporaneity. 

Humor, laughter, joke telling can be frivolous fun or it could act as a sword and a shield to defend and protect us against life. Humor can, at times, illuminate if not completely explain, some of the irresoluble problems and mysteries that individuals face. And, if all else fails, humor can hold off our fear of the unanswerable and the unacceptable. Historically it can be argued that during times of trial, tribulations, and suffering, Jewish communities and individuals have used humor as a way to cope with and deal with reality.

This article reflects on the oddness of humor and laughter as human behaviors. It argues against classifying humorous amusement as an emotion by contrasting amusement with standard emotions. It then examines amusement as a kind of pleasure, specifically, the enjoyment of psychological shifts. It argues that humor evolved from mock-aggressive play in pre-human apes, with laughter serving as a play signal. Understanding humor as play not only helps explain laughter but also clarifies issues in the ethics of humor, such as the wrongness of racist and sexist jokes, and the question of whether a sense of humor is a virtue.

Despite sustained philosophical attention, no theory of humor claims general acceptance. Drawing on the resources provided by intentional systems theory, this article first outlines an approach to investigating humor based on the idea of a comic stance, then sketches the Dismissal Theory of Humor (DTH) that has resulted from pursuing that approach. According to the DTH, humor manifests in cases where the future-directed significance of anticipatory failures is dismissed. Mirth, on this view, is the reward people get for declining to update predictive representational schemata in ways that maximize their future-oriented value. The theory aims to provide a plausible account of the role of humor in human mental and social life, but it also aims to be empirically vulnerable, and to generate testable predictions about how the comic stance may actually be undergirded by cognitive architectures.

In 2017, Steven Gimbel published Isn’t That Clever: A Philosophical Account of Humor and Comedy. This book proposes, among other vastly interesting notions, a definition of humor that eschews audience reactions in favor of focusing exclusively on the craft and intention of the responsible comedian. This article intends to provoke that definition and show why humorous performances cannot be crafted without an audience-centric mindset, proving Gimbel’s notion problematic at best. To poke this definition, I draw on the American Folk Humor tradition and compare its historic roots with modern tourist attractions that on the surface appear to channel its spirit. These include the Hoop-Dee-Doo Revue dinner show at Walt Disney World and The Brewery Follies at Virginia City, Montana. After showcasing the differences between these modern performances and the tradition they pretend to espouse, I conclude that Gimbel’s theory cannot account for the evolution of a funny genre.

This article offers an analysis of the role humor plays in the philosophy of Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412–c. 323 BC). It argues that the Cynicism authored by Diogenes is a philosophy premised on a number of doctrines, and that among these doctrines humor holds the central place. The Cynical humor of Diogenes is characterized as more than just a feature of his personality or a method through which he communicates his real message, but as the actual state of mind that he intends to impart to his students.

The purpose of this article is to enlist the work of the American philosopher and psychologist William James in order to investigate the deeper significance of humor. It is neither James’s character nor anything he states directly about humor or laughter that is under discussion here, but the cosmos as grasped through his bold metaphysics and rich phenomenological observations. The thought of James, it is argued, discloses our inherence within a universe rife with ambiguity, complexity, and incongruity. I explore how these features of reality, particularly when illuminated through James’s lush prose, may cause us to laugh. In addition, the insights of James are employed to examine the close relationship between humor and certain forms of religious experience, as well as with horror.

Dave Chappelle took an extended leave from comedy for moral reasons. I argue that, while he had every right to leave comedy because of his moral concerns, he was not obliged to do so. To make this case, I present Chappelle’s argument that the potential negative consequences of his racial humor obliged him to leave. Next, I argue against Chappelle’s argument about avoidable harms as the harms are not his responsibility, he was not being negligent, and the benefits of his humor outweigh the harms. I also argue in support of the intuition that another’s failure of comprehension or moral character, even if that failure will predictably result in harms to others, should not convert moral acts into immoral ones.

This article investigates the relationships between forms of humor that conjure up possible worlds and real-world social critiques. The first part of the article will argue that subversive humor, which is from or on behalf of historically and continually marginalized communities, constitutes a kind of aesthetic experience that can elicit enjoyment even in adversarial audiences. The second part will be a connecting piece, arguing that subversive humor can be constructed as brief narrative thought experiments that employ the use of fictionalized scenarios to facilitate an open, playful attitude, encouraging a space for collaborative interpretation. This interaction between humorist and audience is an aesthetic experience that is enjoyable in and of itself, as the feelings of mirth are intrinsically valuable. But connected to the “Ha-ha!” experience of these sorts of humorous creations is an “Aha!” or potentially revelatory experience that is a mixture of cognitive comprehension and motivated (emotional) response. The third part of the article will attempt to go beyond the consciousness-raising element with an account of how such possible worlds created in the realm of imagination through subversive humor can bleed into the real world of flesh and blood people. Finally, an example of subversive humor will be analysed.

It is hard to say what the focus of the difficulty here is: the very idea of a sense of proportion or the idea that a sense of humor is an ideal vehicle for it. Both are puzzling. As having the one without the other is quite possible, this is only a feel that the two go well together.

The article’s purpose is to illustrate ways in which renowned philosophers, statesmen, and poets—as well as family members and friends of this author—utilized humor to express fearlessness of or contempt for death, or indeed to mock others’ fears of dying or tendencies to treat death too seriously. If Sigmund Freud was correct in hypothesizing that humor is the ego’s defense against life’s affronts, and if death poses the greatest possible affront to life, then jokes about death are the strongest protests we can lodge against our own mortality.

Humor can be used as a tool for a wide range of tasks, including fighting for social justice. How to most effectively use it, however, is a matter of contention. Jokes that alienate members of an out-group can be called “Otherizing,” and can cause harm by virtue of the alienation. Woke comics, like Hari Kondabolu, intentionally avoid Otherizing in general, but may engage in a version of it that seeks to defang stereotypical treatments of out-groups by replacing the alienating content with something benign. We term this use of Otherizing, “mOtherizing.” Pride comics, like Russell Peters, take a different approach and try to usurp the power of Otherizing by over-engaging in it. The intention is to use the jokes to cobble together a coalition of out-groups that turns itself into an in-group. We term this use of Otherizing, “brOtherizing.”

Using humor, empathy, and improvisation to make science more accessible to the average person, the center has helped many scientists communicate more effectively about what they do. In many cases, this involves taking science down from the metaphorical “ivory tower” and bringing it into the comfort zone of students and people who may not have had a positive experience in science classes. A variety of metaphors are used to make science “come alive.” This is an interesting counter example to earlier theories of metaphor and comedy such as the “disparagement theory” (Mio and Graesser 1991) which described jokes as more successful if they relied on disparaging metaphors that build community through shared hostility. The metaphor approach builds community and creates inclusion through “social-facilitative functions of playful language” (Ritchie and Schell 2009). When a scientist helps a layperson or student understand humorous metaphors, it communicates the literal meaning of terms, but also the contextual meaning, research practices, and the laboratory social setting. This is argued through examples of humor, comedy, and metaphor—a timely issue given current political discussions in the United States.