Volume 7, Issue 2

The quantitative study of inter-group conflict, most notably war, has attended to objectively measured variables of aggregate units such as the state or the conflict event. The relevance of psychology, which focuses on the individual, is not guaranteed even though the aggregates are composed of individuals. The discipline might be relevant by providing some further understanding/explanation for the existence of relationships among the larger units and empirical psychology has developed a number of generalizations about individual behavior based on replicable observations. By itself, this would not guarantee the contribution of psychological research and concepts to the prediction of the occasion and/or intensity of human conflict. The most elementary requirement would involve establishing that group properties are at least somewhat dependent upon individual characteristics. Were this the case, an important contribution might be through theories of human behavior. However, psychological theory engenders a number of logical problems. Although internal mental processes not easily predictable from known environmental-biological facts may reasonably be established, much psychological theory consists of hypothetical constructs that do not represent conjectures about internal physical reality. These constructs, by their nature, connote more than that contained in either operational definitions or indices of them. Their potential utility requires a deductive system that conforms to the logical requirements of any logical system and which is activated under specifiable conditions and also includes overt behavior as a consequence. Psychological models then might contribute more than understanding/explanation such as the ability to predict behavior from environments not yet observed as well as alternative behaviors under similar environmental circumstances. A number of implications for the unit of analysis and for conflict theory derive from these considerations.

Eds: This paper is an outstanding presentation of conflicts in the global system with regard to trade, financial aid, development, poverty reduction and environmental policies. These conflicts may often be described as basically between the developed countries and the developing ones. This paper is a reproduction of a statement appearing in the February issue Africa Notes published by the Institute for African Development at Cornell University. The editors thank the Institute for permission to reproduce the paper.

Many game-theoretic analyses of deterrence confirm the commonsense view that what determines whether a defender can effectively deter a challenger from an unwanted action is (1) the challenger’s perception of the level of punishment that the defender will be able to impose on the challenger should it take the action, and (2) the challenger’s level of belief about the likelihood of the defender actually carrying out this punishment. Reduction of the defender’s forces may affect both the defender’s ability to retaliate and its perceived willingness to do so. Game-theoretic methods are used to assess how the limits on both of these parameters are related, subject to the condition that deterrence remains effective. The results indicate that the defending side can often make do with smaller forces, provided its (apparent) resolve is high. But force structure is important—the models suggest that implementation of an "all-or-nothing" deployment (as called for by a doctrine of massive retaliation, for example) may reduce not only costs, but also deterrence effectiveness.