Band 30, Heft 1

This essay explores a deterrence relationship between one defender and two challengers that are interconnected game-theoretically but are otherwise acting independently. In the double deterrence game model, the primary challenger makes the first move, defender, the second, and the secondary challenger makes its move only after the defender and the primary challenger have made their choices. In other words, the threat of the secondary challenger is both latent and contingent. There are four types of defenders, and three types of the two challengers. These preference assumptions define 36 distinct strategic environments, or games. These games are analyzed under both complete and incomplete information. The results are highly sensitive to the specific combination of player types. Deterrence is most likely to succeed when a defender’s threat is highly credible, and to fail when it is low. The secondary challenger is most likely to have an impact on play only at intermediate levels of the defender’s and the primary challenger’s credibility. Assuming a rising challenger, or a declining defender, or both, a danger zone will exist just prior to, or immediately after, the primary challenger has achieved parity with the defender, that is, when a balance of capabilities exists. The principal aim of a defender of the status quo facing two challengers acting independently should be on preventing a challenge by its primary opponent. This conclusion is robust no matter what configuration of player types one assumes.

The two ideas of the rationality of terrorist organisations and the costly leader game are used in this paper to construct a game theoretic model. It is an addition to the literature on terrorism and leader-follower games, in which the government and a terrorist organisation are the two players. Terrorist group can be rational or irrational. In case it is rational, it does the cost-benefit analysis and is open to negotiation. Only in this case, the government chooses to not spend on counter-terrorist measures. The irrational group has lexicographic preferences, which means that it prefers a successful attack to attract attention and recruits at the beginning or finish of its operation. Consequently, it is assumed that the irrational group will always attack. the irrational terrorist organisation has the option of either choosing not to mimic the rational group or choosing to do so at a psychological cost. Although the irrational group dislikes imitation. It seeks to duplicate the rational group so that the government withdraws and cuts back on spending on counter-terrorism. A costly leader model is set up in the paper, where the government can incur a cost to gather information about the type of terrorist group. In this framework, the paper provides policy prescriptions concerning counter-terrorist measures that the government should take in case the type of terrorist group being rational or irrational is unknown and it highlights the importance of intelligence.

This study addresses the underexplored dimension of the relationship between military expenditures and gender inequality, drawing upon the insights of feminist security and international relations scholars. The influence of militarization on gender inequality is profound, manifesting itself significantly in both conflict and peacetime situations. The destruction of essential infrastructure further restricts women’s access to vital resources. In peacetime, the convergence of militarization and patriarchy reinforces women’s secondary roles in society, while higher military expenditures can divert resources from social spending, disproportionately affecting women and children reliant on public services. Despite extensive theoretical discussions, empirical studies on this nexus are limited. This paper contributes by presenting original evidence using a comprehensive dataset spanning 1991–2019, examining the Female Labor Income Share across over 100 countries. Findings reveal that militarization correlates with reduced the Female Labor Income Share, underscoring the urgency of addressing this critical linkage between militarization and gender inequality.

This study examines the triangular relationship between public debt, economic growth, and political risks, shedding light on the complex underlying dynamics of these factors. Using a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model, we analyze this relationship from multiple angles across 117 countries. The study considers the impact of different political regimes and income levels, recognizing the importance of diverse economic and political contexts in shaping these interactions. The results reveal varied responses to public debt based on the political regime, highlighting that authoritarian systems, imperfect democracies, and full democracies exhibit distinct reactions. Additionally, the study underscores the influence of income levels on the relationship between public debt and economic growth. A balanced and comprehensive approach to public debt management is recommended, with an emphasis on political stability, transparency in political institutions, and economic diversification. Policymakers are advised to consider the duration of shocks to promote sustainable economic growth and fiscal health.

This study extends the existing literature on the relationship between armed conflicts and the socioeconomic status of households in Lake Chad Basin (LCB) countries by adopting a random coefficient model to analyse micro-panel data covering the 1997–2020 periods. The random coefficient approach allows for country-specific effects in explaining variations in both the nature and degree of the effects of conflict due to differing country characteristics. The result evidenced a significant negative effect of the average impact of armed conflict on poverty, while the coefficient of educational outcome is insignificant. The country-specific results point to significant inter-country variations in the impact of armed conflicts on poverty and education outcomes. The descriptive statistics result shows that the inter-country variations could be attributed to differing quality of institutions. Finally, environmental degradation and macroeconomic uncertainties do not appear to bear a systematic relationship with householdsʼ level of socioeconomic status in the Lake Chad Basin. These findings indicate that a uniform and blanket adoption of public policies by government in Lake Chad Basin countries will not yield a significant positive result. Therefore, governments, practitioners and academicians should contextualise policies/recommendations meant to improve socioeconomic status of households in conflict, while strengthening the quality of institutions to ameliorate the impact of conflict on socioeconomic status (SES) of households.