Band 22, Heft 2

While behavioural economics has become part of mainstream economic theory, showing systematic deviations from the standard homo economicius in normal environments, there has been little exploration of behaviour in the extreme – such as conflict, disasters or war zones. This has led to the underdevelopment of behavioural theory examining the choices or motivations of individuals within these environments, resulting in sub-optimal models and policy. This work provides an entry point for the application of behavioural economics within conflict zones, specifically the examination of decision-making of non-combatant individuals. Additionally, it provides insight into the related disaster research field, detailing current studies, overview methodological approaches, approaches and limitations. Concluding with a general discussion and potential implications for policy.

This research compares decision making patterns of two groups of subjects engaged in an international conflict against a virtual actor within a computerized simulated environment that operates according to a set of predetermined rules. Subjects assigned to the first group could attempt to improve their status by choosing from a set of different types of policies, such as negotiating an agreement, threatening, mobilizing forces, and use of force. Subjects assigned to the second group also played against a virtual opponent that was programed to behave in an identical manner and produce identical payoffs. However, instead of each policy being labeled with a substantive meaning, policies were categorized in a formal manner as Policies A, B, C, etc. Therefore the only criterion for evaluating a policy was on the basis of outcomes. The results of this experiment reveal that providing a meaning to each policy rather than a formal label influenced policy preferences and impeded the ability of the subjects to learn from experience.

Using data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, we implement propensity score matching methods in order to test whether the presence of past experiences of direct victimization decreases citizens’ safety perception. Results confirm the hypothesis that victimization strongly increases the fear of crime; furthermore the effect is also gender specific: victimized women show higher decrease in safety perception than men.

Existing research suggests that both natural resource abundance and scarcity are likely to increase the risk of interstate and domestic conflict. Two crucial aspects, however, have largely been neglected in the existing literature: (1) the analysis of international crises (i.e. non-violent conflicts) and (2) the effects of different market conditions of energy resources. Especially a growing number of market participants can affect the strategic value of natural resources and, thus, the incentives for international crisis initiation. It is argued that different market structures make countries to adopt either aggressive or more peaceful behavior towards other states, and this is why I empirically then disaggregate fossil fuels along with the market that they belong to. This study examines 179 countries at the monadic level since 1980. The results suggest variation on the incentives of crisis initiation along the different fossil fuels, while I also correct for potential endogeneity issues.

The present essay discusses how a society can make decisions on specific issues according to how flexible or rigid it is in accepting new ideas and trends. Then, it explains how Athenian society abandoned war in favor of a grand peace strategy during the second half of the 4th century BCE. To achieve this, two visionary Athenian policymakers, Eubulus and Lycurgus, introduced fiscal expansionary policy programs which proved beneficial for the majority of the citizens. Through expansionary public works programs, Athenian citizens were now able to make decisions based on rational choices, based on a wider economic prospective. They could now gain more during periods of peace (as traders, ship-owners, “industrialists” etc.), providing compensation to the poor.