Volume 14, Issue 2

This paper uses a system of differential equations to describe the insurgency in Iraq. The system has four possible outcomes or cases: (1) The U.S.-led coalition increases in size and the number of attacks by the insurgents increases. (2) The size of the U.S.-led coalition decreases and the number of attacks by insurgents decreases. (3) The size of the U.S.-led coalition increases and the number of insurgent attacks decreases. (4) The size of the U.S.-led coalition decreases and the number of insurgent attacks increases. Which case is relevant depends on the recruitment rates of the U.S.-led coalition and insurgents as well as the combat effectiveness of both sides. Policy implications are provided.

Arms embargoes are often said to be ineffective but mandated fairly often. A sample of 74 arms embargo cases between 1990 and 2005 is analysed in order to assess effectiveness. The analysis shows that such embargoes had notable effects on arms import patterns in about 30 percent of all cases. However, effects on targeted policies are much more limited. The link between arms embargoes and targeted policy change grows stronger over the lifetime of arms embargoes. The paper also uses a third measure of arms embargo success, initiator satisfaction. Arms embargoes are comparatively cheap for senders, and thus even only partially enforced embargoes may be seen as a success by the initiators of such a sanction. The analysis confirms the hypothesis that multilateral arms embargoes are more successful than unilateral ones. Multilateralization increases supplier satisfaction with an embargo, it raises the likelihood that there are significant changes in arms import patterns and even increases the possibility that there is policy change in the target. Related to multilateralization is arms embargo implementation. A higher degree of participation of countries and a stronger effort at implementation by participants increase the effectiveness. Arms embargoes are more effective when they are embedded in consistent policy packages. Arms embargoes in and of themselves will rarely affect target policies.

This article proposes a new and unique framework for the promotion of cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the fields of innovation and advanced technology development. The goal is to strengthen the Palestinian Authority's economic basic structure, using the experience and know-how gained by Israel in these fields. We consider the development of a new project: a Palestine-Israel Virtual Incubator (PIVI). This project suggests a new Israeli-Palestinian cooperation pattern, in sectors and types of economic activity that are not based mostly on unskilled workers but are based instead on relatively advanced technology, including innovation, upgrading of old technologies, and high-tech activities, using the skilled workforce that already exists or is in the process of being formed in the Palestinian Authority. This project may provide a long-term catalyst for a new type of economic and scientific cooperation between Israel and Palestine, involving the US and other countries. The basic concept in our proposal is that the virtual incubator will allow high-tech and innovative firms to benefit from the expertise and professional networks of the different existing incubators, thus increasing the array of services available and exposing the companies to greater business opportunities.