Volume 5, Issue 1

This article seeks to define Digital Theology, first by exploring the development of the CODEC Research Centre at Durham University – perhaps the only centre developed to explore Digital Theology. The aims of the centre and some of its projects are explored leading to a discussion of CODEC’s place within Digital Humanities. The article concludes with a focus on different aspects and definitions of Digital Theology.

The article examines the disparity in use of digital humanities tools and resources among the theological disciplines, highlighting the question of why systematic theology has struggled to follow the digital turn. The author argues that issues of fairness in access and use of digital resources in knowledge production constitute an important set of concerns for systematic theologians in considering appropriate uses of the digital in their research. The article suggests that there are indeed reasons for methodological innovation in systematic theology in reaction to the digital revolution in humanities research – not, however, toward more plugged-in methods but toward methods embedded in life with the poor, underrepresented, and excluded. Three principles for a methodological “reboot” in systematic theology are given, which offer directions for further research as well as material for debate.

Digital providers inundate their users with an abundance of words, as well as pictorial and iconic information that has long become almost unmanageable. In terms of religious communicative usage, there are some indications that a new, perhaps even disruptive quality is being introduced into these digital practices, particularly with regard to truth communication. For both the individual actors and their places of lived religion and religious communication, the claim to truth expressed in each case is influenced by the very dynamics of digital use. Against this background, the basic question arises of whether a practical-theological reflection in the mode of a critical observation of these digital dynamics is conceivable at all. Therefore, I examine the current dynamics of digital media use in more detail by focusing on the anthropologically and theologically relevant concept of “searching” in a fundamental sense. The question arises of whether the implied, highly intensive and independent religious search developments are actually able to represent and promise in their entirety that “truth” which can be meaningfully searched for and found according to theological understanding. From these reflections on a practical public theology, some exemplary consequences for the field of religious educational practice are subsequently pointed out. I argue that, in the sense of cultivating critical perception and interpretation competence, an awareness of the significance of this abundance of analogous expressions and behaviors should be created in concrete educational processes. But an awareness should also be created of the relevance of developing an identity and a personal relationality in the digital world, shaped by the theological idea not only of “searching,” but of “finding” and “being found.”

This article describes the digital edition of the Hebrew Bible: A Critical Edition (HBCE), which is being produced as part of a project called Critical Editions for Digital Analysis and Research (CEDAR) at the University of Chicago. We first discuss the goals of the HBCE and its requirements for a digital edition. We then turn to the CEDAR project and the advances it offers, both theoretical and technological. Finally, we present an illustration of how a reader might use the digital HBCE to interact with the biblical text in innovative ways.

This article critically examines the functionalities and significance of three prominent digital tools that have become central to the study of Greek New Testament manuscripts. The design, functionalities, and significance of the New Testament Virtual Manuscript Room (NTVMR), the Center for the Study of New Testament Manuscripts (CSNTM) digital library, and the Pinakes database have a hand in shaping the research questions of the field. As such, it is important to understand what these tools do, how they function, and how they might develop further to address the needs of the field. The analysis of these tools leads to fundamental questions about using digital representations as proxies for primary sources, challenges for managing the materiality of artefactual and digital objects, the collaborative nature of digital scholarship, and the implicit interpretations of the Greek New Testament tradition inherent in digital workspaces.

This article presents the challenges of developing Humanities research in a digital environment in relation to a New Testament test-case: the MARK16 project. The first section argues that virtual research environments (VREs) have become an excellent milieu in which to develop a digitized research project based on collaborative work. The second section presents an overview of VREs and digital projects on the New Testament. The third section demonstrates the ways in which the MARK16 project participates in the development of VREs and fosters new modes of engaging material in digitized NT research.

The O.9.27 manuscript of Trinity College Cambridge is a minuscule manuscript of Hesiod’s Opera et Dies . In a 2001 PhD thesis on Greek palimpsests in Cambridge by Natalie Tchernetska, this manuscript is described to contain two distinct lower scripts, one of which identified as a New Testament text. The author read four lines and a partial fifth of the one-leaf palimpsest that contain Mark 1:44, which is remarkable considering that the washing made the lower script virtually the same colour as the page. This note re-examines the Markan lower script in O.9.27 and offers an account of the use of image processing software for the purpose to uncover more text in a difficult palimpsest, a method useful when MSI is not available.

The aim of this article is to discuss the current state of Arabic Bible studies from a Digital Humanist perspective. It presents an overview of the current existing digital resources, such as digital manuscript collections, and underlines the importance of developing digital projects for the study of Arabic versions of the Bible with a focus on the New Testament. It will also shed light on future challenges and the urgent needs of the scientific field in order to harness the full potential of digital scholarship.

This paper introduces a tool which offers scholars a new way to visualize the structure of manuscripts. The Structural Visualization of Manuscripts (or StruViMan) is a web-based application, developed as part of the Paratexts of the Greek Bible Project, a European Research Council project based in Munich. Drawing on the principles of structural codicology, StruViMan is able to translate the different stages of a manuscript’s development into a visual model based on the codex’s physical, historical layers and aims to facilitate the comparison of manuscripts. It can be used by any web-connected manuscript database from any cultural area and does not require the presence of electronic images. This presentation begins with a short survey of the principles underpinning the tool’s conception and development, followed by a demonstration of how manuscript data from both biblical and non-biblical Greek codices are transformed into interactive, customizable visualizations with varying display modes. We will also touch upon StruViMan’s technical aspects as an open-access web service, available to any software or database able to call its API using the correct parameters. We close with a preview of new features currently under development, including the ability to “reconstruct” a manuscript whose composite parts are presently in different repositories.

Before the interpretation of any text can start, the original wording of the text itself must be critically established. Conventionally, this is done following qualitative criteria. This article, however, explores the application of spatial analyses to New Testament textual criticism by demonstrating how the Levenshtein edit distance could be adapted to calculate confusion distances for variant readings in New Testament manuscripts, i.e. the possibility that a (combination of) letter(s) is confused by another (combination of) letter(s). Subsequently the outcomes are translated to Euclidian space using classical Multi-Dimensional Scaling, which enables visualisation and spatial analyses (in this case not related to geographical space). The article focuses on the data preparation and algorithm to make the data suitable for spatial analyses, thus providing the New Testament textual critic with new analytical tools.

This article seeks to expound upon the first facet of CSNTM’s mission: to capture firsthand digital images of Greek New Testament manuscripts with high resolution digital equipment. By cooperating with likeminded libraries, CSNTM accomplishes the preservation and presentation of cultural heritage artifacts via the utilization of the advances of technology. Details of collaboration, digitization procedures, and preservation and presentation practices are explored, providing a glimpse into this world of artifact digitization. The article then turns to the consideration of ways to improve both digitization and the end user’s experience. While CSNTM engages libraries, archivists, researchers, and students, supportive partners serve to facilitate the work. All are essential, enabling CSNTM to preserve and provide access to timeless treasures.

Amplifying the idea of religious experience as occurring within an encompassing “religious province of meaning” and developing the personal character of the experience of God in the Abrahamic religious traditions, this paper argues that mystics in those traditions experience God “objectively.” Their experience of God is that of experiencing God as what Alfred Schutz called a “Consociate,” despite the lack of God’s bodily presence. Such a phenomenological account of religious experience converges with the description by analytic philosopher William Alston of religious experience as an objectively given, non-sensual perception of God, even though the personal Consociate model is preferable to the perceptual one, given the Abrahamic traditions. Conversely, Alston and Alvin Plantinga show how ascending levels of rational justification of religious experience are possible with reference to the experiential level, and such levels can be accommodated within the Schutzian “theoretical province of meaning” in its collaboration with the religious province. Both the Consociate and Schelerian/personalist accounts of God resist any explaining away of religious experience as mere phantasy, and the religious finite province of meaning provides a more comprehensive explanation of religious experience than either Alston’s or Plantinga’s approaches. However, the strategy of envisioning religious experience as taking place within a finite province of meaning is more noetic in character than Scheler’s view of an eidetically elaborated noematic absolute reality that precedes the rise of consciousness itself and that counterbalances the noetic portrayal of religious experience.

The Syrian bishop Theophilus of Antioch said: «Show me your man, and I will show you my God!». This sentence is a way of conveying that man is the image of God. Philosophical thought has attempted to grasp this image through the representation, which suggests the representation as both visual model and act of thought. The image as representation of thought is the method through which both God and man have been thought. This is confirmed by Immanuel Kant who, in the ‘transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason , showed that metaphysics thought both man (transcendental paralogism) and God (transcendental Ideal) as an ‘idea’. In contrast, Husserl’s phenomenology opened a new method by conceiving every image, and therefore also the image of God and man, not as a representation of thought but as a ‘phenomenon’ that manifests itself. The phenomenological method, based on the imperative “zu den Sachen selbst!”, would be adequate to grasp human essence that, like the divine one, is spiritual, indefinable and unrepresentable. In order to think this unrepresentability, the present paper investigates the work of Jean-Luc Marion, who thought the unrepresentable image of God and, therefore, of man, by distinguishing the image as an idol and as an icon. Above all, we will try to show that phenomenology allows us to grasp the image of God and man as an icon that cannot be constructed by thought.

This essay consists of two parts. The first part deals with the birth of a dual anthropology in Edith Stein’s thought, whereas the second part treats the teleological origin of this duality. In order to explain how she elaborated her dual anthropology two themes become intertwined in my investigation: the question of the feminine in western culture and the teleological question of the human being as an image of God. In my discussion of the first theme, I examine both the historical development of the feminist movement, maintaining that the birth of the feminist movement in the West has its roots in Christianity, as well as the theoretical reflection of Edith Stein on a dual anthropology, which becomes ultimately linked to a theological framework and, hence, to the idea of “image.” Here, we have to ask: What is the meaning of “image”? In what sense is the human being an image of God? Following the foregoing claim, I argue that Stein’s dual anthropology is very helpful in our time to clarify some questions that arise in connection with “gender theory”.

This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of the argument in The First Discourse of Part 2 of Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination . Specifically, this argument is considered with regard to temporal extension of its logos, i.e., the succession of logical steps. Contrary to traditional views of Suhrawardī as a Neoplatonizing proponent of the primacy of essence over existence, the steps of his argument convey a much more nuanced picture in which ligh t emerges as the main metaphysical principle. First, Suhra wardī explicates full evidentiality in visible light (which is the most patent, ’ aẓhar, from the Arabic root ẓ- h-r = ‘to appear, be [made] manifest’): this light gives us the world as “this-there”; and second, as self-evidentiality ( ẓuhūru-hu , ‘being obvious to itself by itself’) in the first-person consciousness of the knower. Suhrawardī accesses these modes by reduction(s) which liberate the transcendental character of light. The correlation in the evidential mode of light between the knower and the objects serves as a ground for the claims of transcendental unity of the self and the world, and as a condition of possibility for knowledge. A juxtaposition of this approach with phenomenological philosophy suggests that in Suhrawardī’s analysis, the evidentiality of visual light plays a role of a new universal a priori. I show that under the phenomenological reduction, this a priori participates in constitution of ontological validities; and within the transcendental empiricism of the physics of light, this a priori underlies the construction of causality. Thereby, the Philosophy of Illumination suggests a new horizon of entry into transcendental phenomenological philosophy. The paper also contains a justification of a phenomenological reading of Suhrawardī’s work, including explanation of the historical reduction.

This paper concentrates on the transformative impact of religious conversions. I understand religious conversions here as all individual spiritual transformations that either create an essentially new religious experience or substantially intensify an existing religiosity. The transformative impact of these transformations consists not only in modifying life perspectives or values, but also (and more substantially) in altering the very structure of personal experience. They can even bring significant changes in the phenomenal character of individual life-worlds, which are then experienced as perceived “differently”. This reflects on the possibilities the phenomenological method possesses to describe (and understand) these changes, and mainly discusses the applicability of Husserl’s analyses in Ideas 2 of the double constitution of body. On this basis, I suggest an explanatory model of transformative localizing/layering.

The central question of this paper revolves around the problem of representation. Following Jacques Derrida and his critique of representation, this paper will interconnect two, at first sight distinct, topics: Christianity and the world of media. For Derrida, Christianity stands behind our common understanding of representation, whereas the media are the major driving force of any representation today. The central argument of this paper is to unfold this link between Christianity and representation and thus to elaborate on the idea of representation in relation to the end of Christianity announced by Derrida. Firstly, I will review Derrida’s account on the logic of representation. Derrida deems Christianity to be responsible for the logic of representation discernible in today’s media world and offers a devastating critique of the concept. Secondly, I will contextualize Derrida’s approach by pointing out the tension between the modern and postmodern perspectives on representation. Thirdly, I will return to a close reading of Derrida. Fourthly, I will offer a critique of Derrida’s critique and will look further at the possible meanings of ‘the end of Christianity.’

Referring to the Platonic division between the transcendent and the immanent world as but a manifestation of the former, Søren Kierkegaard grasped the phenomenal character of the earthly world. According to Kierkegaard, in Transcendence, God is, and the transcendent Ideas exist as patterns of beings given to us in temporality, the fontal phenomenal character of which (as manifestations) intertwines with the real mundane ontological character. Kierkegaard argued against the Hegelian theory of dialectics, as well as the pathos theory, presenting dialecticity and patheticness as two ways in which the existing subject refers to the immanent world of temporality and the spiritual realm of Transcendence. The process of phenomenalisation, accomplished along with the existence of all earthly beings, is accompanied by a singular, subjective response of each individual to the immanent world. This response assumes the form of a dialectical balanced reaction, or a pathetic, hyperbolic, in the aesthetic, ethical and religious stages of individual existence (in the religious stage, it is a response to the world of Transcendence). The paper is dedicated to discussing the relations of the process of the phenomenalisation of Transcendence to its individual, religious responses, particularly the relations to the pathetic type of religious response, as indicated by Kierkegaard.

The phenomenon of sacrifice has been analyzed by Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bataille and many other philosophers. In my paper I intend to examine this phenomenon from the phenomenological point of view as outlined by Jan Patočka, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-Luc Marion. With their help I differentiate several kinds of sacrifice (strategic, moral, political, and religious), but above all, I am interested in the limits of sacrifice. Provided that the fields of morality, politics and religion are opened by sacrifice, is there any morality, politics and religion without one? And if so, what is the meaning of morality, politics and religion that are not based on some kind of sacrifice? These questions seem essential in our time, when the meaning of sacrifice is compromised by acts of terrorism. It is relatively easy to denounce terrorism and its propaganda, which uses the concept of martyrdom, as an inauthentic approach to the experience of sacrifice (Marion). But how can we break its spell if we believe that sacrifice brings our existence to completeness (Patočka)? How can we avoid inauthentic forms of sacrifice, if we believe that without sacrifice we must fall into nihilism and indifference?

The article first outlines Jean-Yves Lacoste’s phenomenological description of “liturgy”, i.e. the encounter between God and the human being. It argues that Lacoste’s rejection of the religious apriori on the side of the human being and emphasis on God’s transcendence and otherness leads to decontextualization of the experience of Christian faith, as his strongly future eschatology does not allow for the real transformation of both the individual and social lives of believers. In the second step, the article gives two counterexamples to Lacoste’s attitude that represent an attempt to recontextualize the experience of Christian faith within concrete historical and cultural coordinates. The examples come from the work of American theologian William Cavanaugh and Czech philosopher Robert Kalivoda, whose focus lies in the hermeneutics of a sacramental experience and the question of the history-making of Christian faith. Cavanaugh recontextualizes the understanding of the sacramental experience in terms of globalization. Kalivoda interprets the transformation of Christian eschatological ideas into a program of real social changes with special attention devoted to the Hussite revolution of the 15th century and the Hussite conception of the Lord’s Supper. The article concludes that Kalivoda’s emphasis on present eschatology stands in opposition to Lacoste’s emphasis on future eschatology, whereas Cavanaugh holds a middle position with balanced emphasis on both poles of Christian eschatology.

In this essay, I outline my view of an epistemic distinction between philosophy and theology along the lines of different evidential authorities operating in the two disciplines. I then go on to suggest that this epistemic view allows for a recognition of different discursive loyalties. In distinction from what I term “Plantinga-type” views, I contend that my broadly postmodern Thomistic account is preferable because of the way in which it better reflects the existential reality of a plurality of loyalties in our lived existence. In this way, I offer a defense of an existential relationship of philosophy to theology that serves as increased warrant for the epistemic account.

This paper explores the implications of Kierkegaard’s concern with the existential meaning of Christianity on his treatment of the relationship between philosophy and theology. It will be argued that Kierkegaard offers an existential corrective to the predominantly scholarly-scientific engagement with this debate, to point to the much more serious matter of the individual’s existence and the impossible difficulty and challenge that the religious sphere poses to the human being, both epistemologically and ethically. This will be shown by taking into account Kierkegaard’s definitions of the terms philosophy, theology, and Christianity, as well as the distinction he draws between objective and subjective philosophy: Whereas Kierkegaard separates from Christianity what can be termed objective philosophy (in particular Hegelian-speculative philosophy), subjective philosophy (specifically Socratic philosophy) is revealed to have a much more complex relationship to the religious sphere. Socratic philosophy’s relationship to Christianity is ultimately kept in a dynamic tension of similarity and dissimilarity, or analogy and contrast, which reflects the difficulty of Christian existence. As such, this reconceptualised debate, for Kierkegaard, does not belong within a scholarly academic context, but rather annihilates such inquiry.

My task in this paper is to study Sartre’s ontology as a godless theology. The urgency of defending freedom and responsibility in the face of determinism called for an overarching first principle, a role that God used to play. I first show why such a principle is important and how Sartre filled the void that God had left with a solipsist consciousness. Then I characterize Sartre’s ontology of this consciousness as a “dualist monism”, explaining how it supports his radical conception of freedom. Then, by assessing Sartre’s dualist monism through a theological lens, I disclose an inconsistency in his thought concerning the idea that the in-itself is a deterministic plenitude, which presumes a theos different from consciousness and hence threatens monism. Finally I argue that his inconsistency originates from the finitude of Sartre’s first principle and analyze this finitude by examining the modes of temporality it implies. The entire trajectory problematizes the practice of theo-logy, the idea that a theos stands at the origin of the “logic” (organization or intelligibility) of everything such that all must be conceived under the logos of the theos . While Sartre forcefully criticized the theology of the infinite, his was nonetheless a theology of finitude.

This article suggests that Rudolf Bultmann can be seen to reconfigure Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology in terms of a transformation of philosophy by theology. In that sense, though Bultmann is often understood to be in line with the early Heidegger on this issue, it seeks to think with Bultmann beyond Heidegger by showing how Bultmann’s theology, precisely as theology, can be used to address critiques (articulated by contemporary French phenomenologists) of Heidegger’s understanding of the related notions of possibility and event. In doing so, it will become evident that, although he himself sets up his understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology as fitting Heidegger’s broader methodological framework, we can nevertheless find in Bultmann the keys to the thinking of philosophy in relation to theology in terms of the transformation of one by the other that this article seeks to develop.

In Berdyaev’s notion of freedom the borders between theology and philosophy seem to fall down. The same existential concern for spiritual freedom is at the heart of both theology and philosophy. From the point of view of existential philosophy as Berdyaev understands it, only a theologically informed account of freedom, could do justice to the concept of freedom. But a freedom determined by God is not what Berdyaev had in mind as representing authentic freedom. It was necessary for him to reinterpret Jakob Boehme’s concept of Ungrund to arrive at a notion of uncreated freedom that both God and man share. But the articulation of this freedom, and an account of it within our fallen world could only be done as a philosophical pursuit. To arrive at the authentic understanding of spiritual freedom, that is theologically informed, Berdyaev believes that a philosophical rejection of erroneous views of freedom should take place. The articulation of the notion of freedom that does justice to the complexity of the existential situation of both God and man is not for Berdyaev a purpose in itself. The purpose is the arrival at a non-objectified knowledge of freedom that would inform a theologically committed existential attitude.

While the French philosopher Paul Ricœur is not usually thought of as an existentialist, during his early career he engaged deeply with existentialist thought, and published two articles on the relationship between existentialism and Christian faith. Ricœur’s attempts to relate philosophy and theology often led to great personal distress, which he occasionally referred to as “controlled schizophrenia,” in which he struggled to remain faithful to both philosophical and theological discourse without compromising one for the sake of the other. This essay first explores the influence of existentialist philosophy on Ricœur before surveying how Ricœur understood existentialism, and how in his view it transforms the relationship between philosophy and theology. It then shows how Ricœur is ultimately able to retain his “dual allegiance” to both discourses through active hope in how the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo testifies to their original and final unity.

There is an ambivalence and indecision at the heart of Michel Henry’s phenomenological ontology of life that this article seeks to resolve. Either “Being is a phenomenon only when it is at a distance from itself” or “the immediate is Being itself as originally given to itself in immanence.” 1 The decision is, simply put, between distance or immediacy. In order to address this indecision, I put forward an hypothetical expressive interpretation of Henry’s phenomenology of life, drawing upon Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of post-Cartesian metaphysics. The metaphysical language of expression is used (a) to make clear the internal structure of ‘auto-affection’ — a key concept for Henry’s phenomenology of life — as well as (b) to correct essentialist readings of this put forward by Dominique Janicaud and (c) broadly Hegelian interpretations put forward by François-David Sebbah. This expressive reading clarifies the ontological significance of life and auto-affection, showing more clearly the way the living self relates to Life or God as a dynamic movement and flux, without distance, gap, or transcendence. Through the clarification of Henry’s ontology of life in terms of expression a further ambiguity with regard to the theological significance and status of Life is revealed. The identification of an immanent and auto-affective Life with God in the early works appears closer to a Spinozist God than the later, Christian writings otherwise suggest. It is possible for the immediate, inner experience of auto-affective life to be as much secular as religious. I discuss this in the final part of this article.

Karl Barth’s and Jean-Luc Marion’s theories of revelation, though prominent and popular, are often criticized by both theologians and philosophers for effacing the human subject’s epistemic integrity. I argue here that, in fact, both Barth and Marion appeal to revelation in an attempt to respond to a tendency within philosophy to coerce thought. Philosophy, when it claims to be able to access a universal, absolute truth within history, degenerates into ideology. By making conceptually possible some ‚evental’ phenomena that always evade a priori epistemic conditions, Barth’s and Marion’s theories of revelation relativize all philosophical knowledge, rendering any ideological claim to absolute truth impossible. The difference between their two theories, then, lies in how they understand the relationship between philosophy and theology. For Barth, philosophy’s attempts to make itself absolute is a produce of sinful human vanity; its corrective is thus an authentic revealed theology, which Barth articulates in Christian, dogmatic terms. Marion, on the other hand, equipped with Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, highlights one specific kind of philosophizing—metaphysics—as generative of ideology. To counter metaphysics, Marion draws heavily on Barth’s account of revelation but secularizes it, reinterpreting the ‚event’ as the saturated phenomenon. Revelation’s unpredictability is thus preserved within Marion’s philosophy, but is no longer restricted to the appearing of God. Both understandings of revelation achieve the same epistemological result, however. Reality can never be rendered transparent to thought; within history, all truth is provisional. A concept of revelation drawn originally from Christian theology thus, counterintuitively, is what secures philosophy’s right to challenge and critique the pre-given, a hermeneutic freedom I suggest is the meaning of sola scriptura .

In The Brothers Karamazov , Dostoyevsky illustrates that encounters with evil do not solely impact agents’ beliefs about God (or God’s existence). Evil impacts people on an emotional level as well. Authors like Hasker and van Inwagen sometimes identify the emotional impact of evil with the “existential” problem of evil. For better or worse, the existential version of the problem is often set aside in contemporary philosophical discussions. In this essay, I rely on Robert Roberts’ account of emotions as “concern-based construals” to show that theistic philosophers can effectively address the existential problem (and so, the problem should not be set aside). In fact, addressing the emotional impact of evil is crucial, I argue, given that resolving just the impact of evil on agents’ beliefs about God constitutes an incomplete response to the problem of evil.

Can panentheism cope with the problem of evil? This problem is often understood as one for classical theists, who maintain that the cosmos, together with its evils, was created by an all-powerful and benevolent God. For classical theists need to reconcile the world’s evils with divine creation. But corresponding problems re-emerge for theologies of both pantheistic and panentheistic kinds. Thus a problem arises for panentheists, with their teachings about a close relation between God and the cosmos. The closer the relation, the more intense the problem. Thus panentheists who regard the world as necessary to or part of God must hold that its evils are likewise necessary to or part of God. I explore in this paper whether panentheism can overcome the corresponding problem. This exploration involves sifting different varieties of panentheism. While for some varieties the problem is insoluble, this turns out to be less so for others, which retain central features of classical theism, while stressing interaction between God and the created world. In particular, grounds will be offered for holding that the version of panentheism put forward by Jürgen Moltmann and by Arthur Peacocke is defensible and can overcome this problem.

Existentialism centres reflection upon the bodily existence of the human person. Generally, however, theological anthropology has struggled to manage developments in biological and psychological sciences that have made clear the pluriformity of human embodiment. The work of the social sciences has also increased the visibility of minority, disadvantaged, or neglected persons. Theological anthropology must begin to conceive of an inclusive, non-static understanding of human nature that fully acknowledges the integrity and the diverse identities of the human subject. To riposte, this article utilises the interplay between phenomenology and theology in the work of the contemporary philosopher-theologian Jean-Luc Marion. Marion undeniably sees the root of the human in the concrete free person; he recognises an ever-receding, indefinable horizon towards which the incomprehensible existence of the subjective phenomenon is universally oriented. In this article I focus on how a combination of the theology of the subject and its existential orientation, realised through the freedom of incomprehensibility à la Marion, may provide a dynamic basis for understanding human nature at a time when subjective diversity is ever more asserted.

In this paper, I examine how Gianni Vattimo, in using the terms “weak thought” aims to promote caritas in intellectual life by converging, however paradoxically, Heideggerian Verwindung and Nietzschean nihilism with Pauline kenosi s. In line with René Girard’s postulation that Christianity rejects the sacred, Vattimo classifies the idea of a transcendent divinity as Aristotelian rather than Christian, arguing that the Incarnation, as an expression of caritas and humility, is incompatible with the idea of divine transcendence. Based on this perception, Vattimo argues that Nietzsche’s dictum that “God is dead” carries the same philosophical meaning as the kenotic doctrine of the birth of God as man. Furthermore, Vattimo redefines the Heideggerian Verwindung , a subtle response rigidity in the structures of metaphysics, in terms of kenotic caritas . Vattimo’s hermeneutic work over several decades have enabled this improbable convergence of methodologies and worldviews, upon which he bases his argument that postmodernism, in its weakening of all transcendental axiomatic claims, may be understood to share the “desacralizing thrust of Christianity.”

The authors argue that there is an epistemological crisis of conservative Islamic scholarship and Muslim mind, rooted in the centuries-old confinement of a role for reason within strict limits, and in the disappearance of rationalistic discursive theology ( kalam ) as a dynamic science. Moreover, epistemological crisis is exemplified by seriously insufficient level of protection of human rights under Sharia when judged by contemporary principles of human rights. This crisis demands a necessity of undertaking epistemological reform, which denotes the incorporation of international standards of human rights and justice into the epistemology and methodology of producing Islamic norms ( usul al-fiqh ). It is argued that the key epistemological premises of rationalistic Islam, such as acceptance that human reason can find goodness and badness independently from revelation and non-acceptance of ethical voluntarism, may offer a good ground to make epistemological reform, which would induce the Muslims to critically approach and reinterpret the pre-modern religious interpretations and to construct an Islamic legal and ethical system that is appropriate for the context of the 21th century. In the end, reason, being the human capacity for shaping reality in a humane way, is indispensable to read religious sources from a historical-metaphorical point of view.

Kierkegaard understands the human self as a process of becoming that is situated in a dialectical relation between sin and faith. The chief task of each human being is to become a true self, instead of assuming a fraudulent identity. This authentic selfhood is grounded in the possibility to be oneself, a condition that is established in faith. Yet this achievement of true selfhood presupposes a state of sin in which the self is regarded as necessarily existing. Thus the aim of this essay is to demonstrate how Kierkegaard argues for a novel modern conception of the self as a dynamic interplay between possibility and necessity, sin and faith, in his attempt to respond to the spiritlessness of his age by vindicating the truth of Christianity.

This article argues that Wolfhart Pannenberg’s doctrine of resurrection can be demonstrated as science. I utilize the so-called “soft” sciences (history and anthropology) alongside the “hard” sciences (cosmology and neuroscience) to demonstrate the rationality of the ostensibly miraculous resurrection. In the discussion, I argue against empiricists who posit the impossibility of the resurrection on account of analogy to favor Pannenberg’s approach of contingency and human exocentricity. Paralleling the shift in Pannenberg’s own theological approach from anthropology to the Trinity, I also argue that Pannenberg’s focus on the hard sciences in his later career reflects his concern for a more “objective” approach. Related to the hard sciences, I take the principle of continuity/discontinuity which touches on issues such as contingency, field theory, time and eternity, and various cosmological theories to demonstrate the scientific possibility of the resurrection that is both this worldly and other worldly. Moreover, using neuroscientific insights, I argue that the resurrection is not an immortality of the soul but a new body, consistent with modern science’s emphasis on physicalism, lifted by a scientifically explained exocentric field. In the discussion, I argue that Pannenberg is a modified Kuhnian who underscores evidence and facts but also the context from which they emerge.