Volume 65, Issue 3 - Special Issue: New Directions in Lutheran Christologies

The paper discusses the question to what extent one can speak of a genus tapeinoticum in Luther, or of a communication of the properties of nature to nature that is both direct and symmetrical. The thesis is that in the 1540 s Luther significantly modifies his earlier rejection of the idea of a passibility of divine nature as such by means of the distinctions between ‘concretum’ and ‘abstractum’ as well as between ‘relativum’ and ‘absolutum’. The boundary between passibility and impassibility does not run between the Son on the one hand and the Father and the Spirit on the other, but between the deus relativus and what might be called the ‘absolute-relative’ God.

This article compares Luther’s understanding of the unity of Christ’s person with that of his theological successors, focusing on Martin Chemnitz and Johann Gerhard. It argues that Luther’s more apophatic approach to the communicatio idiomatum and his heirs’ elaborate doctrine of the three genera of the communication do not stand in a straightforward relationship of continuity. To be sure, both are historically found in the context of Eucharistic polemics. Yet Luther’s perspective on the communicatio is driven by a desire to give expression to Christ-for-me specifically as the subject and agent of his promise; it has its driving force in the ontology of the promise as the essence of the gospel. By contrast, Luther’s successors are preoccupied with the ability of Christ’s assumed human nature to receive divine properties in the hope of shoring up the presence of Christ’s body in the Lord’s Supper. In the end, it is Luther who succeeds in presenting a more successful account of a co-extensive and internally congruent understanding of Christ’s divine and human agency, whereas his successors’ account of the unity of Christ remains undermined by intractable and ever-threatening divergence.

This paper maintains that at the heart of the post-Reformation debates over the extra Calvinisticum lies the question of what it means to name God’s presence in the world – that is, to say where God is. Because the Lutheran position insists that there can be no proper identification of God’s presence in the world that does not take its bearings from talk about Jesus’ presence, it serves as a means of preventing Christian God-talk from becoming detached from the flesh-and-blood realities of human existence. In this way, the denial of the extra Calvinisticum is a corollary of a theology of the cross – that is, the principle that talk about God is normed by the concrete reality of Jesus. At the same time, the Lutheran genus maiestaticum is rejected as making just the sort of move to which Luther himself objected in the doctrine of transubstantiation: a metaphysical explanation of Jesus’ presence in the world rather than a simple appeal to miracle.

Do “majestic Christologies” violate the principle of non-competitive relationship? Majestic Christologies are diverse according to conceptual delineation, but share the common affirmation that Jesus’ humanity participates in the divine majesty in a transformative manner. This notion seems to transgress the principle of non-competitive relationship by behaving as if the fullness of Christ’s deity requires a displacement or transmogrification of his creatureliness. This paper argues that majestic Christology does not necessarily contradict the non-competitive principle by emphasizing the elasticity of theological anthropology from an eschatological point of view.

Sixteenth-century Christological debates sought to clarify the philosophical implications of the hypostatic union thesis formulated at Chalcedon. The genus maiesticatum , in particular, permitted that Christ’s created human nature could be said to possess divine attributes and powers. Other systematic regions like theological anthropology were implicated in this concept as well; the elevation of Christ’s human nature provided a conceptual framework for understanding the way divine indwelling might elevate human moral capacities in the elect. Medieval Scholastics after Lombard sought to clarify what type of relation indwelling might be. Was it a hypostatic union as in Christology or something else? At the start of the sixteenth-century, Protestant reformers inherited this question. Their engagement with it demonstrates the systematic implications of Christological metaphysics and clarifies conceptual continuities and shifts that occurred across this historical moment of reform.

The early nineteenth century was a time between empires in German-speaking lands, following the collapse of the holy Roman empire in 1806. This was also the time at which modern concepts of nations, nationalism, and the state entered theological discourse, bound together with emerging notions of world historical progress. From this time until the First World War, the task of conceptualizing national identity and the nature of the ‘Christian state’ became a pressing theological problem. This essay seeks to locate Schleiermacher’s reflections on the Christian state within this developing problematic. Schleiermacher’s philosophical and theological works closely engaged emerging ideas of the nation, state, and historical progress. However, he departed from the more totalizing affirmations of national spirit and the Christian state of many of his contemporaries, arguing for a more limited conception of the state as a point of transition in the ongoing historical development of the reign of God.

By contextualising the striking similarities in Feuerbach and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of sin as infinite qualitative difference, and the related question of the individual and the species as a shared response to the Hegelian Entzweiung , this article seeks to offer a new framework for understanding Feuerbach’s critique of Christian theology and of Kierkegaard’s famous articulation of the infinite qualitative difference as simultaneously ontological, hamartiological, and soteriological. It argues that Kierkegaard offers a modification of the Feuerbachian account to argue against Feuerbach’s conclusion that the Christian doctrine of sin negates qualitative differences between individual humans, and to conversely affirm that sin differentiates not just God and humans, but each single individual too. Kierkegaard might be said to at once uphold Feuerbach’s critique of Hegelian theology, while inverting Feuerbach’s anti-theological programme by harnessing the ambiguities that appear in Feuerbach’s account of sin. It is thereby shown how both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard make use of Hegelian logic, both through their formal application of the concepts of quality and quantity, as well as their creative appropriation of the notion of Entzweiung .