Volume 12, Issue 3 -

Why is global economic governance often marked by controversies among EU member states despite their commitment to joint action? European members of the G20 diverge over public debt to stimulate growth and over global trade imbalances. These issues express differences in economic interests, such as competitiveness, as well as ideational divergences regarding deficit spending and the role of the government in steering the economy. Therefore, domestic politics theories seem to constitute a necessary complement to integration theories in explaining European governments’ preferences. In applying the societal approach, I argue that domestic value-based ideas and material interests shape governmental preferences in international political economy. In doing so, ideas prevail when fundamental economic policy issues such as public debt are at stake, while interests prevail, when governance directly affects the costs and benefits of specific economic sectors. These arguments are analysed by comparing the domestic politics of British, French, German and Italian positions towards two policy debates in the G20.

This article revisits in today’s global setting the debate among international relations scholars over the so-called Kantian or democratic peace. In particular, it argues that findings made by S. M. Mitchell in a seminal 2002 article in the American Journal of Political Science regarding the diffusion of norms via third party conflict resolution relied upon a questionable methodology and now require belated revision. An alternative measure of norm diffusion would rely upon the proportion of democratic states, particularly contiguous states, in a given region. Moreover, a more detailed look at such diffusion after 1945 suggests important differences over the viability of democratic peace, especially regarding state behavior outside the Western Hemisphere.

Is the world headed for a repeat of the de-globalization of the interwar period? Stefan Link challenges some widespread assumptions about the history of globalization and suggests that this time really is different.

What are the origins and nature of today’s most prevalent forms of Western populism? Where do they carry the most risks? This essay offers a brief survey and outlook for populism in Europe and the United States.

Should a discussion of populism be concerned with populism—along with revulsion of its various extremisms (perhaps along with hints of social and psychopathology and hence, implicit endorsement of ‘moderate’ positions)? Or should it rather be concerned with the failure of institutions and the misbehavior of elites in a world in which 8 billionaires own as much as half the world population? Option a) will yield a totally different and probably somewhat more predictable discussion than option b), which may include ‘from bad to worse’. According to option c) different types of populism—including ‘pluto-populism’—should generate different treatments. This discussion follows options b) and c).

Howard Chiang traces the evolution of a course on global sexuality, intimacy, and the body.