Volume 8, Issue 1

Sexual assault leaves the victims with unbearable emotional pain from the experience. The unwanted aggression against their freewill causes them to suffer physically and mentally. On top of that, they also have to fight to be treated fairly and respectfully during their court trials. There has been some controversy regarding rape prosecution in the Islamic legal system. The reason for this controversy is that the rape victim would usually be either charged with zina because of her confession, or committing qadhf, as a result of her failure to provide four male eyewitnesses. This paper aims at investigating the fundamental legal rights of rape victims who complain of being raped, to be defended fairly, and to get exemption from punishment as provided in Islamic law. This paper also seeks to investigate the admissibility of the individual testimony of the victim against the rapist. This paper suggests that proving rape is not similar to proving zina, because a rape victim who lodges a report or complains of her ordeal of being raped should not be treated the same as a person who confesses to zina. Proving rape is also different from accusing the rapist with committing zina (qadhf). This study will explore opinions and arguments of classical Muslim scholars of Islamic jurisprudence from various schools of thought.

This essay addresses the “cultural legitimacy” of human rights norms in Bangladesh and suggests some strategies for Bangladeshi human rights advocates to effectively disseminate and strengthen human rights standards among their constituents. Abdullahi An-Na‘im argues that human rights will never be secure in a country until they are seen as culturally legitimate, and consequently “human rights advocates in the Muslim world must work within the framework of Islam to be effective” (1990, 15). Taking this idea as its starting point, this article draws on the idea of public reason and the development of politics in the West to suggest some ways that An-Na‘im’s imperative might be realized in practice.

How should judges deal with the manifestation of religious symbols in public educational institutions? In light of the important role of human rights in our legal and political system, courts should grant maximum protection under the freedom of religion or belief. The central thesis of this article is that the European Court of Human Rights fails to live up to this standard. In order to reach this conclusion, the article analyzes relevant case law of the European Court and compares its case law with that of the high courts of Canada and South Africa. In addition, the article assesses the case law of all three courts from the angle of interpretation theory and particularly Cass R. Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism. Adoption of a more consistently minimalist methodology by the European Court might lead to a greater protection granted to individuals and groups. However, a wide and deep ruling is first required to overturn the current line of reasoning. The European Court can draw inspiration from Canada and South Africa for such a judgment.

This study highlights various totalitarian and undemocratic practices in which Bangladesh’s current Awami League-led coalition regime engages. It shows that since its inception in early 2009, the regime has tried to mobilize and manipulate public support from within through—among other means—creating the discourse of “war crimes” and to obtain international support through the discourse of “Islamism” and terrorism. Although “a secular plan” to combat and replace “Islamism” may soothe the nerves of many in the international community, its deployment in Bangladesh has paradoxically produced a dangerous culture of disappearances and extrajudicial killings, infringements on freedom of speech and the stifling of dissenting voices, and the interception of opposition programs and the torture of opposition leaders and activists. The regime has also made a mockery of the law and the country’s judicial system. Many commentators believe that the country’s law courts are now simply an extension of the regime’s political clout. In these circumstances, political repression continues unabated, and victims of persecution are left with inadequate legal recourse. In the name of combating “Islamic terrorism,” Bangladesh’s ruling regime has resorted to a reign of terror that is in many respects tantamount to what we know as fascism.

More than a quarter of the global population of two billion children live in Islamic countries; therefore, their protection is vital while a handful of them are suffering from lack of hygiene, education, and poverty. The current armed conflict in different ways also has an effect and seriously impacts children as victims and associates in armed groups. Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as a collective voice of its 57 members, initiated a series of efforts in this regard. Islamic texts and traditions show significant importance for child protection, but what has been done until today by OIC as a main intergovernmental Organization guided by Islamic principles, values and norms, is not sufficient. Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam is the first human rights binding document adopted by OIC as part of consecutive efforts of OIC to promote protection of children. Although it is regarded as an important step, its adequacy for protection of children affected by armed conflicts is under question. Furthermore, in comparison to International Humanitarian Law and Convention on the Rights of the Child, it does not reflect proportionately and further provisions for children affected, with regard to the extent and the dimensions of conflicts in Islamic countries.

Many scholars, Muslim and Western, struggle to understand the concept of human rights in Islam and its status in contemporary Islamic societies. There is much debate because often the discussion of “universal” human rights does not address the subject of religion at all. Furthermore, the language of “universal” human rights, as presented in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is not explicit in Islam’s primary and secondary sources, including the Qur’an and Hadith. The Rights of God: Islam, Human Rights, and Comparative Ethics attempts to address this sensitive and largely unexplored relationship between Islam and human rights, by further focusing on, what the author calls, “comparative religious ethics,” which “seeks to understand ethical values across religions and cultures.” To demonstrate diversity of opinions on this issue, Irene Oh studies and compares the religious ethics of Abul A’la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, and ‘Abdolkarim Soroush. This text opens the door for further research to investigate into the issue, and uncovers that “universal” ideas of human rights have found their way into Islamic thought.

Olivier Roy argues that the separation of culture and faith—by secular as well as religious actors—has fuelled a "holy ignorance" which paves the way for fundamentalist claims as "authentic." This review draws attention to the consequences for human rights in the Muslim world, especially with regard to gender and religious freedom. While agreeing with Roy's overall thesis, the review finds it too sweeping in its assumption that religious traditions can be grounded at all outside of some cultural foundations. Further, both secular and religious forces have much to gain from—as well as contribute to—a pluralism that offers the strongest prospects for the cultural legitimacy that human rights needs as universalist project.

In 2011, the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and later Syria struggled to overthrow their despotic regimes and bring about radical political change. However, to date, little discussion has revolved around the role of long-standing assumptions about political change and human rights in the Arab world in prolonging the lifespan of these collapsing regimes. The first of these assumptions claimed that authoritarian rulers were the guarantors of stability in nations throughout the region. Second was the assumption that Islamists were the sole alternative to authoritarian regimes in the region. These uprisings also proved false the theory that democracy and civil and political rights were not priorities for peoples of the Arab world. Finally, the fourth assumption to be debunked is the claim that the people of the region are not ready for a democratic system that respects human rights because the religion of the majority—Islam—is incompatible with democratic values and human rights.