Volume 18, Issue 1

This article explores how scholarship can be put to work by specialists penning evidence-based policies seeking peaceful resolutions to long-standing, complex, and so-far intractable conflict in the Malay-Muslim dominated provinces of South Thailand. I contend that more is required than mere empirical data, and that the existing analysis of this conflict often lacks theoretical ballast and overlooks the wider historical context in which Bangkok pursued policies impacting its ethnolinguistically, and ethnoreligiously diverse citizens. I demonstrate the utility of both interacting with what social theorists have written about what “religion” and language do—and do not—have in common, and the relative importance of both in sub-national conflicts, and comparative historical analysis. The case studies that this article critically introduces compare chapters of ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious chauvinism against a range of minorities, including Malay-Muslim citizens concentrated in the southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. These include Buddhist ethnolinguistic minorities in Thailand’s Northeast, and Catholic communities during the second world war widely referred to as the high tide of Thai ethno-nationalism. I argue that these revealing aspects of the southern Malay experience need to be contextualized—even de-exceptionalized.

After almost two decades in power, R. T. Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have established authoritarian and Islamist governance in Turkey, which has adversely affected gender equality and women’s rights. So much so, that in 2009 the European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that there is a climate conducive to domestic violence in Turkey (Opuz v. Turkey). Despite Erdoğan withdrawing Turkey unconstitutionally from the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), the government cannot withdraw from the state’s duty to protect its citizens from the criminal acts of private individuals. By using international and regional organisations’ approaches to positive obligations and due diligence as a measure, the article addresses whether Turkey is fulfilling its duty of protecting women from the violent conduct of others. It is concluded that the government is failing in its positive obligations and instead, is reinforcing the climate through its discourse and practices that strengthen a national tolerance of violence against women and the national authorities’ reluctance to address it, thus allowing for impunity of its perpetrators.

The member states of the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 unanimously adopted the resolution on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to save citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Since adoption, the norm has been invoked in Libya, South Sudan, Yemen, and Syria, nonetheless, the UN refrains to respond to the genocide committed in the Jammu & Kashmir and triggering a greater sense of anxiety. In this context, the present paper elucidates the factors behind the UN failure. It asks why the UN failed to call R2P despite systematic crimes against humanity in Kashmir. What factors or forces preclude the UN to invoke R2P? The paper argues that the inability of the UN to invoke R2P is a consequence of systemic and domestic factors. The Indo-US strategic partnership, materialism, and New Delhi’s influence in the international system are obstructing the UN’s ability to play a decisive role. Meanwhile, the economic and military potential of India and its regional influence forbid the international community to dissuade India not to commit genocide in Jammu & Kashmir. So the high politics of materialism and national interests override the norm of human rights and humanity.

The article investigates the development of discourses related to freedom of religion and discrimination against religious minority in current Indonesia by identifying the discourse constructions of Ahmadiyya in various texts and talks produced and disseminated by government institution and the Indonesian Council of Ulama (the MUI). This study aims to reveal these institutions’ views and perspectives on Ahmadiyya issue using various discourse strategies. The data analysed are some legal proclamations issued and personal views delivered by the officials of these two institutions. The CDA theoretical framework employed is to examine the positive-self and negative-other presentations. The finding reveals that the issue of Ahmadiyya is addressed through discourses related to Indonesian national interest and discourses related to religious matters. in these discourses, the two institutions and their officials present themselves positively and portray the Ahmadiyya sect negatively. The sect followers are negatively presented as the troublemaker, blasphemer, and the destroyer of religious harmony and social order.

This article considers the four eyewitness threshold for zinā’ in Islamic criminal law. In some Muslim-majority countries where zinā’ remains an offence, judiciaries have by-passed the threshold by accepting singular confessions from male fornicators or, otherwise, inferring fornication from pregnancy outside of marriage. As a result, a disproportionate number of women have been prosecuted, convicted, and even punished for zinā’ . I assert that the four-eyewitness threshold allows for an alternative way to view zinā’ that can result in a different set of consequences. If the threshold is taken seriously such that it becomes the only evidentiary basis upon which a zinā’ conviction can be entered, it will create an effective or de facto exemption where alleged perpetrators can never be convicted, except in the rarest cases where four independent eyewitnesses can be corralled. If adopted, this approach would provide a principled basis to reject opportunistic confessions that deflect punishment to accused female fornicators. And as an ‘internal’ solution that arises within the framework of the sharī’a , a de facto exemption approach is more likely to be perceived as legitimate when compared with proposed solutions that find their basis in international human rights legal instruments.

Blasphemy law (BL) has become a central issue for the international community in various parts of the world in the last three decades. In almost every case involving the BL, especially in Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, they are always responded with violence or threats of attack that cause many victims, loss of homes, damage to places of worship, evictions, stigma of being heretical, severe punishments, or extra-judicial killings. When international human rights law (IHLR) and declaration of the right to peace are adopted by the international community, at the same time, the number of violence related to the application of BL continues to increase. This paper aims to examine the ambiguity of the concept of the BL in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and how its lead to the weak of enforcement that creates social injustice and inequality. Then, referring to Galtung’s theory of structural violence and other experts of peace studies, this paper argues that blasphemy law should be included as a form of structural violence. Therefore its challenges these States to reform their BL in which its provisions accommodate the state’s neutrality and content high legal standards. Thus, through guarantee the fully enjoyment of human rights for everyone may support the States to achieve sustainable peace.

Focusing on the constitutional changes undergone since 2005 in Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, this article explains how the constitutional limitation clauses affected the respective material constitutional transformations. The explanatory value of the limitation clauses is tested, with possible causalities (as well as non-causal relations) explored through a case study. Generalizing research arguments are offered, theorizing about the material constitutional transformation processes in authoritarian and post-authoritarian scenarios. The research arguments shed light on the limitation clauses’ potential to reveal the policy intent underlying the constituent power, as well as their negative implications for a proper democratic consolidation, their effects in keeping dynamics of political immobilism, and their consequences in terms of favouring instances of authoritarian regression.