Volume 12, Issue 1 -

Human rights are a contested concept. One important strand of criticism concerns the charge of their Eurocentrism, formulated in particular by postcolonial theorists and scholars. Although postcolonial perspectives are now increasingly acknowledged, attempts to incorporate non-Western approaches into the discourse on human rights are still rare. This article considers whether Islamic human rights concepts can address the postcolonial critiques and decenter human rights discourse and politics from the West. Working within the methodological framework of comparative political thought, the article regards Islamic approaches not simply as counter-discourses but analyzes their potential to supplement the dominant theory and practice of human rights and correct some of its inherent flaws. Informed by the critical analysis of Makau Mutua and Gayatri C. Spivak, the primary focus is on alternatives to the liberal individualist framework of human rights as evident in the concept of the autonomous individual subject of rights, and the balancing of individual rights with ethics and notions of responsibility in particular.

Appearing in the “Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam” as an undefined referent for the limits on freedom of expression in Islam, Shariah is still to be chased as an indefinable referent which restricts freedom of the expression in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s Press Law as well as Constitution unveil Shariah’s referent to be a person: the Jurist-Ruler ( Vali-ye Faqih ) around whom a cult of personality is legalized in terms of “Imamate” and around whom all the limits on freedom of expression revolve (e.g. recent suspension of Bahar Newspaper). Interpretation ( ijtehad ) of Shariah is not a solution but part of the problem in Iran. Such problem can be dealt in terms of three modes of self-expression which were invented by the Iranian Reformists to avoid self-censorship. The notion of master-signifier can be the key to unraveling the problem of self-referentiality in freedom of expression and its Reformist solution in Iran’s legal system.

Since its foundation, militant democratic arguments have underpinned an enforced secularism in Turkey. The 2002 election of the AKP, described as a “moderate Islamist party”, has challenged Turkey’s secular identity. In the more than twelve years since the AKP has been in power, Turkey’s political landscape has experienced significant changes, with periods of extensive democratic reforms punctuated by regression in certain areas, notably freedom of expression and the right to protest. State repressive measures coupled with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reluctance to exit the political stage have been the focus of much commentary and analysis. This article argues, however, that under AKP rule the Kurdish issue – critical to ensuring the normalization of politics and democratization in Turkey – has been brought in from the political cold and assesses the creation and role of the HDP ( Halkların Demokratik Partisi ), a Kurdish political party that is endeavoring to situate itself in the mainstream of Turkey’s political landscape. We posit that the HDP can be viewed as the offspring of this “democratic opening,” a project that was meant to ensure a radical transformation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Through analysing the historical trajectory of both AKP and HDP and the militant democratic arguments that led to their predecessors’ exclusion from the public sphere, this article engages with the key question of the extent to which the AKP’s treatment of the Kurdish issue has provided a vehicle for broader democratisation and facilitated a reconsideration of the Kurdish question in Turkey.

For several decades, the international community has criticized Turkey for failing to uphold the human rights and freedoms of its citizens and for not realizing the principles of non-discrimination and equality within its borders. As Turkey’s European Union (EU) candidacy proceeds, religious groups such as the Alevis claim to face discrimination and violations of their human rights and freedoms by the Turkish state. The Justice and Development Party (JDP, AKP ) debated the Alevis’ problems and structured the Alevi Initiative, which conducted relevant workshops and discussions. Alevi arguments regarding their places of worship and the state’s religious education policy were identified as their main challenges. Alevis argued that the state’s policies on religious education and places of worship discriminated against them and violated their human rights. Through several human rights law cases before domestic and international tribunals, Alevis requested fulfillment, protection, and assurance of their human rights and freedoms. Several court decisions agreed that Alevis’ human rights and freedoms were being violated. However, the challenges and demands of Alevis still persist, as they contend that they have not succeeded in gaining the human rights and freedoms as required in contemporary Turkey under the JDP government.

I examine the rising tension between two Islamic movements in Turkey: The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet Movement within the context of increased human rights abuses by the government in Turkey. I argue that Gülen and Hizmet are a continued concern for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and AKP because of Hizmet’s social services, primarily in the realm of education. Furthermore, their influence in public ranks further troubles Erdogan. However, it seems that because of Hizmet’s disinterest with electoral politics, along with an absence of other challengers to the ruling government party’s electoral success, Erdogan and the AKP will continue to hold political power, at least for the short term. Furthermore, this case illustrates Erdogan’s willingness to carry out increased authoritarian actions, as well as a willingness to violate the human rights of civil society actors in Turkey.