Volume 17, Issue 2 - Experten der Vormoderne zwischen Wissen und Erfahrung. Hrsg. von Hedwig Röcklein und Udo Friedrich

In ‘The Republic’, Plato famously reduced practical authority to theoretical authority, arguing that a just society must be governed by philosophers. This idea of the philosopher-king flourished in the medieval specula principum . The medieval papacy was grounded on a similar blend of practical and theoretical authority. The Pope was credited with the capacity to decide on the truth of beliefs because he was elected to office. In their fight against the omnicompetence of the Pope, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham were aware that in order to contain the power of the papal office, they had to find a way of legitimately distinguishing between theoretical and practical authority. Consequently, both of them severed the traditional link between political theory and virtue ethics, considering the virtue and the wisdom of the ruler as accidental to the legitimacy of government. In contrast to this demotion of theoretical authority in the state, both Marsilius and William argued that experts should play a bigger role in the church. The definition of true belief and heresy should not, according to them, lie in the hands of an elected official (i. e. the Pope), but rather in the hands of theological experts. This article aims to show that the critique of the papal monarchy gave rise to a new understanding of the distinction between theoretical and practical authority.

This article is concerned with the role of experientia in medieval law. This could take a number of forms, three of which are treated by way of example. In the first part of the essay, the author discusses how experience first came to serve as a source for the creation and legitimisation of new law since Late Antiquity. Henceforth, it became an important principle within Canon Law that served not only to create legal regulations supplementary to traditional law but also to overwrite and replace it. The second part of the essay is concerned with the role of expert reports ( consilia ) by men learned in the ius commune which were requested to help rule cases under local law. Being dispersed in collections after their use in court, consilia made a significant impact on common and local law. In the final section the author discusses the use of expert witnesses (from areas as diverse as medicine, agriculture, the arts and crafts etc.). Expert opinions were recognised by court as high-value evidence.

Experience played a key role in the natural science of the later Middle Ages. Both the terms “experience” and “experiment” can be found in medieval texts. However, the latter was mainly used as a synonym and there is only a slight allusion to the concept of experiments in the modern sense. In their arguments, medieval authors rather referred to day-to-day experience, to phenomena which were evident from simple observation. The medieval Latin meaning of expertus (or its close equivalent experimentator ) was thus closely related to the notion of everyday experience. An expert was someone who had a wide experience of natural phenomena and who always sought to extend his knowledge. During the later Middle Ages, this aspect slowly gained in importance (despite the fact that written authorities and the textbooks of natural philosophy remained dominant), thus opening up new ways of thinking, which finally led to the Scientific Revolution.

The essay is divided into five sections: the first section gives a short overview of the history of “experience” – Greek empeiria , Latin experientia – which takes Aristotle’s theory of knowledge as its starting point. Within its theoretical framework, experience served as a crucial mediator between sensory perception and intellectual knowledge. In the philosophy of Late Antiquity and the High Middle Ages the category of experience then was reduced to marginal importance under neo-Platonic and Arabic influences. At the dusk of the Middle Ages, however, it was rehabilitated and turned into a rallying cry by those who attempted to overcome late medieval philosophy. The following section describes the revaluation of experience as the fountain of real knowledge under the auspices of Petrarchism, which ran contrary to the formalistic teachings of the Scholastics. The remaining sections first deal with the role of the humanist concept of experience in the field of moral philosophy (specifically regarding the teaching of history). Secondly, it shows how experience worked as an incentive for field research in natural history and medicine and how it precipitated a revival of ancient Aristotelian empiricism within natural philosophy, thereby paving the way for the modern empirical science of nature.

This essay inquires into the semantics of the term “experience” in a selection of prose novels from the early modern period. Against the background of a complex history of discourses about experience, ultimately leading to a fully articulated concept of “empiricism” and “experiment”, the author traces the term’s usages in Hartlieb’s ‘Alexander’, in the novel ‘Fortunatus’ as well as in Wickram’s ‘Of Good and Bad Neighbours’. Furthermore, he elaborates those cultural topoi of experience that are based principally on an understanding of “memory” and “adaptation”. As a result, the author is able to show, that all three texts place varying emphases on the topics of experience.

In this essay Martin Kintzinger takes as his starting point observations on the current debate regarding knowledge and asserts a lack of reflection on the status of knowledge in pre-modern societies. In Sebastian Brant’s work ‘Narrenschiff’ and other contemporary critical writings, Kintzinger finds evidence that the medieval critique of experts was not by necessity a critique of expertise per se . Rather, it often was a critique of an expertise based on purely theoretical book learning, deemed unpractical and inapplicable. Significantly, there existed a counter-conception of an expert who possessed both theoretical knowledge and practical experience and who was deemed practically able to cure disease, or give valuable legal advice etc. Of course, the term experientia was first used in this context only around 1600. But Kintzinger argues that experience-based knowledge, which is associated with inductive inference and the modern natural sciences, was not a product of the early modern period. Rather, the notion of experience as a warrant of true knowledge was heavily rooted in medieval thought. This essay subsequently traces the emergence of the notion of experience to Scholasticism, to the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great and to the medieval debate on the dualism between the arts and science, and between empiricus and theoricus respectively.

In this essay Martin Kintzinger takes as his starting point observations on the current debate regarding knowledge and asserts a lack of reflection on the status of knowledge in pre-modern societies. In Sebastian Brant’s work ‘Narrenschiff’ and other contemporary critical writings, Kintzinger finds evidence that the medieval critique of experts was not by necessity a critique of expertise per se . Rather, it often was a critique of an expertise based on purely theoretical book learning, deemed unpractical and inapplicable. Significantly, there existed a counter-conception of an expert who possessed both theoretical knowledge and practical experience and who was deemed practically able to cure disease, or give valuable legal advice etc. Of course, the term experientia was first used in this context only around 1600. But Kintzinger argues that experience-based knowledge, which is associated with inductive inference and the modern natural sciences, was not a product of the early modern period. Rather, the notion of experience as a warrant of true knowledge was heavily rooted in medieval thought. This essay subsequently traces the emergence of the notion of experience to Scholasticism, to the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great and to the medieval debate on the dualism between the arts and science, and between empiricus and theoricus respectively.

Leonhard Thurneysser zum Thurn (1531–1596) was not only the personal physician of the elector of Brandenburg, but also a notorious alchemist, astrologist, pharmacist, and entrepreneur. As printer of his own works, he published a remarkable number of volumes on various subjects. Praised as a “miracle man” by some of his contemporaries, he was repeatedly accused of being a sorcerer, conjurer, and charlatan. This article focuses on his herbal book, printed in 1578. Taking into account the state of contemporary knowledge, this paper examines Thurneysser’s explanations of plant names, his interpretation of plant signatures and his magical approach to pharmacology. Scientifically, Thurneysser’s innovations in these fields have not stood the test of time. However, examined within the context of intellectual history, they can be interpreted as strategies for laying claim to a field of expertise, by a man whose reputation was at risk.