Volume 4, Issue 1 - Rights, Balancing & Proportionality

This essay focuses on proportionality stricto sensu as a consequential test of balancing. The basic balancing rule establishes a general criterion for deciding between the marginal benefit to the public good and the marginal limit to human rights. Based on the Israeli constitutional jurisprudence, this essay supports the adoption of a principled balancing approach that translates the basic balancing rule into a series of principled balancing tests, taking into account the importance of the rights and the type of restriction. This approach provides better guidance to the balancer (legislator, administrator, judge), restricts wide discretion in balancing, and makes the act of balancing more transparent, more structured, and more foreseeable.The advantages of proportionality stricto sensu with its three levels of abstraction are several. It stresses the need to always look for a justification of a limit on human rights; it structures the mind of the balancer; it is transparent; it creates a proper dialog between the political brunches and the judiciary, and it adds to the objectivity of judicial discretion. Proportionality stricto sensu however has it critics: some claim that it attempts to balance incommensurable items; others that balancing is irrational. The answer to the critics is that it is a common base for comparison, namely the social marginal importance and that the balancing rules—basic, principled, concrete—supply a rational basis for balancing. A democracy must entrust the judiciary—the unelected independent judiciary—to be the final decision-maker—subject to constitutional amendments—about proper ends that cannot be achieved because they are not proportionality stricto sensu.

This article calls for the construction of constitutional rights as principles, rather than as rules. The rule construction conceives subsumption or classification as the appropriate form for the application of constitutional rights. It attempts, in this way, to avoid the problems associated with balancing. By contrast, the principles construction argues that balancing is inevitable and unavoidable. Balancing is at the very core of the proportionality test. The debate over the construction of constitutional rights is, therefore, first and foremost a debate over proportionality analysis. The central objection to the principles construction is that balancing and, with it, the proportionality test, is irrational. This irrationality objection is countered by analysis of the formal structure of balancing; the analysis shows that balancing is a case of rational legal argument that is explicated by means of an arithmetic formula: the Weight Formula. The Weight Formula provides a demonstration of how and why balancing is possible as a form of rational legal argument. It also makes it possible to show that proportionality analysis endangers neither the power nor the force of constitutional rights.

The arbitral world is at a crucial point in its historical development, poised between two conflicting conceptions of its nature, purpose, and political legitimacy. Formally, the arbitrator is an agent of the contracting parties in dispute, a creature of a discrete contract gone wrong. Yet, increasingly, arbitrators are treated as agents of a larger global community, and arbitration houses concern themselves with the general and prospective impact of important awards. In this paper, I address these questions, first, from the standpoint of delegation theory. In Part I, I introduce the basic “Principal-Agent" framework [P-A] used by social scientists to explain why actors create new institutions, and then briefly discuss how P-A has been applied to the study of courts. Part II uses delegation theory to frame discussion of arbitration as a mode of governance for transnational business and investment. In Part III, I argue that the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is presently in the throes of judicialization, indicators of which include the enhanced use of precedent-based argumentation and justification, the acceptance of third-party briefs, and a flirtation with proportionality balancing. Part IV focuses on the first wave of awards rendered by ICSID tribunals pursuant to Argentina's response to the crushing economic crisis of 2000-02, wherein proportionality emerged, adapted from the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization.

We all live in the age of constitutional balancing. Abstracting away differences of nuance and doctrinal detail, balancing is a common feature of the structure of rights analysis across contemporary constitutional systems. Indeed, abstracting just a little further still, balancing is an inherent part of the near-universal general conception of a constitutional right as an important prima facie claim that nonetheless can in principle be limited or overridden by certain non-constitutional rights premised on conflicting public policy objectives.It is not surprising, then, that a significant literature about balancing has developed at both domestic and comparative levels. What is surprising is that so little of this literature has attempted to present the normative case for constitutional balancing or the general structure of rights analysis of which it is an inherent part. Rather, the existing scholarship has mostly focused on five other tasks: (1) describing and comparing first-order practices of balancing; (2) providing second-order conceptual analyses; (3) explaining balancing's rise to dominance; (4) advancing critiques of balancing; and (5) rebutting these critiques.In this article, I attempt to present one particular normative justification of constitutional balancing; namely a democratic justification. I argue that balancing appropriately bolsters the role of majoritarian decision-making about rights within a system of constitutional democracy. It thereby renders entrenched rights enforced by the power of constitutional or judicial review more consistent with certain enduring democratic concerns. I also explain the implications of this justification for how courts should exercise their powers of review.

The language of balancing and proportionality figures increasingly, often in judicial and academic constitutional legal reasoning in Western democracies. The spread of this particular form of discourse raises important methodological and substantive issues for scholars of comparative law. While the dominant narrative in the relevant lines of scholarship has long been one of similarity and convergence, this article argues that not enough attention has been paid to the possibility of difference—the idea that references to balancing might mean very different things in different settings. In Parts I and II, the article suggests that a methodological shift—from a focus on balancing as doctrine to a focus on balancing as legal argument—will be necessary to bring out these different meanings. Based on a case study of early and mid-twentieth century practices in Germany and the United States, it is argued that one crucial difference in the local meanings of balancing in these settings relates to the extent to which choices of legal form are locally expected to have inherent substantive implications (Parts III and IV).

Robert Alexy has for many years been a prominent analyst of the role of principles in legal argumentation, and an equally prominent defender of the rationality of balancing and proportionality modes of legal decision-making. But although Alexy's defense of proportionality and balancing against charges by Jürgen Habermas and Justice Antonin Scalia that balancing is essentially an irrational process is sound, Alexy in the process is too quick to collapse the important differences between the process of balancing competing principles and the process of interpreting a canonical written text. Although both can be and are frequently rational, rationality is not the same as external constraint, and the ability of canonical texts to provide a degree of external constraint on legal decision-making that cannot be provided by open-ended principles is a difference that should not be lost in the well-aimed efforts to demonstrate that both can be rational and both have important places in legal argumentation and decision-making.