Band 38, Heft 3-4

In this paper I focus on how the meritorious dimension (or latitude, Spielraum) involved in the promotion of the highest good is closely related to the constitution of an ethical community as a free, open and progressive moral society. I argue that since moral perfection and moral belief/faith as the grounding elements for the promotion of the highest good (synthesis of virtue and happiness) are not objective duties that must be promoted to a definite extent but involve a certain latitude in their employment, the ethical community that emerges out of the pursuit of the highest good does not prove to be a uniform society in terms of the degrees of the pursuit of moral perfection and moral commitment of its citizens. Rather, I point out that the latitude involved in the pursuit of moral perfection and the adoption of moral belief leads to the establishment of an ethical community that emerges as an open and free society entered by its citizens freely and willfully as part of their inner self-constraint. I thus hold that in such an ethical society agents can pursue and promote the highest good not in a strictly prescribed and uniform manner but in various forms and degrees as long as they constantly progress towards a higher form of moral perfection and purer form of religious (or rational) belief/faith.

Ethical intuitionism traces its roots back to the early eighteenth century in the field of ethics. Despite apparent distinctions, intuitionism, especially in its recent development by Huemer, bears a striking resemblance to robust versions of rationalist foundationalism. In this paper, we will argue against the perspective of robust intuitionism. Furthermore, we commit to reviewing what theorists operating within the field of study known as Dual Process Theory hypothesize about intuition. Nonetheless, we do not claim that the origin of our moral beliefs is unreliable or discreditable. On the contrary, we entertain the prospect of reviving intuitionistic themes by leveraging the concept of a Kantian scheme.

The concept of branching time is widely utilized to counter fatalistic arguments to the conclusion that whatever will happen is already unavoidable. The most common semantics for branching time, such as Ockhamism, Peirceanism, and Supervaluationism, offer a formal explanation for why fatalistic arguments are flawed. This paper explores a different type of argument, one that borders on fatalism and is concerned with what might possibly happen in the future. In the paper, I show how this type of argument poses a new fatalistic threat to branching time.

According to Ruth Chang (2002, 2022), incommensurability in hard cases cannot be cases of vagueness. This is because vagueness, unlike hard cases, can always be resolved by arbitrary stipulation, leaving no resolutional remainder or substantive disagreement. Contrary to this, I argue that Chang’s argument fails because proponents of the vagueness view are in no way necessarily committed to the claim that vagueness always can be resolved by arbitrary stipulation. In fact, there seems to be no reason to assume that vagueness could not accommodate our intuitions about resolutional remainder and substantive disagreements in a satisfying way. If we want a simple theory, and if at least some incommensurability is vagueness, this could then be a reason for understanding incommensurability as vagueness; and perhaps even rejecting parity.