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I here aim to show that a particular approach to the problem of induction, which I will call "induction by direct inference", comfortably handles Goodman's problem of induction. I begin the article by describing induction by direct inference. After introducing induction by direct inference, I briefly introduce the Goodman problem, and explain why it is, prima facie, an obstacle to the proposed approach. I then show how one may address the Goodman problem, assuming one adopts induction by direct inference as an approach to the problem of induction. In particular, I show that a relatively standard treatment of what some have called the \Reference Class Problem" addresses the Goodman Problem. Indeed, plausible and relatively standard principles of direct inference yield the conclusion that the Goodman inference (involving the grue predicate) is defeated, so it is unnecessary to invoke considerations of `projectibility' in order to address the Goodman problem. I conclude the article by discussing the generality of the proposed approach, in dealing with variants of Goodman's example.

In this paper, we offer a contribution to the discussion of one of the most important objections against a relativist position in the absolute generality debate. The inexpressibility objection accuses the generality-relativist of not being able to coherently express her own position. First, we examine Glanzberg's attempt to reply to this objection and we show that it fails. Second, we study the prospects of generalizing the relativist position. In particular, we analyze Fine's and Linnebo's modal approaches and we argue that, even though they are able to coherently express one of the core ideas of relativism while avoiding the inexpressibility objection, there is an important sense in which they are no longer relativist positions. Third, while strengthening the idea that the inexpressibility objection does succeed, we argue that this is no guarantee of the falsity of relativism. Relativism may be inexpressible but true. However, we stress that even if the inexpressibility objection does not supply a definitive, knock-down objection against relativism, if we want to discuss relativism in a rational way, the objection offers a compelling reason not to embrace generality-relativism.

Lewis [3] argues that, generally, we ought to conform to conventions because that answers (1) our own preferences, and (2) the preferences of others. While (1) is based on instrumental rationality, (2) is based on a moral principle or norm: other things being equal, we should do what answers others' preferences. Bicchieri [1] claims there is a third kind of normativity, neither rational nor moral, that applies to social norms. I argue that conventions draw their normativity from instrumental rationality and other independent moral principles or norms, and that it is unclear what further normativity could there be.

Categorical Monism (that is, the view that all fundamental natural properties are purely categorical) has recently been challenged by a number of philosophers. In this paper, I examine a challenge which can be based on Gabriele Contessa's [10] defence of the view that only powers can confer dispositions. In his paper Contessa argues against what he calls the Nomic Theory of Disposition Conferral (NTDC). According to NTDC, in each world in which they exist, (categorical) properties confer specific dispositions on their bearers; yet, which disposition a (categorical) property confers on its bearers depends on what the (contingent) laws of nature happen to be. Contessa, inter alia, rests his case on an intuitive analogy between cases of mimicking (in which objects do not actually possess the dispositions associated with their displayed behaviour) and cases of disposition conferral through the action of laws. In this paper, I criticize various aspects of Contessa's argumentation and show that the conclusion he arrives at (that is, only powers can confer dispositions) is controversial.

Here I assess Damasio's conceptual model of consciousness based mainly on the concepts of emotion, feeling, and consciousness by analyzing its conceptual implications and its theoretical and scientific problems. One of the conceptual implications of the direct interaction between the concept of \feeling" and the concept of ‘consciousness" is the concept of consciousness as \feeling a feeling", which is also recognized by Damasio. The concept \feeling a feeling" directly implies the concept of consciousness as "an emotional perception of an emotional perception". Each implication has further theoretical implications that form a web of theoretical and scientific problems. I also argue that, since Damasio's model of consciousness is a neuroscientific model, it should provide a rigorous integration between the high-order concepts and the empirical concepts that underlie them, which, for example, is the case of Dehaene's model of consciousness. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I suggest some conceptual changes that would minimize the theoretical problems of Damasio's conceptual model of consciousness.