Volume 26, Issue 1

Karl Popper's well-known refusal of induction consists of three theses which have to be distinguished clearly: the thesis of deduction, the thesis of rationality, and the thesis of use. Whereas the first thesis is correct, the second thesis is pretty questionable and the third thesis is definitely false. It will be argued that Popper himself does not adhere to the second and third thesis consequently, insofar he thinks that practical induction is legitimate whereas theoretical induction is not. Further it will be shown that Popper's presentation of David Hume's thoughts on induction is inadequate.

According to S. Kripke, an expression is rigid provided it refers to the same object in all possible worlds in which the object exists. On the other hand, H. Putnam claims that an expression is rigid provided it refers to the same object in all possible worlds in which it refers to anything at all. The paper shows that the two notions of rigidity are not equivalent because (i) Putnam's rigidity is much broader than Kripke's; (ii) unlike Putnam's rigidity, Kripke's is interwoven with essentialism; and (iii) identity statements between rigid designators in Putnam's sense need not be necessarily true (if true at all).

This paper looks at some aspects of semantic metarepresentation. It is mostly concerned with questions more formal, concerning the representation format in semantic metarepresentations, and the way they are processed. Section 1 distinguishes between metacognition and metarepresen- tation in a narrow and broad sense. Section 2 reminds the reader of some main areas where metarepresentations have to be used. The main part considers the ways that metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 3 introduces some general ideas how semantic metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 4 looks at some recent theories about ways that semantic metarep- resentations are built and processed.

In this paper I hope to answer the questions "How do we make something an intentional object?" and "What kinds of things can be intentional objects?" My response will be a direct reference theory following Chisholm. Such a theory has as a consequence, I will argue, different types of indeterminacy in our attitudes. This is due to Chisholm's concept of conceptual entailment. I hold that if the self-ascribed attribute conceptually entails another which gives a different intentional object, then the attitude is indeterminate as to which is the actual object or objects, although all such objects are 'purported' to be such.

This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briefly discuss the standard incompatibilist argument-the so-called consequence argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe and others, reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in section 3 by examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and argue that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.