Volume 21, Issue 1

Sydney Shoemaker has gone to great lengths to defend a repre-sentationalist view of phenomenal character, and yet he describes this view as breaking with standard representationalism in two ways. First, he thinks his representationalist position is consis- tent with the possibility of spectrum inversion, and second, he thinks there are qualia. Thus, we can think of his position in the qualia debate as moderate representationalism (or, equally, moderate qualia realism) by taking up some middle ground be- tween these two major camps. This \moderate" view faces several problems. Here I will very briey explain Shoemaker's represen- tationalist account of spectrum inversion in which he appeals to the existence of a certain sort of subjective property of objects, namely, what he calls appearance properties (formerly he called these phenomenal properties). I will argue that an alternative ver- sion of representationalism provides a more plausible explanation of both inversion-type scenarios and Shoemaker's color constancy case, which he uses to motivate the existence of these subjective properties, without positing appearance properties at all.

In this paper I develop a theory of Weltanschauungen (world- views). A judgment belongs to a Weltanschauung if it represents reality simultaneously in three dimensions: the descriptive- cognitive dimension (true/false), the ethical-practical dimension (right/wrong), and the esthetic-emotive dimension (beautiful/ugly). It is a crucial anthropological function of Weltanschauungen that they coordinate human perception and action in all these three dimensions (this idea goes to Ernst Topitsch). Different Weltanschauungen differ from each other in the weight of importance which they attach to each of these three dimensions. Therefore I suggest to classify Weltanschauungen according to their position within a triangle, the so-called Weltanschauungsdreieck, whose vertices represent these three dimensions. In sections 1-3 my analysis of Weltanschauungen is based on general epistemological and anthropological reections, drawing on the philosophical and scientific literature. My sections 4-6 make use of Robert Musil's impressing novel \The man without qualities", in which Musil explores Weltanschauungen by literary methods: at hand of the major figures of his novel he brings Weltanschauungen into being, lets them develop, reconstructs them, parodises them and finally deconstructs them. In the final section I show how a variety of typical bipolarities of Weltanschauungen (such rational vs. intuitive, passive versus active, etc.) can be analyzed within the Weltanschauungsdreieck.

In this paper, I examine P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" [6] in an effort to clarify the essential features of attitudes that Strawson believes may be understood as reactive. I propose a definition of the reactive attitudes that outlines the various conditions that must be met in order to give rise to a given reactive attitude. I then expand upon Strawson's work (as captured in my definition of reactive attitudes) by introducing two additional categories of reactive attitudes: self-reflexive reactive attitudes and second-personal reflexive reactive attitudes. In addition to explaining the new categories of reactive attitudes that I seek to introduce, I also set forth reasons that lead me to accept such attitudes as reactive. Finally, I outline why I believe the self-reflexive reactive attitudes provide the foundation upon which all the other reactive attitudes rest.

Michael Devitt's views on realism and naturalism have a lot in common with those of W.V. Quine. Both appear to be realists; both accept naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal of first philosophy; both view philosophy as continuous with the empirical procedures of science and hence view metaphysics as similarly empirical; and both seem to view realism as following from naturalism. Although Quine and Devitt share quite a bit ideologically, I think there is a deeper, more fundamental dissimilarity between the two. I will explore the difference between them in an attempt to bring out the subtle complexities surrounding the issue of realism{complexities, I will argue, Devitt sometimes overlooks. I will also explore a real tension in Quine between his earlier, more pragmatic (or anti-realist) tendencies and his later, more austere realism. I will conclude by defending a more Quinean brand of realism I call internal realism.

Bernard Bolzano criticised Kant's philosophy so vehemently that his pupil Franz Prihonsky called him "Anti-Kant". One of his criticisms concerns Kant's cosmological antinomies. The context of this critique is the problem of limits of knowledge. Kant wanted to prove that there are such boundaries, and to show where these are located. In this paper we will (i) schematize Kant's antinomies (to see what Bolzano really criticised on them) and (ii) summarize Bolzano's criticism, which is distributed over his and his student's work. At the beginning we will work out the (more fundamental) theoretical differences between Kant's and Bolzano's philosophy to see what roles these play in the construction of the antinomies.