Volume 114, Issue 2

In multiple parts of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant describes how time is dependent on space – which is the fundament of his distinction between inner and outer sense. However, he does not provide us with an argument for this dependency. In this article, two reasons for this dependency thesis are introduced. The first one aims at providing a conceptual link between time and space but runs into conflict with the Transcendental Aesthetic. The second one shifts our focus from the conceptual level to a priori possible objects of experience: Time cannot provide such objects, which are different from our subjective states due to its one-dimensionality. Only space makes such objects possible.

It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb , which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. Expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is P ‘in its own right’ or without some further ‘condition’. Accordingly, “an sich selbst” should not be treated as forming complex nouns. This analysis has significant consequences for the interpretation of “thing in itself” in particular, for it implies that the latter is not a complete nominal expression. Instead, one must treat ‘an sich selbst’ as expressing how some S is a ‘thing’, looking to the wider sentential context. I conclude with a brief account of the new significance granted to the concept of a ‘thing’ (Ding) according to the present interpretation.

Immanuel Kant’s oft-repeated statement that physical objects are mere representations has given rise to various phenomenalist interpretations. Here I understand phenomenalism to be the view that physical objects are actual or possible perceptions. I argue for a novel phenomenalist interpretation: for Kant a physical object is nothing but the sum of actual and possible perceptions that agree with its empirical concept. I argue that this interpretation is supported by the textual evidence and that this interpretation is not vulnerable to objections commonly made against phenomenalist interpretations. I also argue that the textual evidence provides more support for this interpretation than it does for certain other phenomenalist interpretations.

Traditionally, pleasure has been understood in three different ways: as a simple feeling or phenomenological quality, as a behavioral disposition, and as an evaluation. While versions of these accounts – and combinations of two of them – have been attributed to Kant, I argue that Kant successfully combines all three. Pleasure, on this view, is an evaluation of an object’s agreement with a particular subject’s ability or intention to act. Because it refers to a particular subject, it has a subjective felt character, and because it is about agreement with an ability or intention to act, it disposes one to action. In addition to being philosophically compelling, this reading incorporates Kant’s disparate characterizations of pleasure.

It is well-known that Immanuel Kant used Meier’s Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason as a textbook in his logic lectures for almost forty years. Kant himself, and most later scholars, regard Meier as a follower of Wolff and Baumgarten; however, when we compare Meier’s Excerpt with Thomasius’ Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason , we find that Meier’s conception of “learned cognition” is derived from Thomasius’ conception of “learnedness.” Kant seems to have developed the pre-critical distinction between “the logic of the common and healthy reason” and “the logic of the learned reason” from Meier’s distinction between “common” and “learned” cognition , which means that Meier’s appropriation of Thomasius also influenced Kant’s conception of logic. Connecting Kant’s views on logic to Thomasius through Meier in this way reveals that Kant’s pre-critical conception of logic was more eclectic than scholars have previously recognized.

Two issues are at the core of a seemingly never-ending debate about Groundwork  III: First, does Kant in GMS III still think he has to deduce the moral law partly from non-moral presuppositions by making a transition from theoretical to practical freedom, as Schönecker argues? Or does Kant already regard the categorical imperative as grounded in a fact of reason, as Puls argues? It is, secondly, no less unclear what exactly is meant by the “deduction” Kant mentions in three places in GMS III. While Puls claims that Kant is referring to the deduction of the idea of freedom from the unquestionable consciousness of pure practical reason, Schönecker contends that GMS III is ultimately about the deduction of the categorical imperative. Schönecker takes issue with Puls’s position as developed, and Puls replies.

This paper argues against the assertion that several of Kant’s writings were published in the form of pirate editions. It seeks to establish that most of the the editions in question (printed between 1769 and 1803) were lawfully printed. Presumably, these editions were to be sold exclusively at book fairs in Frankfurt and Leipzig; both locations are printed on their title pages, although no information on the publisher is provided. The paper also presents crucial results of detailed comparisons of all contemporary editions of Kant’s writings and delivers a short historical sketch of eighteenth-century copyright law and the philosophical debate on this topic. Finally, the importance of book fairs for trading and selling books at that time is emphasized.

It is shown that the famous quote from Fontenelle in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason , “I bow before an eminent man, but my spirit does not bow,” comes from the book On Principles of Morality , written by Abbé Mably. The Fontenelle quote is found in a review of this very book in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (No. 21, 1785). This review should further be considered Kant’s source.