Band 108, Heft 3

Abstract: This paper studies the Kantian conception of modality of judgement. After making some general considerations about the text following the table of the forms of judgement, I will take an historical perspective which will point out that the central concept for the definition of the modality of judgement is the copula. Then, after explaining the distinction between two conceptions of the copula, namely the formal conception and the transcendental one, I will argue for the second one. Finally, I will define each of the three modalities of judgement in relation to the justification the judger is able to give for her judgement.

Abstract: The paper discusses Kant’s enigmatic claim that his critical philosophy succeeds in articulating a philosophical insight at which Leibniz’s pre-established harmony was ‘truly’ aimed. Kant makes the claim in response to Salomon Maimon’s (mis)reading of his Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, which involves, in Kant’s words, the untenable assumption of a capacity of divine (intuitive) understanding in humans. The paper argues that Maimon’s misreading of Kant’s account of human intuition has found influential followers in contemporary Kant scholarship and that it is based on a failure to distinguish between what Kant calls “mere sensible appearances” and real phenomena of nature. While the former are entirely sensible singularities without unity, the latter are units composed of infinitely many sensible appearances, and their unity requires understanding. Kant thus appeals to a refurbished version of Leibniz’s pre-established harmony of mind and world, which takes the form of an immanent, indubitable, but ultimately inexplicable harmony of the faculties of sensibility and understanding. The paper includes a reconstruction of both the B-Deduction’s argument and the role of transcendental imagination in the proof.

Abstract: The present article offers a reconstruction of the argument of the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (the so-called B-Deduction), highlighting the unity of Kant’s argumentation. Such unity becomes manifest once we acknowledge that the B-Deduction is built as a progressive development of the Principle of Apperception, a development that implies a synthetical enrichment of the concepts which are the components of the formula of the Principle. The author discusses some current interpretations of the B-Deduction.

Abstract: In his Morning Hours , a mere four years after the publication of the first edition of the  Critique of Pure Reason , Moses Mendelssohn provided an accurate and complete refutation of Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument. In this paper, I expound the way in which both Kant and Mendelssohn conceive of the ontological proof. Later, I analyse Mendelssohn’s discussion of the three possible forms in which Kant’s main objection to the argument can be presented, as identified by Mendelssohn himself. I conclude that Mendelssohn’s defence of the ontological proof, far from being an attempt to reduce the question to a mere verbal dispute, seems to succeed in drastically limiting the value and scope of Kant’s criticism of speculative theology.

Abstract: The interpretation of the second treatise of the Conflict of the Faculties constitutes the basis and the core not only of Lyotard’s understanding of Kant’s thought, but equally of his self-understanding. As I will try to show, Lyotard’s interpretation proves to be highly selective in that it mainly focuses on Kant’s remarks on enthusiasm and on the concept of a sign of history. The blind spot of Lyotard’s reading seems largely due to the fact that he ignores the motive that forces the philosopher to confront the challenge of history as well as the dialogical situation which Kant sets up in this text. A confrontation of Lyotard’s interpretation with Kant’s text might thus contribute to a better understanding of the unity underlying Lyotard’s thought as well as of the specific character of Kant’s Political Philosophy.