Band 6, Heft 3 - Special Issue: Kantian Metaphysical Legacies; Guest Editors: Faustino Fabbianelli and Antonino Falduto

Kant’s argument that space, time, and the categories are the necessary forms of human experience are powerful; his transcendental idealism, that is, his arguments that spatiality and temporality in particular are only forms of human representation are not. His foundation of morality on the idea of preserving and promoting the maximal but equal freedom of all is profound; his conviction that human beings are always free to do what morality requires, based as it is on his transcendental idealism; is not. But his arguments that completeness in both scientific and moral knowledge are always only regulative ideals are compelling, with no corresponding downside.

This paper challenges the traditional interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom, which typically locates its core understanding within the noumenal world. Instead, it argues that positive human freedom is grounded in the living human body. The living body, with its distinct beginning (birth) and end (death), thus becomes the foundational condition of possibility of freedom, since it provides the temporal existence for infinite reason. The embodiment of reason within the living body is then presented as equivalent to the limitation of autonomy, which in turn allows for positive freedom to come into the world. Embodied in a living body, reason, as a legislative entity, can thereby inhabits a world governed by laws that are both self-imposed, i.e. expression of autonomy, and heteronomous, such as the laws of nature.

Fear and anxiety are constitutive of human nature. They inform us about danger and thus help us to protect ourselves from it. The topic of fear – anxiety does not play a significant role in Kant’s philosophy. Nevertheless, it serves as an informative example of how Kant views humanity. In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Perspective Kant identifies – regarding fear – different degrees that correspond to his division into nature, temperament and character. Kant’s primary interest lies in repeatedly examining what it means to be human in relation to the central task of self-determination through one’s own reason. If reason succeeds in not allowing fear to dominate one’s actions, the person concerned demonstrates courage of character. Kant also recognized that there is a kind of anxiety of one’s own freedom, because autonomy requires courage, which should also be mentioned because of an interesting parallel to Kierkegaard’s important concept of anxiety.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate Ulrich’s impact on Kant and the immediate reception of Kant’s account of freedom. I argue that Ulrich’s critical inquiry into grounding and free will influenced Kant’s treatment of the subjective ground of the exercise of freedom in the Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. I analyze Ulrich’s critique in relation to Kant’s understanding of freedom as a kind of causality, exploring the connection between grounding and the subjective ground of freedom’s exercise. I argue further that Ulrich shaped the subsequent debate on the scope of free will and the possibility of free immoral action by inciting the 1790s debate on moral imputation.

In this essay, I argue that Bradley’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, often mediated by Herbart, Hamilton, and Lotze, led him to reassess his early Hegelianism and to develop a critical metaphysics. Bradley’s philosophy is examined diachronically, from early writings (2) to Appearance and Reality (4) through The Principles of Logic (3). I also provide a preliminary overview of Kant’s reception in Britain (1) to set the historical background for other sections. This essay explores a topic not previously investigated, as other contributions on Bradley and Kant compare them without historical concern. By focusing on Bradley’s sources, we can appreciate the influence of Kantianism through some understudied thinkers. In addition, I adopt a historical-diachronic approach that clarifies the development of Bradley’s philosophy by exploiting documents such as manuscripts and reading notes. In particular, I present the first analysis of a 1877–1878 manuscript – Bradley’s initial formulation of his peculiar metaphysics.