Volume 4, Issue 2 - Special Issue: Kant and the Role(s) of Doctrines of Method; Guest Editors: Gabriele Gava and Andrew Chignell

The aim of this paper is to show the unity and consistency of Kant’s reflections throughout all three sections of the Canon of Pure Reason. More specifically, I argue that Section 3, which is devoted to the issue of Fürwahrhalten , or taking-to-be-true, is crucial to achieving the methodological goal of the Canon, which is to justify the legitimacy of the speculative assumptions of pure reason. After examining the historical roots of Kant’s notion of a transcendental doctrine of method, I focus on the methodological role that the practical element plays in the first two sections of the Canon. I then show how the limitations of Kant’s argument necessitate the introduction of a third crucial section, which serves both an analytic and an orientative function.

In this paper I argue that Kant’s doctrine of definitions, as it is developed in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method ( TDM ) and in the lectures on logic, lays down the semantic background of the problem of the objective reality of the categories and of the solution Kant provides for it in the Transcendental Analytic . The distinction between nominal and real definitions introduces a two-dimensional element in Kant’s theory of concepts, and this, I argue, provides a compelling explanation for the assumption Kant makes in §13 that it is possible to possess a concept without knowing the conditions of its legitimate application. This view is supported by the parallels between Kant’s discussion of empirical, mathematical, and philosophical concepts in §13 and in the TDM . And, it allows clarifying the sense in which the arguments that prove the objective reality of the categories are, at the same time, counterfactual reflections that give us (incomplete) insight into their real definitions.

According to Kant, we gain mathematical knowledge by constructing objects in pure intuition. This is true not only of geometry but arithmetic and algebra as well. Construction has prominent place in scholarly accounts of Kant’s views of mathematics. But did Kant have a clear vision of what construction is? The paper argues that Kant employed two different, even conflicting models of construction, depending on the philosophical issue he was dealing with. In the equivalence model, Kant claims that the object constructed in intuition is equivalent to the properties included in the conceptual rule. In the overstepping model of construction, Kant argues that construction goes beyond the concept which is a “mere definition”. What is more, both models of construction can be found in the Doctrine of Method in the first Critique. The paper examines reasons that have led Kant to adopt the two models of construction, and proposes a reading that alleviates the apparent contradiction between the two models.

Why does Kant say that a “skeptical satisfaction of pure reason” is “impossible” (A758/B786)? I answer this question by giving a reading of “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemic Employment.” I explain that Kant must address skepticism in this context because his warning against developing counterarguments to dogmatic attacks encourages a comparison between the critical and the skeptical methods. I then argue that skepticism fails to “satisfy” [ befriedigen ] reason insofar as it cannot “pacify” reason’s tendency to go beyond its own boundaries. The skeptical method reveals the past failures of dogmatic metaphysics but cannot rule out future successes. Only critical knowledge of reason’s proper bounds can do this, thereby pacifying our restless reason. I close by arguing that Kant’s discussion implies that a skeptic must feel dissatisfied with her renunciation of metaphysics, and that this dissatisfaction can lead her to take interest in Kant’s critical philosophy.

In § 60 of the Critique of Judgment , entitled ‘On the doctrine of method of taste,’ Kant suggests that the study of so-called humaniora (ancient Roman and Greek literature) will help one to become a good artist. I will argue that a proper, namely emotional, engagement with humaniora will further the two components of humanity in ourselves: the feeling of sympathy and the ability to communicate feelings. I will discuss two options of how a strengthening of these two components might contribute to the creation of good artworks: it will help one to create artworks that arouse the universal communicable pleasure in the beautiful, or it will help one to create artworks that arouse sympathetic feelings. Siding with the latter option, I will argue that emotions can contribute to the enlivening of aesthetic ideas and, thus, to good art.

This paper deals primarily with the Doctrine of Method ( DM ) of Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue . First, I present an overview of the DM (1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is a DM necessary at all (2.1)? How does the DM relate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for latitude. The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to the DM ; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties.