Volume 12, Issue 2

The second edition of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) was issued in June of this year. A Congressional mandate requires each QHSR to examine the nation’s homeland security strategy and explain how this can lower risks from terrorism, natural hazards, and other challenges. The intended audience is not only Congress and the department of homeland security (DHS), but also the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) – stakeholders comprising federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private sector partners, as well as communities, families, and individuals. The first QHSR institutionalized homeland security fundamentals and presented a set of missions and goals, but questions have been raised about the strategic benefits of the document and its value to all homeland security stakeholders. Will the second QHSR effectively build upon the first and function as a strategy that ensures homeland security programs will align with mission priorities? What improvements can be made in DHS’s efficiency and effectiveness as expressed in both documents? Will the QHSRs serve the entire HSE, particularly those below the federal level? What are future expectations for this series of documents? This article analyzes the QHSRs, with the objective of and illuminating these and other questions of interest to the homeland security community.

The US’ domestically-oriented, homeland security enterprise lacks a structure that facilitates an all-hazards intelligence mission. An all-hazards mission must account for both positive and negative intelligence information. The primary hubs for interagency collaboration and collection, within the US, are the Department of Homeland Security-funded state and local fusion centers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs). Both of these entities focus on negative intelligence. The FBI JTTFs focus on one element of negative intelligence, the DHS fusion centers have unfocused, but still negative, missions, due to bureaucratic realities. Meanwhile, other government agencies, notably the CIA’s National Resources Division and even other elements of the FBI are engaged in uncoordinated collection, an activity that threatens to bring even more disorganization to the homeland-security enterprise. Rather than creating yet another agency, the strengths of both the JTTFs and the fusion centers should be leveraged, in conjunction with other domestically operating collectors, to establish new platforms, using fusion centers as a backbone, staffed with a service of joint duty personnel.

In the fall of 2014, the US was faced with the reality that a deadly, foreign virus had entered its borders. Ebola, a disease thought to be of little threat to the US yet classified as a major bioterrorism agent, became a reality for the American government and its citizens. The introduction of Ebola unveiled many deficiencies in the country’s health care system, international travel policies, and ability to control or restrict the movement of exposed individuals in order to protect the larger population. The need to review and establish legal guidelines and policies to deal with these deficiencies is paramount: the inherent lack of training and education; weaknesses in monitoring, maintenance, and treatment; and the lack of uniform guidelines to isolate international travelers have all demonstrated that the country may not be able to control a larger-scale threat in the future.

This study examines what motivates local emergency management officials to implement federal emergency management and homeland security policies within their own departments since the September 11 attacks. Pre-existing research claims there is confusion among local governments about potential changes to the role local emergency management services play before, during, and after natural, accidental, or terror related incidents. Meanwhile, additional research claims the federal disaster management policies (The National Response Plan, National Incident Management System, and Incident Command System) lack flexibility in implementation expectations, and there is limited cohesion among the layers of government, actors, and interests involved. This study asserts that something must spur local actors to comply with federal policy demands in their daily operations given how the post-September 11 policies change the field. The study specifically examines the effects of coercion, defined as actions taken by the federal government to force state and local implementers to comply with federal policy demands. Available federal grant dollars for emergency management and homeland security practices could make a dramatic difference to local emergency management operations, forcing these actors to comply with federal policy demands, even if it is in a begrudging fashion that deviates from traditional Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) principles.

This paper examines the growth of mobile communications, electronic health records, and clinical decision support technologies and formulates the concept for a system that leverages these technologies to enable the general public to better support medical response during and after crisis events. Recognizing that data for modeling how people will react to and behave with such a system is very limited, the initial analysis was directed toward the potentials of civilian users, operations centers with remote medical advisors, and the new medical system for civilian response. Using relational diagrams, system operations for when the user is confronting a massive crisis, coping with an isolated emergency, or conducting self-training are described to encourage the initiation of pilot projects with user test groups. There are risks in shifting the dynamics between first responders and the people they are trying to save. However, the life-saving potential of emerging technologies demands further investigation and testing.

Since the second half of the latest century the disaster landscape has experienced important changes. Disasters are not only increasing in quantity, they are also qualitatively different and seem to distress humanity to a considerably higher degree than in the past. This evolution does not only deeply affect modern societies; it might also have a disruptive impact on the intervening units of emergency management organizations. Recent disaster research mainly focuses on mitigation efforts, risk reduction and resilient societies. Though, despite good mitigation efforts and up-to-date preparation initiatives, still millions of people are affected and thousands killed annually by some kind of disaster. As a consequence, disaster response remains a vital aspect of disaster management and will even become more important in the future taking into consideration the changing disaster landscape. On that account, our study aims to remodel the response phase of the disaster management life cycle, focusing on a new and fresh approach. We consider the response phase as an unfolding global process and its ensuing sub-processes rather than just an enumeration of potential activities.

Despite operational volcano surveillance using meteorological satellite, thermal remote sensing and infrared camera technologies, predicting a volcano’s hazardous activity and explosive eruption, with any accuracy, remains nearly impossible. Volcanic hazards and risk literature identifies risk communication as critical but insufficiently understood. This paper, therefore, investigates disaster risk communications during Indonesia’s Mt. Sinabung eruptions in February 2014, causing 16 deaths and continuous evacuations of 30,000 residents. We critically examined one-way government-to-citizens communications via e-government websites and Twitter and citizens’ multi-directional communications via #sinabung hashtag for sharing volcano risk perceptions about affected villagers. Our Twitter analysis of #sinabung found evidence for the absence of government engagement in risk perception communications and leadership in responding to the Indonesian public’s expressed concerns for the Mt. Sinabung disaster. For governments that would implement citizen-centric e-governance, Twitter can be used effectively as a multi-directional risk communication tool to quickly and effectively share risk perceptions and disaster information with the public.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the US Gulf Coast in 2005, leading to the largest mass evacuation in US history and straining the region’s transportation infrastructure and services. This case study addresses the topic of disaster response to transportation unmet needs through an unprecedented spatial and longitudinal analysis of transportation-related disaster 2-1-1 call data collected in real-time, allowing for the investigation of unmet transportation needs by location and disaster phases. The authors analyze 25,205 transportation-related calls logged in Texas’ 25 regional 2-1-1 Area Information Centers from August 1 to December 31, 2005, including a baseline period before Hurricane Katrina, evacuation and landfall, and 3-months recovery post-Hurricane Rita. The spatial results show that transportation unmet needs were concentrated in Texas’ major metropolitan areas, especially in Houston-Galveston, and along highway evacuation routes. However, after controlling for population size, areas close to the landfall site and evacuation destinations had greater unmet transportation needs. Longitudinally, transportation unmet needs surged during evacuation and immediate disaster response then returned to baseline levels during recovery. Based on the results of the case study analyzing Texas 2-1-1 call data of unmet transportation needs, strategies and policies for improving mass evacuation and transportation support services are proposed and discussed.

Mass evacuation of urban areas due to hurricanes is a critical problem in emergency management that requires extensive basic and applied research. Previous research uses agent-based models to simulate individual vehicle and driver behavior, and is limited mostly to a small study area due to the complexity of the models and the computational time needed. To better understand evacuation behavior, simulating the evacuation traffic in a larger region is needed. This paper develops a two-level regional disaster evacuation model by coupling two agent-based models. The first model uses each census block centroid, weighted with its corresponding number of vehicles, as an agent to simulate the local road network traffic. The second model, developed on the platform of a commercial software program called VISSIM, treats each vehicle as an agent to simulate the interstate highway traffic. This two-level agent-based model was used to simulate hurricane evacuation traffic in New Orleans. Validation results with the real Hurricane Katrina’s evacuation data confirm that the proposed model performs well in terms of high model accuracy (i.e., close agreement between the real and simulated traffic patterns) and short model running time. The modeling results show that the average root-mean-square error (RMSE) for the three major evacuation directions was 347.58. Under a simultaneous evacuation strategy, and with 240,251 vehicles in 17,744 agents (census blocks), it would take at least 46.3 hours to evacuate all residents from the New Orleans metropolitan area. This two-level modeling approach could serve as a practical tool for evaluating mass evacuation strategies in New Orleans and other similar urban areas.