Volume 9, Issue 3

In this article the premise is that personality interests exist in factual reality independently of any legal recognition. This emphasis on the pre-legal existence of individual personality interests is not merely of philosophical interest, but of cardinal jurisprudential and practical significance as it brings to the fore the fact that the qualities of personality interests are not determined by legal principles, but primarily by their nature in the sphere of factual reality. A jurisprudential definition and delineation of personality interests, which is essential to enable protective measures to be properly applied in practice, does not detract from this. This classification and typology therefore take account of factual reality, supplemented on a comparative law approach by the personality rights identified and delimited by jurists, the courts and legislatures, as well as typical examples of infringements of personality sanctioned by the different legal systems. Accordingly, the following classification and typology of personality rights are proposed: the right to life, the right to physical integrity, the right to physical liberty, the right to reputation, the right to dignity, the right to feelings, the right to privacy, and the right to identity.

It is argued that supply chain liability could be based either on tort law or on contract law and – drawing on experience from product liability law – it is examined whether there is a basis for assuming that these two approaches might end up merging into one unified approach forming the basis of a new concept of ‘production liability’.

In June 2017 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down a complex decision on the liability of vaccine producers. The reference for a preliminary ruling stemmed from a French case in which a hepatitis B vaccine manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur allegedly caused personal injury to Mr W in the form of multiple sclerosis, a disease that ultimately led to his death.

Proof of Causation addresses many contemporary and classical issues about causation and its proof in tort cases. This review explains the admirable depth, breadth, and scope of the book, along with the author’s assessment that would limit instances when the burden and standard of proof of causation are relaxed. In the final section, the review addresses the relative paucity of consideration by Proof of Causation of scientific evidence despite its increased importance in the contemporary toxic tort area.