Volume 25, Issue 1 -

Rawls’ theory is about prudence rather than justice. It is about the kind of political structure on which rational people would agree if they were preparing for the worst. Other strategies, such as confining redistribution to upholding a safety net, might also be plausible. Rawls’ theory is Georgism in persons: the income from individual abilities is regarded as if it is at the disposal of the collective and could be taxed as rent. This goes against the strong moral intuition of self-ownership. However, Rawls’ question, where the worst off are as well off as they can be, is interesting. According to the Index of Economic Freedom, it actually may be under relatively unfettered capitalism. Unlike Rawls, Piketty is chiefly worried about the rich, seeking to impose confiscatory taxes on them. But the rich are not a fixed, unchangeable group of people who can effortlessly watch their capital accumulate. Capital is precarious, as is vividly illustrated in Balzac’s novel Père Goriot which Piketty quotes. Different as the approaches of Rawls and Piketty are, both of them agree that their ideal society has to be closed: It must become ‘socialism in one country.’

This article argues that, notwithstanding views to the contrary, Frédéric Bastiat (Bayonne, 1801; Rome, 1850) was indeed a man of science. Thus, in several of his essays he showed that political economy can attain a level of scientific rigor comparable in many respects to that of the natural sciences. Subscribing to the principle of methodological individualism, he offered some persuasive explanations for why people believe in a multitude of things. After examining science as Bastiat conceived it, we shall look at two important examples, mechanization and rational voting.

John Komlos’s Foundations of Real-World Economics is an ambitious book that aims at taking down the foundations of modern mainstream economics that students are taught at Econ 101 classes and replace them with a more reality-based alternative. However, Komlos’s falls way short of the stated objective. First, he fails to genuinely engage the introductory textbooks with which he supposedly argues. Komlos also appears to misunderstand the purpose of introductory-level economic models like perfect competition, as well as to entertain the idea that their rejection may lead to different conclusions from those that he seems to favor. Finally, Komlos does not cite sufficient research and evidence for his own potential building blocks for a new economics, such as the claim that the basic assumption of scarcity should be scrapped in favor of that of abundance.