Volume 22, Issue 2 -

The financial crisis brought about a higher degree of monetary policy unpredictability. To anchor expectations and promote nominal stability, there is a need for predictable monetary rules or stable constitutions. This paper’s purpose is to define the general expectational properties that monetary constitutions should possess to work as coordination devices. I use Buchanan’s predictability criterion, as well as the expectational monetary transmission mechanism, to propose that monetary constitutions should be considered stable as long as they contain dynamics allowing self-reinforcing expectations of monetary neutrality. Self-reinforcement of expectations is an integral property of monetary constitutions for them to be agents of coordination and therefore stable. I find that these expectational properties are consistent with the stability properties established in the constitutional literature.

Thomas Hodgskin (1797–1869) is still studied as a forerunner of modern socialism: in fact, he is typically characterized as a prominent “Ricardian socialist”. Among the most influential of Hodgskin’s works was his pamphlet Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital (1825a), thus prefiguring with its very title announces a denunciation of capitalism. Hodgskin’s work should be considered instead in its entirety, paying proper attention to its nuances. If Hodgskin indeed chastised “capitalism,” he meant precisely what we now call “crony capitalism.” He did not condemn the “higgling of the market,” which he thought should be the sole mechanism by which resources, including human labour, are allocated. But he saw clearly that legislative meddling served specific interests and often prevented market forces to emerge and blossom. If he was unfriendly towards the “capitalist” class, it was only because he saw them as disproportionally benefiting from the favour of political power. Hodgskin denounced the idle classes but did not want to substitute the market process with any alternative distributive scheme. He considered a sound understanding of an innovation-fostering economy incompatible with archaic distribution of privilege on the part of government. His work can help to clarify how embracing the market economy did and does not entail a defence of the status quo.

Introduction: Is soft power effective? Justice institutions have become a key topic in the international scientific and institutional agendas some decades ago, for different, and still interdependent reasons: the waves of democratizations (Pridham 2000), the increasing power of the judicial branch (Russell and O Brian 2001; Stone Sweet 2002), the transnationalisation of the processes of law making and law enforcement (Allard and Garapon 2005), the increasing demand for justice, dispute resolution, and rights enforcement (Epp 1998; OECD 2014, 2015). Despite the vast literature focusing on these phenomena, very little has been said on the impact that the recent development of the quality of justice mainstream (Fabri et al. 2005; Piana 2010) has on the relationship between the judicial and the executive branch. Notoriously, this relationship is one of the key dimensions for a constitutional democracy.

Since 1789, France has had 21 constitutional regimes. This paper explains French constitutional instability through the optic of “constitutional culture” – the norms, attitudes, and beliefs, conscious and unconscious, held by a dominant portion of the French people about the nature, scope and function of constitutional constraints. French constitutional culture has historically been torn between a desire for a strong and effective state, and an obsessive veneration of democracy. This paper argues that France’s constitutional instability between 1789 and the constitution of 1958 was a series of swings between plebiscitarianism and caesarism, caused by the influences of Rousseau and Descartes. Problems remain, especially the risks of an unconstrained “hyperpresidentialism” and undue power to the street’s ability to bully the rule of law into continued rents. But the Fifth Republic has been successful because it balanced the tensions through a semi-presidential system: the plebiscitarianism of parliamentary democracy, along with the caesarism of a strong presidency.