Volume 20, Issue 2 -

Raymond Boudon a été l’un des rares sociologues, surtout en France, à placer l’individu au centre de ses analyses. Il n’a pourtant pas été, contrairement à une idée reçue, un théoricien du choix rationnel. Dès les années 1970, alors qu’il est encore en début de carrière, il a proposé, du moins c’était son souhait, une théorie plus générale, de plus vaste portée, qui conjuguait la rationalité instrumentale et la neutralité axiologique, où le comportement des acteurs sociaux ne devenait intelligible qu’en tenant compte de ses croyances et de ses motivations. Rien de mécanique dans le social, aux yeux de Boudon, qui a sans cesse été soucieux d’inscrire sa propre démarche dans le prolongement de ce que la sociologie classique avait de meilleur à offrir. S’agissant de la rationalité du politique, ce n’est ni Marx ou Comte qui offraient les analyses les plus satisfaisantes, mais Weber et plus particulièrement Tocqueville. Ainsi, la « science politique nouvelle » de l’auteur de La Démocratie en Amérique , permettait à Boudon de mieux comprendre la démocratie et le libéralisme, de même qu’elle mettait en lumière les possibles dérapages du relativisme.

This comparison between Boudon and Mises focuses on the main tenets of their respective conceptions of social science. It covers action theory, the theory of belief, the epistemology of social science, and also addresses the topic of liberalism.

The purpose of this article is to show that Boudon’s explanation of action in terms of “good reasons” can be philosophically enriched by merging his methodological perspective with Mises’ praxeology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In order to develop our goal of merging Boudon’s approach with Mises’ and Gadamer’s, we will focus on two points. The first is the identification of the invariable structure of human action. Unlike Boudon, we suggest that the best way to establish this invariable structure, which makes the explanation of action possible, is not to refer to the controversial concept of “human nature,” but rather to use Mises’ praxeological analysis of the invariable logic which all actions have in common. The second point analyzed in this article is the temporal and cultural dimension of the interpretative process which individuals elaborate to develop their reasons. This point, which is related to hermeneutical philosophy and is not investigated in detail by Boudon, is largely discussed by Gadamer. In our opinion, merging Gadamer’s description of the interpretative process – a process that Gadamer calls “hermeneutical circle” – and Boudon’s sociology of “good reasons” is useful because, unlike Boudon, Gadamer clarifies the epistemological nature of the interpretative process as well as the reasons why this process – which is a trial and error process – allows us to understand the actions of people who belong to different cultures.

Lighthouse and the Trinity House case have triggered extensive debate on the possibility of private production of public goods and, more especially, lighthouse services provision. This contribution sums up current academic debate about lighthouse provision. It shows that the English system of lighthouse services provision cannot be rigorously considered as an example of private provision. Some historical experiences have shown that private provision was possible, although governmental hindrances restrained a full-fledged market process provision. This contribution defends the interest of mobilizing a political economy perspective for an understanding of the different frameworks and institutional designs for providing such services. Some national cases illustrate and sustain the proposed political economy framework.