Volume 18, Issue 1

The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of privatization on the performance of firms by using a panel data set of 38 companies that were privatized in Europe. We compare the profit, profitability, total product, operating efficiency, net income, employment, leverage and risk of these SOEs before and after their privatization. The legal environment, regulation, goals of privatization and competition characterize each sector, which is why we split the total sample into sectors. Our results indicate that the performance of companies in the utility industry is significantly better after privatization; however, we cannot assert this for the other sectors.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau est l'auteur de l'entrée "économie politique" dans l'Encyclopédie en 1755. A ce titre, il aurait pu être l'un des fondateurs de cette discipline. Pourtant, la définition qu'il en donne est à l'encontre de la pensée libérale des physiocrates, puis des classiques, et constitue une véritable "anti-économique". En hypertrophiant le rôle de l'Etat et en niant l'intérêt personnel, Rousseau est au contraire l'un des pères du socialsme. En niant la liberté humaine, il nie aussi l'existence de choix éthiques.

Recent years have seen a problematic upward trend in disequilibrium in the international balance of payments. What accounts for this trend? Three hypotheses for the rise in disequilibrium are tested in this paper: greater fixedness of the world exchange rate regime causes greater disequilibrium; greater flexibility of the exchange rate regime causes greater disequilibrium; and a decline of United States economic hegemony causes greater disequilibrium. It is argued here that the problem was created by state choices, a lack of coordination among states in the international system, and the absence of an international exchange rate regime. The evidence presented in this paper supports the idea that a stable international exchange rate regime is critical to secure a healthy world economy.

We treat science as a Hayekian social order whose distinctive emergent characteristic is the generation of knowledge. We model modern science as an institutional form that principally relies on publication with citation and its effects on individual reputation in order to study the possible effects of funding on science. We develop a taxonomy of three broad categories of effect: those having to do with the direction followed by scientific activity, those involving the operational and financial stability of both the physical institutions integral to scientific work and the scientists themselves, and those due to distortions of the basic knowledge-generating procedures of science. It is argued that, while directional effects of funding are ubiquitous, destabilizing and distorting effects are much more likely to emerge when funding sources are concentrated than when they are decentralized. Further, when funding is accompanied by regulatory oversight, the possibilities for distortion are significantly increased. Examples of such effects actually occurring under the current U.S. funding regime are discussed.