Band 6, Heft 1 -

The member states bound by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have committed to not produce, stock pile, or use biological weapons, but finding the line between what is a biological weapon and what is justified by “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” is difficult with the broad wording of the convention. In a world of quickly emerging technology, the gray area created by the broad exceptions to what constitutes a BWC biological weapon produces ever-changing security risks and public policy considerations. Despite the BWC’s attempt to strengthen prohibition on biological weapons of prior agreements, a large exception is carved out for the three justified uses, which hinges on the intent and purpose of the actor. The three permitted purposes are not defined, and there is no objective test for determining the intention of the actor.

Over the past two decades, the event of eco-terrorism has become a significant threat. The law should encourage the advancement of scientific research by providing criminal penalties for those who engage in eco-terrorism. This article examines the threat eco-terrorists pose to scientific researchers in the United States, and covers the historical use of animal research, notable activists and organizations, and the applicable laws as they currently exist, including potential improvements.

The United States Government has sought to incentivize the development of medical countermeasures for biological agents (as well as other weapons of mass destruction) by establishing the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). Several legal impediments exist to the development of vaccines targeting the most disconcerting biological agents. This paper identifies the key legal incentives and impediments regarding the development of vaccines for select agents and determine whether these incentives currently outweigh the impediments.

Agroterrorism is a subform of bioterrorism with the potential to have a crippling impact on both the agricultural industry and the food supply of a nation. A calculated attack using a miniscule amount of pathogenic or disease causing substances on the livestock or crops in one rural community can spread to animals and metropolitan regions much farther away long before any response from state or federal veterinary or agricultural organizations. Although there have been no large-scale agroterrorism attacks in the United States, there have been historical precedents for agricultural biological warfare and recent examples of unintentional or accidental spread of pathogens in the food supply that have threatened the health and safety of the public. Along with an ongoing push for preparedness to prevent a biological attack on the U.S. agricultural industry, there is a great deal of uncertainty and conflict among landowners, farmers, analysts, and politicians about what methods should be implemented to safeguard the public. In response to this possible threat, the United States government has implemented legislation that it considers preemptive in its ability to safeguard the food supply and manage the public health and/or biological crime response in a widespread agroterrorist attack scenario. However, this requires cooperation on both the state and federal levels, and of several agencies including the department of Health, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Health and Human Services. This paper examines the steps being taken by the USDA in fulfilling the orders of the federal government in response to the looming threat of agroterrorism and how the TAHC works cooperatively with federal agencies and the private agricultural industry to carry out these regulations.

The conditions in refugee camps are often strikingly similar to those considered by existent bodies of law governing mass gatherings. Sanitation is a key concern in both cases, as is access to adequate shelter and medical care. However, the laws that govern refugees and mass gatherings are promulgated by different organizations, and the lack of overlap can exacerbate already poor conditions for refugees. This paper examines the various health issues that arise in refugee camps in terms of mass gatherings, analyzes the laws that govern both, and concludes with recommendations on how to address any ineffectiveness in the current models.

With the ability to travel among nations comes the risk of spreading infections among disparate populations. Travel and the spread of disease has been a topic of health organizations since the nineteenth century. This paper analyzes these health concerns through the lens of nineteenth century cultural concerns over international travel, addresses them with regards to the various international and US federal regulations that have been enacted, and concludes with potential changes demonstrative of modern cultural concerns with international travel.

Since 9/11, the United States and the international community have emphasized the need to protect people from terrorist attacks. The Boston Bombing that took place on April 15, 2013, showed that even with all of the preventive measures in place, the United States is not immune from terrorist attacks. If there had been a bioterrorist attack in Boston instead of a homemade bomb, the amount of casualties would likely have been a lot higher. Many hospitals lack effective emergency preparedness plans that address bioterrorist attacks. One area that will help prepare nations during a mass casualty incident or public health emergency involves implementing effective mass casualty preparedness plans for hospitals. This paper analyzes mass casualty preparedness in hospitals and demonstrates the need to have legislation in place to protect doctors who treat patients during mass casualty events.