Volume 8, Issue 2

The kings of the Achaemenid Empire are known for employing a number of particularly gruesome punishments for those who were deemed guilty of rebellion. While it is certainly true that the Achaemenids punished rebels with utmost severity, it is also true that they were, at times, willing to forgive rebels, and even to rehabilitate them. In this paper, I investigate the mechanisms by which the Achaemenid kings were able to show mercy to rebels. By examining a number of relevant cases from a period of a century and a half, I argue that the decision to be merciful was based on the king’s familial or social relationship with the rebel, the rebel’s relative strength vis-à-vis the king, the geography of the revolt, and the presence of other external factors which might also restrict the king’s powers. By a comparison with royal inscriptions and texts found throughout the empire, I demonstrate the ways in which these reconciliations stood apart from, and even in contradiction to, administrative and ideological norms concerning law and justice within the Achaemenid Empire. Finally, by reviewing the traditions and attitudes towards justice and mercy among the Achaemenids' Near Eastern predecessors, I put this policy in historical context and show that it is a unique response to a problem faced by other ancient empires.

This article aims to discuss the relationship between Herodotus and Thucydides. New scholarly trends date the composition of Herodotus’ Histories to 413 BC, or even later, against high chronology of 431, and suggest Herodotus’ use of Thucydides’ narrative. Herodotus’ debt to Thucydides has been suggested by scholars either cautiously or boldly. This examination will show cases where Herodotus is alluding to events of the Peloponnesian War or even responding to Thucydides’ narrative. In fact, anachronisms, presentisms, and allusions to Thucydides’ text can be found throughout Herodotus’ narrative. We will explore the reasons for Herodotus’ engaging with the events of that War, conjecturing about his goals: attracting the interest of his audience, or providing a warning to his contemporaries; moreover, it is important to understand whether this engagement was just coincidental.

This article highlights two aspects of the language used in Classical Greek literary sources to discuss pitched battle. First, the sources regularly use unqualified forms of the verb kinduneuein , “to take a risk,” when they mean fighting a battle. They do so especially in contexts of deliberation about the need to fight. Second, they often describe the outcome of major engagements in terms of luck, fate, and random chance, at the explicit expense of human agency. Taken together, these aspects of writing on war suggest that pitched battle was seen as an inherently risky course of action with unacceptably unpredictable results, which was therefore best avoided. Several examples show that the decision to fight was indeed evaluated in such terms. This practice casts further doubt on the traditional view that Greek armies engaged in pitched battles as a matter of principle.

The advent of writing in the Greek polis administration resulted in the appointment of officials responsible for document management. These were known as grammateis (secretaries). The need for records connected to judicial proceedings led to the involvement of secretaries in the polis legal procedure. Although there remains little evidence of this, in Athens secretarial support was certainly connected with almost every use of writing in a judicial context. Secretaries appear to have received suits, published notifications of trials and recorded fines, but their most well-attested duty is that of the reading of documents brought as evidence in the courtroom. The study of references to secretaries in a judicial context demonstrates that their duties were essential to the persons involved in the administration of justice. By keeping track of judicial documents secretaries helped the officials to keep accurate records for the sake of accountability, while the reading of legal texts enabled the Athenian citizen-judges to get to know verbatim the texts of the state laws and avoid manipulation by litigants who produced their own interpretations of a law. The purpose of this article is to present all the relevant cases of secretarial support in the justice system of Athens and to discuss the contribution made by the secretaries to the Athenian legal procedure.

Several elements suggest that Polybius’ description of the Roman army in Book VI of his Histories depicts a rather outdated military system, making it hard to accept it as an up-to-date portrait of the legions by the mid-second century BC. After all, the Roman army had been experiencing a series of changes since the mid-third century that were affecting both the army’ structure and how citizens experienced military service. This paper argues that the famous episode of Spurius Ligustinus (Livy 42.34) contains several suggestions about the nature of these changes and their social ramifications. Although Livy embellished his source for rhetorical reasons, this episode still offers crucial evidence not only on the Roman army but especially, through the figure of Ligustinus himself, on the mid-Republican citizen-soldiers. Through a careful examination of key sections of this episode this paper aims to explore how, by this point, the army already presented features traditionally associated with Gaius Marius and his reforms, thus further emphasizing the outdatedness of Polybius’ description. By offering the very unique profile of an individual Roman citizen of the mid-second century and his relationship with military service, the speech of Ligustinus depicts a more believable and up-to-date representation of military service during the crucial decades of Roman Mediterranean expansion.

This article attempts to read the phenomenon of collective resistance in the Roman army of the Late Republic as political action. Taking my inspiration from post-colonial theories of popular power, I contend that we should not understand acts of collective resistance in military settings as simple events activated by a singular cause, but rather as expressions of individual and collective grievances with the status quo. Indeed, the variant practices of military recruitment in the Late Republic, and the exploitative nature of Rome’s imperial rule put oppressed groups – Italians, provincials, and former slaves – in constant contact with the state apparatus. Thus, military service offered an essential space for political action in the first century BC. These findings help us to better understand how popular power could be realized beyond traditional institutional settings in this period.

Nabataean history is significantly overlooked in the works of ancient historians. Josephus is an exception to this, as he includes several important events from Nabataean history in De Bello Judaico and Antiquitates Judaicae . However, his retelling of these events differs between the two works. In this paper, I argue that Josephus became more “pro-Roman” over time and eventually overshadowed an accurate portrayal of Nabataean history in his later narrative. He undermined moments of tension between Rome and Nabataea in order to showcase Roman power in the Near East, even beyond reality. In support of this argument, I analyze the Nabataean sections of Josephus’ works, as each passage has overlapping details, but significantly different emphasis, characterization, and perspective through variations in terminology, imagery, and tone. Though problematic, Josephus has preserved a unique look into Roman-Nabataean relations in the two centuries prior to the incorporation of Nabataea into the Empire.