Volume 5, Issue 1

The objective of this article is to measure the degree of competition among retail stores to sell a specific brand of a product. For this purpose, we estimate brand-specific demand equations along with first order conditions from stores' profit maximization. In stores' profit maximization, we account for three sources of conjectural variation: within a store but across brands, across stores for the same brand, and across stores for other brands. Data on U.S. retail store price and sales data on cheese products from ACNielsen Homescan database are used in our empirical analysis. A set of indices representing concentration of purchases across brands within each store and across stores for each brand are used to estimate conjectural elasticities. Results show the existence of price markups suggesting imperfectly competitive behavior in retail cheese markets.

Contracts are an increasingly common method for coordinating exchange in the food industry. Contracts often include specifications for product attributes including food safety. One of the goals of explicit safety specifications is to discourage or deter suppliers who would deliver unsafe food. In this article, we use a principal-agent model in the context of adverse selection to examine how contracts that include traceability can be used to select against producers who cannot meet a processor's safety specifications. We find that the motivation to select against unsafe producers depends on the magnitude of the failure costs and the proportion of the failure costs allocated to producers. We also identify the conditions under which the processor selects against unsafe producers regardless of traceability. Our results are important to regulators and negotiators who want to support safe producers and deter unsafe producers.

This paper revisits the analysis of generic commodity advertising under product differentiation by Crespi and Marette. Crespi and Marette had shown that a dominant firm producing high-quality goods and facing a competitive fringe of lower quality producers could be harmed by a generic advertising campaign while the fringe was left unaffected. Under this dominant-firm model, a question remained why these producers might support a program for which they were indifferent. In this paper we show that under a duopoly model a high-quality firm may be harmed while its lower-quality rival may be made better off by a generic program, thus helping to explain why some producers might favor a program while others do not. Further, this paper dismisses the claim made by some litigants that increased branded advertising is the result of a deleterious effect of generic advertising.

This paper investigates consumer reactions to changes in information provision regarding organic production. Quantitative analyses focus on the actual implementation of mandatory labeling guidelines under the National Organic Program. The unique nature of the fluid milk market in combination with these regulatory changes allows us to place a value on information sets under different labeling regimes. Hedonic price functions provide an initial reference point for analyses of individual responses. A random utility discrete choice model serves as the primary econometric specification and allows consideration of consumer preference heterogeneity along observable household demographics. Our results indicate that the USDA organic seal increases the probability of purchasing organic milk. An initial hedonic price function approach, as well as simulations within the discrete choice framework, suggests that consumers value the change in labeling regulations with regard to organic production. Our results further suggest that consumers substitute away from milk carrying the rBGH-free label. This may indicate that consumers pay less attention to these labels in the time period investigated compared to results found in studies that use earlier time periods.

Among the dominant firms in the US meat and grain business, many produce several products, some of which are demand-related. Yet, virtually all research on collusion among those firms focuses on a single product. This paper uses a game-theoretic model to investigate the conditions under which multi-product food firms producing demand-related goods have incentives to collude, and examines the welfare implications of collusion for participants in a vertical marketing chain. I show that multi-product food firms have a greater incentive to collude when they become more efficient. In contrast to previous work, I find that the effect of the degree of product substitutability on collusion sustainability hinges on the cost effect arising from joint production. From a policy standpoint, I show that mergers between single-product firms producing demand-related goods under certain conditions may hinder collusion.

In this paper, we analyze how generic advertising affects brand advertising and firm profits in differentiated oligopoly markets. We show that in the Crespi (2007) model only the high quality firm will use brand advertising when differentiation is vertical. We also demonstrate that when differentiation is horizontal, the equilibrium is likely to be more symmetric in terms of firm profits, spending on brand advertising, and firm response to generic advertising. Finally, we point out that generic advertising will increase expenditures on brand advertising when firms play a supermodular game. The results confirm that there are many reasons why generic advertising may increase firm spending on brand advertising.

In this paper we investigate consumers' preferences for various environment-friendly production systems for carrots. We use discrete-choice multi-attribute stated-preference data to explore the effect of collective reputations from growers of an Alpine valley known for its environment-friendly production: Val di Gresta 'the valley of organic orchards'. Data analysis of the panel of discrete responses identifies unobserved taste heterogeneity for organic, bio-dynamic and place of origin, while observed heterogeneity for income is addressed by a piece-wise linear function. The implied sample distributions of individual-specific WTP for each of these random attributes are then compared. Results indicate that Integrated Pest Management is preferred to biodynamic as an emerging method. The presence of a premium for Val di Gresta produce is confirmed. The use of an experimental design to identify the relevant second order effects reveals the presence of a reputation effect which can be decomposed into a generic effect from place of origin and a specific one for each EFPMs. Farmers operating in geographically limited marginal areas, such as mountain valleys, may find it useful to invest in collective reputation through high quality standard to achieve higher returns. This strategy may compensate for the dwindling public support to farm income from EU programmes.

This study investigates the Indian market for GM wheat. First, we address the obvious valuation and acceptance questions for Indian consumers. Then we investigate the extent to which the provision of information about GM wheat has any significant effect on consumers' willingness to pay and the degree to which the effect varies based on the information treatment. Finally, we consider whether the type of primary beneficiary of GM wheat production affects valuation. Specifically, we assess the conjecture that consumers' willingness to pay for GM wheat changes according to whether the crop is portrayed as producer-friendly or consumer-friendly.

This article is a theoretical contribution to the debate surrounding the introduction of Fair Trade products into large-scale retail distribution. In the model, a Fair Trade certifier and a traditional producer compete to supply their product to a single retailer, consumers who are Fair Trade likers are willing to pay an "ethical" premium for the Fair Trade product, and the premium depends on the revenue of Fair Trade product producers. The conditions of existence of an equilibrium where the Fair Trade product coexists with the traditional brand product on the retailer's shelves are highlighted. In particular, we show that a Fair Trade certifier implements this equilibrium if his preferences are such that the weight devoted to the price paid to producers is smaller than the weight he grants to the quantities of Fair Trade product sold. We also show that a retailer's decision to sell the Fair Trade product is not based on the percentage of consumers who are willing to pay for it, but on how much the Fair Trade likers are willing to pay.

With increasing interest in renewable energy from agriculture, including biopower and cellulose ethanol, there is a need for better understanding of the economic organization of this emerging industry. Study of the organization of the biopower industry represents an under-researched area and a new application of transaction cost theory to an emerging industry.Refinement of the theory can also result from challenging applications. This article provides an application of transaction cost economics to the existing United States biopower industry while challenging the empirical convention of excluding production cost variables from transaction cost analysis. Utilizing survey data from 53 biopower generators we study the relationship between physical asset specificity, site specificity, and scale in explaining firms' decisions to procure inputs internally, externally, or to use both methods. Consistent with transaction cost theory, both site specificity and scale are good predictors of organizational form. Given this evidence, this article reconsiders the impact of scale and transaction costs on the choice of organizational from.

Agricultural goods sold in supermarkets often vary significantly in quality. Yet, when these goods are sold at a single price, consumers may expend significant time and effort to sort goods for quality. From the standpoint of sellers, the resources expended on sorting only serve to reallocate high quality goods to consumers who sort intensively and low quality goods to consumers who sort minimally or not at all. Because these lower quality goods are less attractive to consumers who do not sort, sellers may be forced to lower prices. Why then do sellers allow sorting when they might prevent it?This paper presents a demand model where sellers choose whether to allow sorting. Sellers may allow consumer sorting when it fosters the distribution of qualities that occurs under quality discrimination, despite the associated reduction in the total gains to trade through sorting costs and quality efficiency loss. In general, sorting may allow sellers to improve the quality of goods for marginal consumers who constrain price-setting for sellers with market power. The total effect on price, amount sold and welfare is ambiguous due to the role of market power. Simulations are provided to demonstrate these effects.