Volume 16, Issue 4 -

This paper examines the role of deontic and epistemic central modality as a discursive strategy to express vagueness in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Syrian armed conflict. The paper follows a corpus-based methodology with a two-fold objective: (i) identification, quantification and analysis of the central modal verbs retrieved from the resolutions, and (ii) the description of the communicative functions performed by these verbs. Our ultimate aim is to reveal the use of deliberate flexible language leading to ambiguous positioning towards the Syrian armed conflict in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions which have been issued since 2012. The consequences associated with the institutional use of flexible language and ambiguous positioning in the resolutions under study will also be accounted for.

In this paper we present the results of the first empirical reception study on the comparative strength of swearwords in two audiovisual translation (AVT) modes. We test the assumption/hypothesis that swearwords are perceived as stronger in writing (i.e. subtitles) than in spoken language (i.e. dubbing), which has led to the long-held translation practice of toning down or deleting swearwords more in subtitles than in dubbing. By means of an online survey, participants were asked to a) rate the psychological distance between the connotative meanings of swearwords embedded in ten film clips on a four-point strength scale, and b) comment on their ratings in open-ended text boxes. The results of various types of quantitative analysis show that our participants do not rate swearwords in subtitles higher than in dubbed clips. The qualitative analysis identified contextual factors (genre/director of film, participating characters and their relationship, setting and linguistic context) as well as viewer characteristics (gender, swearing habits and reactions to swearing) as main determinants of swearword strength. The convention of toning down or deleting swearwords more in subtitles than in dubbed audiovisual products thus seems to be based on an invalid assumption and ought to be abandoned altogether.

This paper presents a corpus study of pragmatic factors involved in interpreting potentially ambiguous sentences with negation and universal quantifiers, as demonstrated by the Russian sentence Oni ne uspejut vsjo eto sdelat’ ‘They won’t have time to do all this.’ Ambiguity in such sentences results from potential differences in scope assignment. If negation scopes over the quantifier, we get the interpretation of partial negation: ‘They will manage to do some of these things, but not everything.’ If negation scopes over the verb, we get total negation: ‘They won’t manage to do anything.’ This study is based on Russian and English data extracted from a variety of corpora. We demonstrate that while syntactic conditions where scope ambiguity is possible are different for Russian and English, in situations when both languages allow it, speakers rely on the same pragmatic mechanisms for disambiguation that are based on Gricean cooperation principle and shared background knowledge. Disambiguation is facilitated by lexical markers, different for verb-negated and quantifier-negated readings, and similar in Russian and English. We show that the interpretation of the quantifier is pragmatically different for verb-negated and quantifier-negated readings (emphatic in the former case and quantificational in the latter), and lexical markers of each reading are semantically and pragmatically consistent with this difference. Namely, verb-negated readings occur primarily in the context of demonstrative pronouns in their pragmaticalized meaning of negative assessment and negatively connoted nouns, while quantifier-negated readings occur in the context of verbs with quantitative semantics and quantitative implicatures that consolidate the interpretation of quantification.

This paper examines indirect reports from the lens of socio-cognitive approach (SCA) to pragmatics. Indirect reports have the capacity to re-mold the substance of the original utterance as a whole. In direct reporting, the original utterance is produced in an actual situational context, and then, it is being reported by a different speaker in a new situational context. So, the utterance which was initially produced is only interpretable in the light of the common ground A whereas the reported utterance is only interpretable in the light of common ground B. We have it from Kecskes (2013. Intercultural pragmatics . New York: Oxford University Press: 159) that “common ground is both an a priori existing and a cooperatively constructed mental abstraction. Likewise, the main condition of reporting is the need of the hearer: there would be no need for reported speech if the audience were already aware of the content of the report. For that reason, the process of meaning making in reporting, that is, the transmission and simultaneously creation of meaning is inextricably bound with the question of context, salience, common ground, pragmatics, semantics and syntax, not to mention all those bodily gestures and expressions that can, or more importantly, cannot be registered in language.