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The article provides a systematic outline and refinement of societal constitutionalism (SC), one of the frameworks emerged in contemporary legal theory to analyse constitutional phenomena. After an introduction in Section 1, Section 2 summarises SC’s theoretical background, namely the debates on the Economic Constitution (2.1), legal pluralism (2.2), systems theory (2.3), and the work of David Sciulli (2.4). Section 3 explains SC’s analytical limb, which on the one hand criticises some tenets of state-centred constitutionalism (3.1); and on the other hand identifies functions, arenas, processes, and structures of a constitutionalised social system (3.2). Section 4 turns to SC’s normative limb, pointing to some constitutional strategies that increase social systems’ capacities of self-limitation (4.1); and develop a law of inter-constitutional collisions (4.2). Section 5 addresses the main competing approaches and criticisms, which are based on state-centred constitutionalism (5.1); on international/global constitutionalism (5.2); and on contestatory/material constitutionalism (5.3).

Sophocles’ Antigone has been studied intensely for more than two thousand years, but it was especially Hegel’s allegorical use of this tragedy in several of his works (first and foremost the Phenomenology of Spirit) that added yet another fascinating facet to its possible reading: the birth of the legal order and therewith a constitutional system from the conflict between two normative orders. In this contribution, I interpret the dialectic structure of Antigone in a manner in which each normative position – both Antigone’s and Creon’s – are equally justified and thereby antithetic in the ethical world of the Greek polis. It is therefore only by transcending this tragic conflict between the human and the divine orders that we can transform necessary externalities (‘fate’) into a process of a legal status which eventually allows individuals to become the authors of the law itself and thus to guarantee their freedom. I denote this reading of Hegel’s Antigone as ‘symmetrical’, since it accepts both positions – Antigone’s divine law and Creon’s human law – as equal and makes freedom and justice only possible through the law. This means that an ‘asymmetrical’ reading, giving prevalence to either position (for instance, found in Goethe or Habermas) and localizing freedom and justice beyond the law, can never effectively result in a legal status that would allow individual persons to become legal persons.My principal argument consequently is that only a symmetrical view of this normative conflict can justifiably be regarded as making a constitutional order possible in the first place. It is feasible only in a dynamic-genealogical fashion (ie, by constantly generating this order through conflict and the transcending of this conflict through mutual recognition) that concurrently also respects individuals as particular individuals, not just as formal equals among equals, by allowing them to realize their personalities and to find themselves through the arts, science, and philosophy. This is more than a merely formal or negative constitution which recognizes every person as equal and free, but disregards their particularities; this is a material and positive constitution that can guarantee both equality and self-actualization. Such a constitutional order guarantees an identity of universal laws and individuality, and accordingly offers individuals a solution to the conflicting ethical orders of the ancient polis in which they would otherwise remain trapped.

This article assesses the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty against the background that, at the time of UK’s withdrawal from the EU, UK parliament proclaimed it to be preserved despite the continuing domestic legal effect accorded, under 2018 and 2020 Acts, to pertinent EU law provisions in the UK legal system. The relevant evidence is analysed to show whether that position is one to which English law subscribes.

The COVID-19 pandemic is testing parliamentary systems of governance across the world, especially in relation to oversight of executive actions. Observers in multiple jurisdictions have already noted the proliferation of delegated legislation during the pandemic and the shortcomings in legislative oversight of the same. To date, however, no close analysis has been conducted of the way in which legislative oversight mechanisms have broken down during the pandemic. This paper provides such an analysis, using examples from Westminster systems adopting the ‘legislative model’ of providing extraordinary powers. Looking at individual examples from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the analysis seeks to identify and explain the failures, and relative successes, in different mechanisms for parliamentary oversight, including parliamentary scrutiny committees (pre-existing and ad-hoc), disallowance, and sunset clauses. Although primarily descriptive, the comparative approach analysis permits preliminary conclusions to be drawn as to the way each jurisdiction may improve its methods of parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation. These comparative lessons will be of use both during and beyond the pandemic.