Band 29, Heft 3 - Symposium: HUMAN RIGHTS TODAY: A DIVERSE DEBATE FROM EUROPEAN AND BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVES

There is little need to argue for the importance of human rights (HRs) in our world. If one looks at the role they play today, it is hard to deny that their impact has increased beyond anything the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration could have hoped or imagined. However, even though human rights today have a far greater impact on politics than in the past, the philosophical reflection that surrounds them has had a less fortunate history. It is doubtful whether we are today in a better position than we were in 1948 to answer any of the philosophical questions surrounding them, including, and perhaps most crucially, the question about their foundation. Why are human rights standards—of whatever sort—that we should adopt, or even just take seriously? The first two parts of this paper summarize my recent work on the above question (Caranti, 2017) and the third takes it a step further. I will 1) show why the main orientations in the contemporary philosophy of human rights all fail to yield a satisfactory foundation, 2) sketch an alternative foundation that exploits Kant’s account of human dignity in a rather critical way; and 3) address one major objection my approach is bound to attract (and in a certain form has already attracted). Since my foundation suggests that we have dignity (and as a consequence human rights) because we are autonomous, that is, capable of moral behavior, some scholars have argued that I am bound to the counterintuitive conclusion that people with a temporary or permanent lack of rational capacity, which would cause a condition of “impaired autonomy,” are not entitled to the protection of human rights. While this objection does nothing but reformulate in the language of human rights an old, classical objection to Kant’s ethics, replying to it requires mobilizing new intellectual resources.

The paper frames the issue of intergenerational justice by addressing an historical source and a theoretical difficulty. In relation to the historical point of view, the paper offers a preliminary re-reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights aimed at revealing the intergenerational commitment that lies behind it (§1). In addressing the second point, it presents the issue of intergenerational justice from a phenomenological perspective (§2). In developing such a perspective, the paper articulates a comprehensive ethical question that is constitutively related to any possible shaping of an intergenerational justice theory (§3). In turn, the explanation of that question presents the opportunity to propose a theory of motivation for the elaboration and implementation of policies explicitly aimed at fulfilling the intergenerational need, beyond any skepticism arising from pragmatic objections. Finally, the paper proposes to address this need by presenting a model of obligation ranking in which the flexibility and strength of the normative bond for the present generation and future ones are considered (§4).

The paper deals with a possible tension within Axel Honneth’s theory of justice as presented in his Freedom’s Right . It takes as its point of departure Georg Lohmann’s objection that Honneth loses sight of the critical potential associated with positive right and tries to discuss it critically both exposing Lohmann’s and Honneth’s position. From the complex of problems identified thereby, the paper moves to a discussion of Émile Durkheim’s theory of State, with which it helps to provide a possible contribution to the discussion between positive, individual rights and the normative framework of social freedom.

For feminist philosophers it is important to consider how the language of human rights can be used to support women’s issues and how well it is established in political institutions. However, they suggest that human rights should be reformulated and supplemented with other ethical frameworks to ensure that injustices to women are not neglected. The aim of this paper is to argue that Nussbaum’s capability approach can take into account feminists’ insights into rationality, care and context to reform and to supplement the universal framework of rights. Finally I will illustrate Nussbaum’s claim that human rights and capabilities need to complement each other through a discussion of the Brazilian case.

The paper is structured into four parts. Firstly I discuss the connection between the concept of injustice and the idea of human or individual rights. The claim is quite trivial: the language of rights has been and is still used as a strategy to demand correctives against injustice. Since this strategy has negative effects, of which concrete examples are given, I suggest a different grammar be adopted, the grammar of needs, which is what societies adopt in their justificatory discourses anyway. This leads into a consideration of how social criticism could start precisely from such discourses and why, under specific circumstances, the grammar of needs could represent a better strategy for this criticism than the language of rights does.

This pilot study examined the idea that use of a mobile technology can have positive consequences for both individual users and, indirectly, society. The augmented reality (AR) application used here is defined as a persuasive technology because it is intended to modify users’ attitudes or behaviours. The application was designed for personal use although it can generate indirect benefits for users’ communities as well as for users themselves. The application was tested on a small sample in a controlled setting in order to observe how it was used and to evaluate its efficacy as a source of information and tool for persuasion. The results showed that opinions of the AR device were generally positive; moreover, participants admitted that it improved their awareness of environmental issues. The strengths of this research are that it shows how the use of persuasive technologies can have collective benefits and demonstrates their informational power.