Volume 5, Issue 1

This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.

This paper estimates the impact of interest rate shocks on regional output in Germany over the period from 1970 to 2000. We use a vector autoregression (VAR) model to obtain impulse responses, which reveal differences in the output responses to monetary policy shocks across ten German provinces. Next, we investigate whether these differences can be related to structural features of the regional economies, such as industry mix, firm size, bank size and openness. An additional analysis of the volatility of real GDP growth for the period 1992-2000 includes the Eastern provinces. We also present evidence on the interrelationship between firm size and industry, and compare our measure of firm size with those used in previous studies. We conclude that the differential regional effects of monetary policy are related to industrial composition, but not to firm size or bank size.

We find fast convergence in productivity for 99 three-digit European industries over the 1985-98 period. Half of any productivity gap is closed on average in about 10-15 years. We explicitly formulate the steady-state assumptions for structural convergence to hold. Convergence in industrial structure is much slower than productivity catch-up with a half-life of around 50 years, a stylized fact which cannot easily be explained by the existing models of trade and growth.

This paper models some reductions in output that may follow the opening of electricity markets to competition. Specifically, we show that vertical separation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution could reduce welfare compared to the previous system of vertically integrated monopoly, if grid owners can act as monopolistic retailers or, alternatively, set access prices that maximize merchandizing surplus. Moreover, we show that a rule of non-discriminatory pricing would not remedy any of these problems. Hence, to secure the efficiency gains of deregulation, the re-regulation of the remaining monopolistic core - the electric grid - cannot rely on simple rules like cost-based non-discriminatory pricing.

A tournament is examined in which two agents with different abilities choose efforts as well as risks. According to the previous literature, the more (less) able agent should choose a low (high) risk strategy, because the first one does not want to imperil his favorable position, whereas the last one can only gain by increasing risk. We show that this is not necessarily true. Risk taking affects equilibrium efforts as well as winning probabilities. Depending on both effects diverse equilibria are possible. For example, the low and the high ability agent may both choose high risks or both choose low risks.