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We analyze the relationship of retail investor sentiment and the German stock market by introducing four distinct investor pessimism indices (IPIs) based on selected aggregate Google search queries. We assess the predictive power of weekly changes in sentiment captured by the IPIs for contemporaneous and future DAX returns, volatility and trading volume. The indices are found to have individually varying, but overall remarkably high explanatory power. An increase in retail investor pessimism is accompanied by decreasing contemporaneous market returns and an increase in volatility and trading volume. Future returns tend to increase while future volatility and trading volume decrease. The outcome is in line with the conjecture of correction effects. Overall, the results are well in line with modern investor sentiment theory.

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well-defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.

We use model-based recursive partitioning to assess heterogeneity of growth and convergence processes based on economic growth regressions for 255 European Union NUTS2 regions from 1995 to 2005. Spatial dependencies are taken into account by augmenting the model-based regression tree with a spatial lag. The starting point of the analysis is a human-capital-augmented Solow-type growth equation similar in spirit to Mankiw et al. (1992, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 407-437). Initial GDP and the share of highly educated in the working age population are found to be important for explaining economic growth, whereas the investment share in physical capital is only significant for coastal regions in the PIIGS countries. For all considered spatial weight matrices recursive partitioning leads to a regression tree with four terminal nodes with partitioning according to (i) capital regions, (ii) non-capital regions in or outside the so-called PIIGS countries and (iii) inside the respective PIIGS regions furthermore between coastal and non-coastal regions. The choice of the spatial weight matrix clearly influences the spatial lag parameter while the estimated slope parameters are very robust to it. This indicates that accounting for heterogeneity is an important aspect of modeling regional economic growth and convergence.

Voluntary certification systems potentially reduce search costs in markets with imperfect information. Service markets with many heterogeneous firms - such as the crafts market - are prone to information imperfections and can therefore potentially benefit from such informational mechanisms. We examine if the Meister qualification in the German crafts sector improves service quality as perceived by consumers. We find a significant and positive relationship between the Meister title and consumer ratings and conclude that the certificate is a credible sign of quality.

This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruptionminimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision-making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent-seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non-linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.