This paper demonstrates, within a simple two-country model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping, that the tax revenue (welfare) effects of a minimum tax requirement depend crucially on the character of the initial non-cooperative tax equilibrium, i.e. whether it is Nash or Stackelberg.
Contents
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedNon-cooperative vs. Minimum- Rate Commodity TaxationLicensedNovember 30, 2019
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedTrade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free EntryLicensedNovember 30, 2019
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedMonetary Policy and Forecasts for Real GDP Growth: An Empirical Investigation for the Federal Republic of GermanyLicensedNovember 30, 2019
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedInput Demand and the Shortand Long-Run Employment Thresholds: An Empirical Analysis for the German Manufacturing SectorLicensedNovember 30, 2019
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedDownward Nominal Rigidity in West German Earnings, 1975-95LicensedNovember 30, 2019
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedNon-linear Error Correction and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: The Case of German Dual-Class SharesLicensedNovember 30, 2019
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedIndex: Volume 2, 2001LicensedNovember 30, 2019