Volume 16, Issue 4

Victimization is a poorly studied topic in economic research. This paper considers economic factors of victimization using individual data. It tests the rationalchoice- based hypothesis that the more attractive and poorly guarded targets are facing a higher risk of victimization. The used dataset also covers own criminal activities such that individual offending behavior can be studied as endogenous driver of victimization. Econometric results confirm that a criminal background is one of the major reasons of own victimization. In line with rational choice behavior of offenders, victimization is also associated with being a job holder and more schooling. Moreover, large peer groups increase the risk of victimization, whereas married and healthy people have a significantly lower risk of becoming a crime victim.

This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business cycle. In particular, under source-based taxation, in the short term, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn. The converse is true during a recovery: in this case, they are underprovided. In the long term, however, tax competition does not affect capital accumulation. This means that the provision of public goods is unaffected by taxation.

With direct incentives and sanctions being the most common instruments to fight tax evasion, the theoretical literature has tended to overlook indirect schemes, such as itemised deductions, in which one agent’s behaviour affects the likelihood that others will declare their revenue. Itemised deductions provide an incentive for consumers to declare their purchases. This induces a partial shift in the demand from the black market to the legal one, for consumers need a transaction receipt to enjoy the tax deduction. I show that it is possible to increase tax proceeds by choosing a suitable level of itemised deduction, and this, for any level of taxation. Indeed, the cost for the tax authority on the consumers’ side is more than compensated for by the extra proceeds generated on the sellers’ side.

During episodes of increased global risk aversion, or risk-off episodes, safe haven currencies such as the Swiss franc tend to appreciate. The immediate impact of a risk-off shock is an increase in net private inflows to Switzerland, mostly driven by a reduction in Swiss residents’ net purchases of foreign debt securities and reduced foreign exposure by Swiss banks. Given that the bulk of capital movements related to risk-off episodes is driven by decisions of Swiss residents, capital flow management policies that discriminate based on the residency of the investor (capital controls) are not likely to be effective at reducing the impact of risk-off episodes. However, prudential policies that limit leveraging or foreign exposure by Swiss banks may diminish the volatility of capital flows during risk-off episodes.

This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984-2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation methods using fixed effects and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference- Generalized Method of Moments estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country’s corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the socioeconomic implications associated with migration flows.

The model of Mehra and Prescott (1985, J. Econometrics, 22, 145-161) implies that reasonable coefficients of risk-aversion of economic agents cannot explain the equity risk premium generated by financial markets. This discrepancy is hitherto regarded as a major financial puzzle. We propose an alternative model to explain the equity premium. For normally distributed returns and for returns far away from normality (but still light tailed), realistic equity risk premia do not imply puzzlingly high risk aversions. Following our approach, the ‘equity premium puzzle’ does not exist. We also consider fat-tailed return distributions and show that Pareto tails are incompatible with constant relative risk aversion.