Band 9, Heft 4 - Governing Through the Senate

The Senate is often the institutional pivot for political conflict in the United States, so this issue of The Forum focuses on ‘governing through the Senate’. Charles O. Jones considers its inherent peculiarities as the institution meant to ‘go second’ in a separated system; Sarah Binder argues that the modern Senate is moving away from its constitutional role; Frances Lee considers the role of party competition in shaping senatorial behavior; Barry Burden asks about the influence of senatorial polarization and party balance within the bicameral context; and Daniel DiSalvo contrasts partisan polarization with divided government as influences on senatorial behavior. Randall Strahan observes one particular senator negotiating this complicated framework; Wendy Schiller and Jennifer Cassidy consider the dynamics of cooperation (or not) among same-state senators; and Andrea Hatcher contrasts a majority leader who lost re-election with another who won. Ryan Black, Anthony Madonna, and Ryan Owens examine a very private form of senatorial obstruction, ‘blue slip behavior’; Gregory Koger examines what is surely the best-known form of obstruction, the filibuster; Eric Schickler and Gregory Wawro argue that, whatever its collective impact, senators have multiple reasons to protect this filibuster; and James Wallner closes with a substantive realm, budgeting, where the absence of policy action by the Senate is critical. In book reviews, Joseph Cooper uses Matthew N. Green, The Speaker of the House: A Study in Leadership, to think about the study of Congress more generally, and Matthew Green responds; Amnon Cavari reviews B. Dan Wood, The Myth of Presidential Representation; and Philip Brenner reviews Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us.

Periods of split-party control and narrow margin politics encourage criticism of the separated system, accompanied by proposals for reform and change. The U.S. Senate is notably exposed under these conditions for the very reasons it was created. This essay revisits that rationale, concentrating on its institutional role as a second chamber and its operational style of individualism. Attention is directed first to the marginally democratic status of the body, then to the chamber’s individualist roots as nurtured by the three classes formed for staggering senatorial selection. Working within its own political and electoral rhythms, the Senate operates as an elite society of singles. Functioning on independent meridians, this exceptional second chamber resists reform and challenges prophecy, very much as intended. Like it or not, it is there.

Some twenty years ago, Richard F. Fenno, Jr. published “The Senate Through the Looking Glass” – a particularly illuminating and trenchant assessment of the state of the Senate. Listening to senators debate whether to allow television cameras into the chamber, Fenno concluded that the Senate was still capable of thoughtful deliberation and consensual decision-making. In this article, I take a Fenno-inspired peek through the looking glass at the contemporary Senate, using a recent parliamentary dispute to probe senators’ views about their institution. The view is unusually dark. Two decades after Fenno’s assessment, rising partisanship has made the Senate nearly ungovernable—leaving a chamber that struggles to fulfill its most basic constitutional duties.

One of the most striking characteristics of the contemporary Senate is the regular transfers of party control, with six shifts in the majority between 1980 and 2007. Continual uncertainty about future control of the chamber has important consequences for congressional incentives. In this environment, senators have adapted their behavior and institution to more effectively contest Senate control. These adaptations include: the rise of “message politics” and the growing size, significance, and outreach capabilities of party committees and leadership staffs.

Despite achieving a 60-seat majority in the 111th Senate, Democrats were unable to pass many of their key legislative priorities without support from Republicans. The striking inability of Democrats to govern the Senate despite a filibuster-proof majority demonstrates key differences between the chambers of Congress. Whereas party polarization helps the majority party in the House of Representatives to exert more control over the legislative process, in the Senate it aids the minority. Because Republicans viewed the Senate as their main opportunity for hindering the Democratic agenda, the GOP benefitted from their party’s ideological cohesion and rules favoring obstruction.

In recent years, scholars have marshaled a vast amount of evidence to show that the congressional parties are increasingly polarized. However, David Mayhew demonstrated that most standard legislative enactments in the second half of the twentieth century passed with the support of large majorities of both parties. This article investigates whether the partisan polarization of the past two decades has crept into the temple of consensual lawmaking that hitherto characterized Senate action on final passage votes. The findings reveal that unilateral votes by one party are better explained by unified government than the rise of partisan polarization. In that light, the import of polarization may be overstated. Institutional features of the political system, coupled with the electoral incentives of lawmakers, offset ideological polarization at the final passage stage of important legislation.

This essay takes Richard Fenno’s concept of the senatorial career and Keith Krehbiel’s generalization about the importance of the pivotal 60th senator as points of departure for an account of a day spent on Capitol Hill with Senator George LeMieux (R-FL) in July 2010. The goal of the essay is to describe a day in the career of a senator who took full advantage of opportunities presented by being the pivotal senator on a major piece of legislation.

In the decade since Partners and Rivals: Representation in U.S. Delegations (2000) was published, Congress has experienced increased levels of party polarization. Congressional scholars have since concluded that this polarization trend has dramatically changed the context for deliberation, competition, and cooperation in the U.S. Senate. However, scholars have not explored the ties between increased polarization and representation within Senate delegations. In this article, we evaluate whether the dynamic of cooperation and competition among same-state Senators still exists along the lines identified in Partners and Rivals, or whether it has become merely a folkway of the past. We find that same-state Senators still construct distinct legislative portfolios designed to garner public attention and support, and that this still reflects a commitment to representation in the Senate.

Senate majority leaders risk electoral defeat despite advantages of incumbency. In 2010, according to conventional wisdom, Harry Reid seemed likely to lose re-election, as had his predecessor. Nevertheless, he won a decisive victory. This paper seeks to answer the basic question—how did Reid escape electoral defeat?—as a means of elucidating the conditions under which Senate majority leaders lose re-elections. This research can be couched in a broader study of Senate majority leadership that understands the role as one that balances the constraints of multiple constituencies of state, party, Senate, and president. In these terms, and based on the cases of Tom Daschle and Harry Reid, I hypothesize that Reid’s electoral victory was no surprise in light of his state’s ideological position and support of President Barack Obama. As a rule, a Senate majority leader faces an electoral threat when he opposes a president that his state has supported, but gains electoral security when he serves a president his state has supported.

Senators increasingly use obstructive tactics to stall or kill legislation. Unfortunately, because senators can obstruct privately, scholars have little understanding of the conditions under which they do so. Using previously unreleased data from 2001-2009, we examine Senate obstruction by focusing on blue slipping behavior. We find that extreme members who do not belong to the president's party are most likely to employ negative blue slips. Thus, as moderate senators continue to be replaced by more extreme members, senators will increasingly use obstructive tactics.

The distinguishing feature of the modern U.S. Senate is the ability of any senator to block legislation and nominations, forcing the rest of the chamber to limit debate using a slow process that requires a 60-vote supermajority. This article explains the development of this new and powerful veto in the legislative process, its use as a minority party veto, and then reviews options for restoring the balance between governance and deliberation.

We argue that even as the Senate filibuster poses serious governance challenges in today’s Congress, it persists because most senators prefer to maintain the minority’s right to obstruct. We consider what this rank-and-file support for the filibuster tells us about the nature of individual senators’ preferences and about the Senate as an institution. We believe that continued support for the filibuster underscores the importance of personal power and publicity goals, the ability of rules to provide “political cover” for legislators, and the role of shared understandings about the appropriate use of rules and about the Senate’s place in the political system. Where nineteenth-century senators propagated a set of beliefs that limited the legitimate use of obstruction, today’s senators have developed an alternative set of beliefs that bolsters the institutional role of the filibuster. Under these circumstances, reform will likely require substantial pressure from outside the institution rather than emerging from within the Senate.

The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 represented a bipartisan effort to contain unsustainable spending and restore fiscal discipline. Yet an examination of one aspect of the congressional budget process will demonstrate that it has all too often failed to contain the accumulation of government debt and impose fiscal discipline. This article will argue that contrary to its intended design, the congressional budget process does not force a fundamental reevaluation of federal commitments during times of budgetary crisis. It will demonstrate the ways in which the budget process allows senators of both political parties to avoid balancing the obligations of the federal government with the resources it commands when making politically difficult decisions. In its examination of the congressional budget process, this article will highlight the potential role political scientists can play in formulating procedures that can meet the future challenges presented by persistent budgetary deficits.