Volume 23, Issue 1-2 - Special Issue: Gender and Gender Identity after the 2024 Election; Editor: Sara Chatfield

In three presidential election cycles from 2016 to 2024, the Democratic Party nominated two women, Hillary Clinton and Kamala Harris, and one man, Joe Biden. Each ran against the Republican Party’s repeat nominee, Donald Trump, with Clinton and Harris losing and Biden winning. This paper examines the role that sexism plays when women lose elections, focusing on the narratives used to explain Democrats’ (and Harris’s) loss in 2024. Using original survey data, we find that men and women attribute blame across the candidates differently from one another. Regardless of party identification, women voters are significantly less likely than men to blame Harris most for Democrats’ loss. Indeed, women who identify as Democrats and Independents blame Harris the least for Democrats’ loss. We also find evidence that the blame gap between men and women in their views of Kamala Harris is significantly mediated by hostile, though not benevolent sexism. The dual finding of a gender gap in blame attribution and the persistence of hostile sexist attitudes among some voters has important implications for the Democratic Party as it processes their loss in 2024 and looks ahead in nominating candidates to run in future elections.

Following the 2024 election, LGBTQ+ representation in state legislatures increased, yet, at the same time, 2024 also marked a record-breaking year for anti-trans legislation being introduced in the states. In this brief note, we explore LGBTQ+ representation in U.S. state legislatures, the unique backgrounds of the 2024 newcomers, and how minority representation across the states continues to increase despite national rhetoric indicating otherwise. Our snapshot of the 2024 election cycle contributes to an increased interest in LGBTQ+ incumbency as more individuals seek and win elective office. Notably, we find that LGBTQ+ women and nonbinary incumbents are far more likely to be challenged in the general election than men and win with a smaller margin.

The past decade has seen a dramatic surge in state LGBTQ policymaking, rising from a few dozen policies a year to hundreds of expansive and restrictive proposals, raising questions about what drives this rapid spread. A potential explanation is the growing mobilization of pro- and anti-LGBTQ interest groups at the state level due to federal gridlock. We investigate this dynamic by identifying model legislation for two prominent policies: bans on gender-affirming care and conversion therapy. Using text analysis, we track how legislative text spreads across states. We find extensive text borrowing in both policy areas (both from interest groups and other states), with interest groups playing a more central role in the network supporting gender-affirming care bans. States are significantly more likely to borrow policy language from others with similar partisan control, ideology, and legislative professionalism. These findings suggest that ideology-driven interest group activity is shaping the structure and pace of policy diffusion. In the wake of the 2024 election, these dynamics are likely to continue, accelerating state-level polarization in LGBTQ rights and restrictions.

Lawmakers from historically marginalized groups often emphasize unique political messages from their counterparts that hinge on their identities or those of their constituency. Because symbolic representation increases constituent support and satisfaction, elected officials are keen to use high-profile nomination hearings as an opportunity to communicate their positions as a tool to maintain or expand constituent backing. Using the case of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr’s nominationhearing for the Health and Human Services Secretary, we find that partisanship plays a crucial role in how elected officials style their identity-based messaging. Furthermore, scholars’ traditional understanding of gender, women’s issues, and intersectional issues is evolving. Our analysis spotlights the ways in which elected officials’ contemporary communication around women and related issues has evolved from earlier findings in our field.

Justice Anthony Kennedy is widely regarded as the author of the gay rights legal movement–establishing the Court’s attempt to codify gay and lesbian dignity into a constitutional rights-based logic. From Romer v. Evans to Obergefell v. Hodges , Kennedy’s was often the only federal voice that mattered in the fight for gay and lesbian rights. When he retired, gay rights advocates worried about the stability of his distinctive gay rights doctrinal legacy. Trans rights advocates wondered whether the Kennedy precedent would apply to transgender legal claims. And anti-LGBTQ advocates hoped that Kennedy’s retirement could usher in an era of LGBTQ-rights retraction. It’s been 10 years since Obergefell and 8 since Kennedy’s retirement and conservatives have not only stemmed the flow of Kennedy’s doctrinal legacy but have encouraged the Court to entertain some significant setbacks. In this article we revisit Kennedy’s legacy, identifying the contours of his contributions, the opportunity costs of his retirement and the Court’s emerging LGBTQ rights retractions.

In recent years, conservative actors have decried what they call “gender ideology,” defined as efforts to recognize the complexity of sexuality and gender beyond the simple binary. We first review the recent politics of the anti-gender ideology movement both globally and in the U.S., with a particular focus on the rights of transgender people, a central target of these efforts. We emphasize that many of the attacks on gender ideology are associated with rising anti-democratic forces around the world. Employing a unique national survey with extensive questions regarding both democracy and trans attitudes fielded after Donald Trump returned to the White House in 2025, we find that fewer than half of Americans support policies that expand or defend the rights of trans people. However, support varies considerably across specific trans policy issues and between different groups in society. Without making any claims to causal direction, we find support for democracy and attitudes toward right-wing authoritarianism are strongly associated with support for transgender rights. We conclude that the observed link between anti-democratic forces and opposition to trans rights at the elite level is replicated at the mass level.