Volume 40, Issue 1 -

The structure as well as the themes of the Symposium suggest that Eryximachus’ speech plays a fundamental role in the dialogue. The problem is that what he says in praise of love is far from clear and continues to be a subject of debate. The aim of our article is to re-examine this speech to clarify its meaning and determine its contribution to Plato’s theory of love. First, we will analyse the text of the Symposium , then we will investigate its medical back-ground, and finally we will evaluate its philosophical impact. We will argue that Eryximachus’ speech, which draws inspiration from the Hippocratic Collection and the Pre-Socratic thought, is based on the concept of ‘harmony’: a balanced and organised unity of opposites. According to Eryximachus, love – conceived of as harmony – is the key to the health and the virtue of human beings, as well as to the cosmic order and justice. Thereby the specificity of Eryximachus’ speech will become clear: Plato tries to combine science and morality by proposing, among other things, some considerations on bioethics .

This article is devoted to the philosophical fragment found in 1977 in the Bactrian city of Aï Khanum. Both its content and origin are still a matter of dispute among scholars. I provide first a new edition of the three remaining columns of the fragment, based on a new reading of its photographic reproductions. The second part of this paper deals with the difficult problem of its origin. I give new evidence in favour of the hypothesis according to which the transmitted text is a piece of the second book of Aristotle’s lost dialogue Περὶ φιλοσοφίας. First, the comparison between this fragment and the opening lines of Theophrastus’ so-called Metaphysics suggests that both of them were written shortly after Plato’s death in the same historical and philosophical context, viz inside the Assos circle. Then, I examine the hypothesis of Louis Robert and Paul Bernard according to which an epigram written at the end of a list of Delphic maxims also found in Aï Khanum must be attributed to Clearchus of Soli, the pupil of Aristotle during the Assos period. The close connection between Clearchus’ main philosophical interests and the first book of Aristotle’s lost dialogue explains why he chose to bring it with him during his journey through the East, and left it in Aï Khanum. Finally, the reconstruction of the general structure of the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας leads to the conclusion that the fragment must come from its second book.

Two literal quotations from Chrysippus’ On Possibles , preserved in Plutarch’s On the Contradictions of the Stoics , seem to contradict the Stoic thesis of the isotropy of the void. According to this thesis the void is an infinite undifferentiated expanse (a wide continuous area) whose center is marked by, and coincides with, the position of the world. Since there is nothing else outside the world, the cohesive force that pervades it is sufficient on its own to guarantee the quasi–indestructibility of the trans–cyclical διακόσμησις (i.e the fact that in the new cosmic cycle the διακόσμησις returns in a form identical to the one it had in the previous cosmic cycle) and the eternity of the οὐσία. Conversely, in these two quotations Chrysippus maintains that there is a central διαφορά equipped with causal force. This seems to imply the anisotropy of the void. Chrysippus’s view here is also at odds with another official Stoic thesis, i.e. that the incorporeal is causally inert. In this paper it will be argued that there is in fact no contradiction, because, in those two quotations, Chrysippus consciously develops a cosmological hypothesis in order to resolve a difficulty concerning the role of fire during the universal conflagration. Chrysippus’ solution to this difficulty belongs to modal logic and consists in distinguishing between the actual universe and the possible ones.

While Epictetus’ Diatribai are not an ethical treatise, but aim chiefly at urging and training pupils to practice philosophy, they can also be used to reconstruct Epictetus’ positions about some of the questions raised within the Stoa after Zeno. This paper focuses on the problem of the contribution of indifferent (external or bodily) things to happiness and of the relationship between virtue and these indifferents. Against scholars claiming that Epictetus shared Aristo of Chios’ heterodox indifferentism, it is shown that Epictetus upholds Chrysippus’ ethical doctrine of the telos and acknowledges that some indifferents are natural or have ‘value’ ( axia ) and should not be despised or ignored. In making this point, Epictetus uses the concept of ‘good reasonning’ about value which can be traced back to Diogenes of Seleucia (and Antipater of Tarsus). Moreover, when he describes how we can reach the goal of life through our natural faculties, Epictetus might also borrow Panetius’ explanation of the telos .

Aëtius Placita 1.3.8, in the chapter On Principles , provides a systematic overview of Pythagorean thought, which can be instructively compared with ps.-Archytas On Principles , provided both fragments of the latter are kept together.

In the paper I discuss three theses defended by A. Kenny: (1) in antiquity up to Aspasius or to Alexander of Aphrodisias the EE was considered the most important version of Aristotle’s ethical discourse; (2) the idea that the common books belonged to the one or to the other treatise; (3) the opposition between the theory of happiness of EN I and X and that of EE II and VIII.

In this paper I compare Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Proclus’ conceptions of dialectic by discussing a passage from Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Topics and texts from Proclus’ Platonic Theology and commentary on Plato’s Parmenides . I show how Alexander takes up Aristotle’s view of dialectic as an argumentative technique that has no specific object but can be put in the service of philosophy e. g. to establish first principles. In a key passage, Alexander quotes some lines from the Parmenides to emphasize that this was also Plato’s view on dialectic. By contrast, Proclus uses the Parmenides as a crucial source for his conception of dialectic as the crowning glory of philosophy, and fiercely criticizes such interpretations of the Parmenides as that of Alexander, which reduce it to the illustration of a logical method. I argue that the difference in their conceptions of dialectic lies in Alexander’s positive and Proclus’ negative view on doxa and on its role in knowledge.

This article draws out the political implications of some of the avatars of ancient skepticism in modern fiction. It relies on Martha Nussbaum’s claim that fiction can provide some of the best lessons in moral philosophy to refute her claim that ancient skepticism was a bad influence on morals. It surveys references to skepticism from Shakespeare through such diverse writers as Isabel de Charrière, Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Anatole France, and Albert Camus down to recent writers such as Orhan Pamuk and Michel Houellebecq. The most substantial treatment is of Naguib Mahfouz’s Cairo Trilogy , which is interpreted in two ways: one, as an example of isosthenia or equipollence in arguments on both sides of questions about gender in the Islamic world, and two, as the biography of a person who claims to be a self-conscious skeptic. Skepticism emerges as a multi-faceted concept in modern literature, but there are definite references back to the ancient skeptics, including mention of the name Pyrrhonism and knowledge of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. The political implications militate against dogmatic claims to truth and knowledge of a one-dimensional justice.