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This paper critically evaluates the arguments proposed by Cheffins and Reddy in their recent article, advocating for the abolition of the UK Corporate Governance Code with the promise of substantial benefits to the market. The exploration primarily delves into the potential ramifications of such a proposal on other European jurisdictions, where Codes of corporate governance hold significant sway in the corporate domain, reflecting a spectrum of legal and cultural traditions. While the article under scrutiny is geographically confined to the United Kingdom, the ramifications of such a proposal extend far beyond, resonating deeply with the pervasive influence of the UK Code of Corporate Governance even within continental Europe, urging a comprehensive examination.The analysis begins by revisiting the arguments advanced by the authors and scrutinizing them in light of the Continental European context. This examination reveals several concerns that necessitate attention. We contend that despite geographic limitations, the Code serves as a valuable and adaptable instrument for fostering accountability, transparency, and innovation in markets transcending borders and jurisdictions. Its continued relevance is underscored by its utility in addressing emergent issues and governance challenges, particularly in the realm of ESG and auditing. Consequently, the proposition of its abolition carries significant drawbacks for both companies and investors alike. In conclusion, we assert that European jurisdictions should not dismiss Codes of corporate governance outright, but rather advocate for their refinement and adaptation to the evolving imperatives of the globalized 130economy. Such an approach is deemed imperative to maintain and enhance corporate governance standards, thereby ensuring the continued integrity and efficiency of European markets.

157 This article discusses the regulatory definition of collective investment undertakings (CIUs) as provided for by Article 4 (1) (a) AIFMD and Article 1 (1) UCITSD in the context of traditional family offices, holding companies, and joint ventures, and distinguishes them from more recently observed digital asset pools such as digitally managed accounts, crypto lending, crypto staking, and decentralized autonomous organizations.Testing the legal definition of CIUs in the context of traditional and digital pooled investments allows not only for the delineation of the scope of AIFMD (and to a lesser extent, UCITSD), but also provides insights on the desirable content of Level 2 regulation under MiCA. While ESMA guidance based on many years of supervisory experience sets the limits on traditional use cases, the digital boundaries of collective investment schemes are largely untested and to some extent uncertain, resulting in high costs for legal advice, as demonstrated by our brief look into MiCA set out in this article. To address these matters, we argue in favor of broad default rules on pooled finance, paired with exemptive powers from individual or all rules where a disparity exists between the purpose of regulation and the regulated activities. If paired with carve-outs for applications below EUR 5 million (where retail investors are present) and EUR 100 million (sophisticated clients only), these default rules would assist supervisory authorities in setting adequate boundaries for investment fund regulation of innovative financial products. After the introduction (Pt. I), Pt. II outlines the legal definition(s) of CIUs; Pt. III discusses the regulatory limits in the context of traditional use cases; Pt. IV analyzes the limits for digitally managed accounts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), and decentralized finance as a whole (referred to collectively as “digital limits”); Pt. V presents our policy considerations; and Pt. VI concludes.

192 Despite the tremendous number of studies devoted to the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the unprecedented number of sanctions applied and the recent European Union (EU) reforms on sanctions, sanctions effectiveness should be still a matter of debate. More than a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but G7-led sanctions have not materially hindered Russia’s war effort. This study intends to address this problem by focusing on how to make the use and application of EU sanctions against Russia more effective. In doing so, I argue that the main impediments to EU sanctions effectiveness are systemic in nature and inherent to the EU sanctions policy framework. The piecemeal changes of the EU sanctions regulatory framework undertaken so far have not solved these systemic flaws that undermine the effectiveness of EU sanctions. A fundamental revision of the entire system of the EU sanctions policy framework is needed. This study proposes implementing a comprehensive principles-based framework for EU sanctions policy, where harmonisation and the risk-based approach are its foundations, to make sanctions more effective. The proposed sanctions principles-based framework is broader in its scope than is currently the case; it covers a broader set of principles. The proposed frame includes all the stages of the sanctions process, is addressed to a broader number of actors and its foundations are developed. I recommend that this sanctions principles-based framework should be mandatory for use. This is the first part of a two-part article. Part I of the article discusses the need for the revision of the regulatory approach to the EU sanctions policy to increase the effectiveness of sanctions. It includes the analysis of the EU sanctions as a foreign policy instrument and a comprehensive overview of the EU regulatory framework on sanctions as well as the analysis of imposition of the EU sanctions against Russia. Part I also discusses policy proposals for the effectiveness of the EU sanctions, such as harmonisation of the EU sanction policy and the application of a sanctions risk-based approach.

234 Various reasons have been put forward for the declining global relevance of the London equity market. Reform proposals and changes already implemented target some of the major problems identified as reasons for the stock market’s decline. Surprisingly, tax related explanations for the current state of the UK stock market are largely absent from the discourse. This paper argues that the preferential tax treatment of the dividend income of UK pension funds and insurance companies introduced in the early 1970s and repealed in the mid 1990s first contributed to the UK stock market’s growth by implicitly subsidising financing via equity and encouraging the flow of the funds of these investors into the market, and subsequently led to the market’s decline as a result of the outflow of the funds of the two major classes of institutional investors: UK pension funds and insurance companies. The key implication of this argument is that omitting tax as a major factor in the decline of the UK stock market risks ending up with reforms that can, at best, do little to change the current situation.