Volume 70, Issue 4

European culture is distinguished by a special and indeed unique appreciation of freedom. Understanding why we care so much about freedom requires continual reflection on the heart of the matter. This is especially necessary because the concept of freedom has been constantly reworked and remodelled throughout its long history. This article lists five key characteristics and highlights two in particular: (1) the openness of being free, which means that freedom does not itself determine what it is used for; and (2) the fact that freedom is by its nature an extrinsic, not an intrinsic, end. In addition, the article comments on various highly influential aberrations in the explication of the idea of freedom that began early, in the 4th century, with Plato.

This article reconstructs Herbert Marcuse’s first and widely ignored philosophical project, as set out in his texts published from 1928 to 1933. In these texts, Marcuse tried to put in dialogue ideas from Heidegger and Marx to articulate a dialectic phenomenology of historical existence. This attempt, of great originality and philosophical ambition, was marked by tensions arising from the peculiar status given to the ontology of historicity in a framework of thought that maintained strong links with Marx. By analysing this early philosophical project of one of the icons of the international student movement, theoretical tensions can be detected, which clarify the subsequent approach of this thinker as a member of the so-called Frankfurt School.

Immanuel Kant is, famously, not only the major philosopher of European enlightenment, but also one of the first philosophers to develop a philosophical theory of “human races”. How do these two sides of Kant relate to each other? What is the significance of race in Kant’s philosophy? In this article, we aim to discuss these questions by taking (1 st ) a close look into the conceptual and philosophical presuppositions underlying Kant’s understanding of race; relating them (2 nd ) to the concept of teleology as developed by Kant in the Critique of Judgement and to the idea of natural history that can be derived from there. In the last two chapters (3 rd and 4 th ), we intertwine both perspectives in such a way that, on the one hand, we can determine the philosophical significance of race for Kant, and, on the other hand, show how a race-sensible perspective gives new and critical insight into Kant’s concept of reason.

In Germany the voices calling for a critical discussion of racist ideas in the works of the so-called classics of philosophy are growing louder. So far, the focus has been primarily on Kant and Hegel, in whose works racist statements are easily detected. However, the role of these racist ideas in their respective systems remains unclear, and especially in the case of Kant, the question also arises whether Kant is the author of the statements at all. Moreover, the accusation itself is quite ambiguous both in terms of its premises and its subject matter. This paper aims to help clarify this debate. It is primarily concerned with Kant’s philosophy, which is, however, situated in the context of some of the central assumptions of the Enlightenment. It will be shown that racist claims result from crucial elements of Kant’s mature philosophical system.

Recent discussions of Hegel’s conception of second nature, specifically focused on Hegel’s notion of habit, have greatly advanced our understanding of Hegel’s views on embodied normativity. This essay examines Hegel’s account of embodied normativity in relation to his assessment of good and bad habits. Engaging Hegel’s account of the rabble in the Philosophy of Right and Frank Ruda’s assessment of Hegel’s rabble, this essay traces the relation between ethicality, idleness and race in Hegel. In embodying a position of refusal in its affirmation of idleness, the rabble disallows the progressive revision of the project of modernity central to Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel’s discussion of the rabble is thus key to assessing the production of race within Hegel’s notion of ethical life.

The text presents the general cultural-historical thesis that one cannot adequately understand philosophy after the Second World War if one does not understand it in interaction with politics and popular culture. These three spheres find themselves in a variable triangular constellation after the Second World War. Methodologically, the text is guided by the fact that this interplay is also organised in a triangular and variable way, namely according to the options of coexistence, conflict and cooperation (CCC-principle). Adorno’s philosophy serves as a challenging example. The principle of coexistence, conflict and cooperation also serves as a framework for the second part of the text, which reformulates Adorno’s socio-critical question about the possibility of change as an ontological question. In the constellation with politics, pop music can in this context express in its own way what in philosophy is called the principle of ontological contingency.