Volume 63, Issue 2

This paper reconstructs Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s position on the limits of legitimate economic inequality as presented in his Second Discourse. It argues that, although Rousseau’s position is egalitarian in that it places severe limits on permissible inequalities, he values economic equality instrumentally, not for its own sake but only as a means for promoting freedom and for securing the social conditions that make recognition, a central component of human well-being, available to all. The paper articulates the conception of freedom at work in Rousseau’s view (freedom as the absence of domination), showing both how his conception differs from Philip Pettit’s and how John Rawls’s conception of justice could be enriched by according greater importance to Rousseau’s concerns about economically caused forms of domination.

The article presents Plato’s Republic as a work arguing for the fundamental principles which constitute not - as Popper thought - a totalitarian state, but rather our own state, based on the rule of law. Plato is trying to develop here a new form of ‘Enlightenment’ (unlike the so-called ‘Sophistic Enlightenment’ he criticizes here) which we should see as a ‘revitalisation’ of traditional positions, which Plato thinks should be regenerated according to rational principles.

For a couple of years, “Aristotelian Naturalism” has been the subject of intensive debates. Among the most prominent proponents of this type of ethical theory are Philippa Foot and John McDowell. At first sight, these approaches are quite attractive for they seem to combine a number of advantages. The central thesis of the present paper is, however, that they do not succeed in developing a convincing ethical theory. To substantiate this claim, Foot’s approach will be presented in a first step. In a second step, McDowell’s critique on Foot will be outlined. Foot’s attempt to provide an external foundation for morality takes centre stage here. In a third step, McDowell’s own version of Aristotelian Naturalism, which has an explicitly anti-foundational shape, will be delineated. Although McDowell’s critique on Foot proves to be valid, it leads him to the wrong conclusions. He ignores that a reason-internal foundation of morality is available which resists his legitimate critique while being superior to his own anti-foundational theory. At the core of such an approach lies a non-reductive concept of person, which stands in clear contrast to Foot’s concept of “life form” as well as to McDowell’s concept of “second nature”.

The determination of specific limitations of biological descriptions, explanations and structuralisations presupposes a proper understanding of the methodical status of “function”. This is particularly relevant if biological knowledge is supposed to play a crucial argumentative role even beyond the limits of the empirical science. In such cases it is not easily determinable at which point purely empirical knowledge enters into the argument and where additional methodical and methodological aspects must be considered. This paper provides a methodological reconstruction of the functional form of biological knowledge itself, which is unfolded in three consecutive steps. The reconstruction starts with the determination of model-theoretical prerequisites of functional structuralisation of biotic entities as organisms. The second step explicates the logical grammar of functional and dysfunctional characters. Based upon this reconstruction, the systematic relation between the form of functional and evolutionary arguments is reconsidered. Finally some of the argumentative burdens are developed, which result from the use of biological language- and theory-particles being applied beyond the scope of validity that is and can be claimed for their proper use within their original life-scientific language game.

Two short typescripts by G. Lukacs from the archive, dating from 1941/42, shed light on his appraisal of the cultural ‘inner reserves’ of Germany and the ‘moral reserves’ of the democracies involved in the Second World War, as well as on Lukacs’s political philosophy at that time. The conception of an intrinsic interrelation of a humanist philosophical anthropology and rationalist epistemology elucidates his egalitarian and democratic account. Both texts are located within the intellectual development of the author in an introduction by the editor, which sketches the historical background and indicates relevant contemporaneous theoretical and political debates, such as the controversies over realism and humanism and also a dispute with K. Jaspers on German collective guilt.