Volume 62, Issue 6

Among philosophers and social scientists, Hume’s idea of justice is generally identified with a system of rules based on mutual advantage, their moral quality playing either an insignificant or no part at all. This conventional or contractarian model, respectively, is not adequate to the special institution of morality or, in Hume, to the virtues, artificial or natural. It is not self-interest but sympathy in combination with the indirect passions of pride and humility that gives conventions their moral quality and social relevance. This article suggests exegetic and systematic reasons for the normative importance of Hume’s moral psychology, which should open the way to a developing morality much more in agreement with actual Western societies than a static morality based on self-interest would allow.

Does truth have a history? Whereas Bernard William denies it and only allows a history of truthfulness, I defend the possibility of a critical history or genealogy of truth. Because a trifling relativistic historicization of truth leads to a paradoxically a-historic and pacifistic conception of truth, one must first establish the methodological concepts with which a genealogy of truth can avoid both problems. Three first steps towards such concepts can be found in some of Michel Foucault’s lectures, which lead the genealogy of truth to focus on the origins of truth’s force.

Emergency situations cannot be defined as situations in which a person is facing contradictory moral duties. Rather, they are situations in which an asset secured also by moral norms is in imminent danger so that the situation is perceived as existentially threatening for a person, either by the person herself or by someone else, for reasons comprehensible also for a third person. Hence, emergency situations call for an emergency ethics since in an emergency situation an action can be morally permissible that would not be permissible in a different situation. As I will show in this paper, whether an action is morally permissible in such an emergency situation that would not be permissible in a different situation depends on five conditions. These conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the moral permissibility of an action that would be morally forbidden if they were not fulfilled.

The idea of an ethics of extreme emergency follows from the suspicion that what is morally permitted in the ordinary course of events could not cover what may seem supposedly morally required in a situation of emergency. There is claimed to be a demand for an ethics that gives reasons for moral permission for actions beyond what is generally morally permitted. The paper (1) provides reasons for the argument that what is generally morally permitted does cover what is morally permitted in situations of emergency and (2) states that the rejection of (1) entails a profound undermining of the ordinary moral code, the only resource available to legitimate action seemingly being beyond this code.

The fact that the topic of emergency situations has been neglected almost completely by ethical theory raises the question why normative ethics has had so little to say about extreme situations so far. One can assume that this disinterest is not due to the rarity of emergency situations but rather to their peculiar properties. All ethical theories rest on the premise that moral agents make the most of their decisions under normal circumstances. The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether or not normative ethics is able to adequately evaluate emergency situations. In order to do this, different types of extreme situations must be distinguished. It is argued that, on the one hand, self-defence and agreements by which all the participants refrain from certain of their rights in order to enable some of them to survive are morally unproblematic. On the other hand, there are emergency situations that do not allow for a solution which would be morally acceptable to all of the involved persons. Hence, morality itself can be unacceptable under extreme circumstances.

A philosophical inquiry into the ethics or the morals of distress has to address a distinction regarding its very own scope. On the one hand, situations of distress can be understood to involve particular moral considerations. On the other hand, distress can be understood as the presence of specific characteristics that may allow for a divergence from what is obliged from the moral point of view. The article reflects on the idea of distress as setting limits to moral reflection and obligation, considering particular examples that illustrate the meaning of integrity and personal ties and their practical relevance in situations of distress. In the light of these reflections it seems inadequate to claim that distress exempts one from relying on moral reasoning altogether, but rather that situations of distress engender specific moral considerations.

The article shows that an ethics of distant emergencies can justify duties of assistance under recourse to reasons of humanitarian morals as well as corrective justice. After providing a notion of severe emergencies, I argue that such duties of assistance have global scope. But a comprehensive conception of duties of assistance could be understood neither as a conception of moral duties of assistance alone nor as a mere conception of duties of corrective justice. It rather has to combine duties of humanitarian morals and corrective justice to cover all cases of severe emergencies. Three principles to specify responsibilities resulting from such duties of assistance for different cases of emergency are suggested.

In this “Letter from Chile” I describe and comment the main features of philosophical activity in Chile. My perspective is related to my own academic experience: that of a Chilean academic, who earned his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin, worked in that same university for six years as an Assistant Professor (wissenschaftlicher Assistent), and has been an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago for the last eleven years. The first part of the text offers a review of the historical development of philosophy in Chile. Afterwards, I refer to the current situation of our academic philosophy, analyzing various aspects: issues, currents, institutions, publications, research system, among others. Finally, I outline, from the above, some assessments and a general diagnosis of the present situation of philosophy in my country.