Volume 19, Issue 1

This paper argues that three widely accepted motivating factors subsumed under the broad heading of iconicity, namely iconicity of quantity, iconicity of complexity and iconicity of cohesion, in fact have no role in explaining grammatical asymmetries and should be discarded. The iconicity accounts of the relevant phenomena have been proposed by authorities like Jakobson, Haiman and Givón, but I argue that these linguists did not sufficiently consider alternative usage-based explanations in terms of frequency of use. A closer look shows that the well-known Zipfian effects of frequency of use (leading to shortness and fusion) can be made responsible for all of the alleged iconicity effects, and initial corpus data for a range of phenomena confirm the correctness of the approach.

A number of iconically motivated grammatical distinctions, among them that between alienable and inalienable possession in Japanese and Korean, are graded. Haspelmath's Zipfian frequency hypothesis may be able to accommodate these facts (lowest bulk is most frequent, middle bulk is less frequent, and maximal bulk is maximally infrequent), but until more data are forthcoming, iconicity alone makes the correct predictions in those cases, and (crucially) in others where bulk is simply not the grammatical variable at issue in signaling markedness (as for example, the distinction between nominative/absolutive and ergative/accusative in Kurdish). The productivity (not just the fortuitous correctness) of an iconically motivated “more form” implies “more meaning” principle is attested in: (a) the (pre)history of the development of nominalizations in Romanian and Khmer, (b) in the frequent operation of “Watkins' Law” whereby 3sg. forms are interpreted as if they were zero-marked, even when they are not, and (c) grammaticality judgments about the differences between anaphoric epithets and structurally identical non-anaphoric noun phrases like the pig in English. Like reduced form, so too elaborated form, may have a number of motivations, not only iconic and economic (both cognitive), but also esthetic. It is probably misconceived to look for only one motivating factor to account for most observed grammatical facts, although the motivating factors are more easily identified when they operate alone.

Haspelmath argues that certain universal asymmetries in linguistic distance previously analyzed as examples of iconicity of distance are better analyzed as the result of frequency. It is argued here that Haspelmath's arguments can be countered by an advocate of iconicity of distance as an explanatory factor. Iconicity of distance is not different in kind from iconicity of contiguity, which Haspelmath endorses. Haspelmath's argument works only if one takes relative frequency instead of absolute frequency; yet it is generally accepted that economy effects are the result of absolute frequency. The empirical frequency data that Haspelmath presents is inconclusive. However, Haspelmath presents data that suggest that an iconicity of distance analysis, at least for possession constructions, must be revised as iconicity of length. Finally, criteria are offered to differentiate the effects of economy, iconicity of distance/length, and iconicity of independence.

I am grateful to John Haiman and William Croft for their penetrating critiques of my claims and for the interesting challenges that they provide for them. This offers me a chance to clarify and elaborate on some of the central points of my article. This is an important debate, because iconicity and frequency are central explanatoty concepts in functional and cognitive linguistics. Even if we do not succeed in resolving the issues, our understanding will be enhanced by this discussion.

This paper discusses proposed characteristics of implicit linguistic and explicit metalinguistic knowledge representations as well as the properties of implicit and explicit processes believed to operate on these representations. In accordance with assumptions made in the usage-based approach to language and language acquisition, it is assumed that implicit linguistic knowledge is represented in terms of flexible and context-dependent categories which are subject to similarity-based processing. It is suggested that, by contrast, explicit metalinguistic knowledge is characterized by stable and discrete Aristotelian categories which subserve conscious, rule-based processing. The consequences of these differences in category structure and processing mechanisms for the usefulness or otherwise of metalinguistic knowledge in second language learning and performance are explored. Reference is made to existing empirical and theoretical research about the role of metalinguistic knowledge in second language acquisition, and specific empirical predictions arising out of the line of argument adopted in the current paper are put forward.

1. Overview Constructions of Intersubjectivity (CoI) is an important addition to the growing body of work on ‘cognitive’ and construction-based grammars, which CoI links to evolutionary issues in interesting ways. CoI also touches upon a number of fundamental (indeed philosophical) issues in the study of linguistic communication, meaning, and human cognition; it should be applauded for the explicitness with which it does so, using language as a ‘window on the mind’ (p. 210). A concrete vision of the evolution of language is endorsed, arising against the background of analyses of a number of seemingly disparate and scattered linguistic data. The book thus forms an excellent starting point to engage with foundational assumptions entering into the theoretical framework adopted. We will here equally embed our comments within a theoretical discussion at the level of frameworks.

1. Introduction Let me start by saying that I very much appreciate both the effort that Hinzen and Van Lambalgen (hereafter, H&L) have put into commenting on Constructions of Intersubjectivity (hereafter, CoI ), and their comments as such. It is important for all cognitive disciplines studying language that representatives from different schools of thought try to address each other's work, in terms of both results and foundations. We may not reach agreement as a result of a discussion, but it will still be helpful in clarifying matters for ourselves and for other interested scholars, and thus for the future development of our common field of study. This is true even if the divide is deep—which is the case here in a number of respects, as H&L indicate themselves.