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We develop and estimate a microeconometric model of household labour supply in four European countries with differing economies and welfare policy regimes: Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. We then simulate, under the constraint of constant total net-tax revenue (fiscal neutrality), the effects of various hypothetical tax-transfer-reform basic-income policies: Guaranteed Minimum Income, Work Fare, Participation Basic Income and Universal Basic Income. We produce indexes and criteria by which the reforms can be ranked and compared to current tax-transfer systems. The exercise can be considered as one of empirical optimal taxation, where the optimization problem is solved computationally rather than analytically. Many versions of basic income policies would be superior to the current system, and the most successful are not means-tested (Universal or Participation Basic Income) and adopt progressive tax rules. If constraints other than fiscal neutrality are considered, such as the implied top marginal tax rate or the effect on female labour supply, the picture changes: unconditional policies remain optimal and feasible in Denmark and the United Kingdom; while in Italy and Portugal universal policies appear instead to be too costly in implied top marginal tax rates and adverse effects on female participation – conditional policies such as Work Fare emerge as more desirable there.

Egalitarian liberal political philosophers have been at pains to show that there is a nonnegligible “place” for liberty within the framework of an egalitarian theory of justice. Thus, many have insisted that, when redistribution is required in order to achieve greater equality, assets should be transferred in the most abstract form possible, ideally through a system of cash transfers. In this article we argue that this strategy has the potential to generate significant violations of neutrality. The problem arises from the fact that individuals with certain rates of time preference often want to use social institutions as self-binding mechanisms and as a result may exhibit a preference for in-kind benefits or other institutional arrangements that are frequently misclassified as paternalistic. We argue that egalitarians who rely on cash transfers as a way of accommodating the demands of liberty do so at the expense of neutrality.

Under what I call ”Near-Universal Basic Income,” or NUBI, everyone receives a high level of basic income, except for the rich. NUBI is therefore only near-universal and it requires means-testing. It is an economic hybrid: a cross between Universal Basic Income (UBI) and conservative social relief. My thesis is that if standard considerations that are often advanced to support UBI against social relief are successful, then these combined considerations probably lend NUBI even greater support. Thus, UBI supporters should consider becoming NUBI supporters. The considerations I examine focus on (1) sufficiency; (2) cost cuts; (3) equality; (4) freedom; (5) the social bases of self-respect; and (6) political resilience.

In this article we consider the potential of a Basic Income (BI) as a mechanism for promoting well-integrated and autonomous social and productive development in newly independent Democratic Republic of East Timor, and for expanding the freedom of this country’s population that is struggling to throw off the bitter legacy of colonial and postcolonial dispossession and violence. We briefly outline the main social and economic problems faced by the new Democratic Republic of East Timor. Then we argue that a BI financed by oil and natural gas revenues could play a major role in combating these problems.

Antipoverty movements have generated many “little” or “near” basic income guarantee (BIG) proposals. Most theorists discussing BIG posit a full-fledged universal grant that entirely satisfies the core value guiding their theory. Debates are conducted about feasibility, desirability and rival values. This article looks into particular considerations that need to be made when debating a little BIG. If a “status” value, meaning “all or nothing,” is the core value under debate, then a grant falling short of securing this status will need some other justification. If the core value is “scalar,” meaning there can be more or less of it, then a lower grant can be justified if it is an efficient way to add to that value. I offer two reasons that a little BIG can have merit: 1. Organizations will benefit because the grant provides a clear target for citizen action. 2. There are reasons to think that a BIG of whatever size will promote organizational capabilities more efficiently than money coming from an employer, family member or conditional public entitlement.