Volume 2, Issue 1 - Debate: Basic Income and Employment in Developing Countries

This paper explores the desirability and feasibility of a minimum income for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region. I review arguments in support of a basic income or a negative income tax for the European Union (EU). Then I examine ways in which the NAFTA countries do and do not resemble the EU in aspects relevant for the desirability and feasibility of a regional basic income. I argue that a case can be made for a North American guaranteed income, grounded, with respect to desirability, in a globalist theory of justice, and with respect to feasibility, in the necessity of moderating the flow of labor migration. A universal regional basic income is a useful tool for regional development that is fair and that insures better than does the current NAFTA that cooperation benefits the least advantaged.

The reciprocity objection is one of the most widespread criticisms against Basic Income (BI). In this article I challenge the consistency between the reciprocity principle and the preferred policy options of left reciprocity theorists. I argue that any consistent policy design for a reciprocity theory should satisfy two conditions: 1. Everyone who benefits from social resources contributes relevantly (reciprocally) to society’s efforts; and 2. Everyone who contributes relevantly to society benefits from social resources. BI is accused by reciprocity theorists of failing to satisfy Condition 1. But, surprisingly, their preferred policy pack also fails to satisfy Condition 1, and seems badly prepared to satisfy Condition 2. Significantly, left reciprocity theorists reject those options that would satisfy both conditions. I suggest that other normative values and intuitions may explain that inconsistency and indicate that the reciprocity objection to BI is wrong for principled reasons.

Many recent policy-related debates have centred on the possibility of constructing post–social insurance and post–means tested forms of income provision. Such asset-based welfare and stakeholding proposals have included Basic Income (BI) and some form of endowment or Capital Grant (CG) scheme. Although the differences between these systems are certainly real, and present us with distinct policy options, they are often overstated. This article has two objectives, therefore – the first of which is to identify the key similarities and differences between BI and CGs, and to argue the case for a partial, non-time-limited and unconditional BI. Second, this article reviews the issue of convertibility, i.e., the main normative questions to consider when designing a system permitting the mortgaging of income streams into lump-sum grants or pools.

In this article, I take for granted agreement on the merits of an unconditional basic income, and I consider the form its distribution might take. I explore the equity, efficiency, and incentive effects of several basic income models in order to provide a plausible example of what a basic income in the US might look like. I present four basic income models, discuss their advantages and disadvantages, and consider whether any one of these models is conclusively superior to the others in terms of the trade-offs involved. I conclude with a tentative proposal for a level and distribution for introducing an unconditional basic income in the US.

This note identifies three arguments from the monetary reform debate that are particularly relevant to universal basic income (UBI) and explores their contribution to the cumulative case for UBI.