Volume 17, Issue 1

Universal basic income proposes providing instalments of constant magnitude to all. One problem with a stable basic income across life is that it seems unfair to shorter-lived persons, who are worst-off due to premature death and receive less over their whole lives. Basic capital solves this problem by providing a one-off grant to the young, but I argue that it mistreats long-lived persons, as it does not guarantee their real freedom across life. There is a dilemma between these proposals regarding their respective unfairness to the short- and long-lived. The solution I propose is a net basic income of decreasing magnitude until a specific age, after which the income is constant. This solution is compatible with constant income benefits across life, and it offers a fair answer to the problem of unequal longevity, a widely neglected but essential challenge in debates about basic income.

Covid-19 has sparked calls for a universal basic income as a way of coping with a demand shock caused by the pandemic. Temporary income payments have been part of the emergency response to the pandemic. This paper questions the effectiveness of temporary payments as a way to raise demand. Some observers claim that vouchers are better targeted at sectors hit hard by Covid-19 as people may have a tendency to save than spend from temporary payments. There may be a stronger case for permanent rather than temporary payments if the aim is to boost demand in the economy.

Does a penny per month constitute a Basic Income? Were that penny to be paid individually, universally, and unconditionally, the answer would be ‘yes’, following the definition of Basic Income given by some of its leading advocates, be it organisations like the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) or prominent scholars such as Philippe Van Parijs. Some might be puzzled as to how this could be ‘a capitalist road to communism’, or give us ‘freedom as the power to say no’, both of which have been advocated by prominent researchers. The purpose of this paper is not to argue for or against their definition, but rather to situate it historiographically, enabling fruitful discussion. The paper will show how there was a widely shared assumption in the 1970s and 80s, at the early stages of both academic articulations and public discussion, that Basic Income comes with some notion of a threshold or level to be taken as a minimum or as adequate. The paper goes on to outline three issues that arise once the concept of a threshold is dropped from the definition. Examined in addition are five justifications for doing so. Much like any other idea, the concept of Basic Income is a social construct. By situating it here within a historical perspective, we wish to facilitate academic discussion regarding both the achievements and erasures that have occurred as a consequence of the concept’s academic refinement—refinement that is in itself majorly indebted to BIEN and Van Parijs.

The present article aims to utilize some insights from behavioral and happiness economics to discuss the consequences that the introduction of an unconditional basic income to cope with technological unemployment may hold for well-being. The impact of 21st-century technological progress on employment has only just begun to make itself felt and it will take time to realize its full extent. However, the main innovation is already common knowledge: robots (and artificial intelligence) are finding their way into the production process. According to several recent (although controversial) contributions, the phenomenon is radically different from past technological revolutions and could generate high levels of unemployment, calling for innovative redistributive public policies. The present article, building on Keynes’ (1930) short essay (“Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren”) and referring to some of the principles and models of behavioral and happiness economics, focuses on the best-known of these policies, namely provision of an unconditional basic income. A series of factors – loss aversion and hedonic adaptation, the impossibility of escalating to higher-grade consumption behaviors, social interaction in the form of active and passive envy, loss of self-esteem and social stigma – are all likely to have a negative impact on well-being if an unconditional basic income that remains unchanging over time is implemented. A policy mix combining a rising basic income with other measures is therefore proposed.

Bureaucratic selectivity mechanisms are the true colours of welfare states, stigmatising benefit recipients while hampering their trust in institutions and society at large. Universal policies such as the Universal Basic Income (UBI) could protect recipients’ trust by circumventing selectivity paraphernalia. By analysing regressions on the Finnish UBI experiment’s survey data, we assess the links from policy selectivity to trust in the benefit-providing institution and generalised trust through the pathway of reduced bureaucratic experience. More specifically, we analyse whether receipt of UBI leads to greater trust directly or while accompanied by an actual or perceived reduction in bureaucracy. According to our results, UBI is accompanied by greater trust, while selectivity does not necessarily lead to less trust or perception of less bureaucracy. However, in our analysis, policy selectivity did not directly correlate to recipients’ reported bureaucratic experiences, and their relationship with trust proved tricky: selectivity did not risk recipients’ trust in the policy-implementing institution, but generalised trust in other people was lowered. Thus, selective benefit recipients might be prone to self-inflicted stigma, hampering their trust in other people, regardless of actual bureaucratic experiences or trust in the welfare system.