Volume 22, Issue 1 - Special Issue: The Macroeconomics of the Covid-19 Pandemic

We use an overlapping-generations model to explore the implications of mortality during pandemics for the economy’s productive capacity. Under current epidemiological projections for the progression of COVID-19, our model suggests that mortality will have, in itself, only small effects on output and factor prices because projected mortality is small in proportion to the population and skewed toward individuals who are retired from the labor force. That said, we show that if the spread of COVID-19 is not contained, or if the ongoing pandemic were to follow a mortality pattern similar to the 1918–1920 Great Influenza pandemic, then the effects on the productive capacity would be economically significant and persist for decades.

I develop an extension of a canonical epidemiology model in which the policy in place determines the probability of transmission of an epidemic disease during economic and social interaction. I use the model to evaluate the effects of isolating symptomatic individuals, of increasing social distancing and of tests such as polymerase chain reaction – PCR – or Rapid Diagnostic Test that discriminate between currently infected agents, and its combination with a serology test like Neutralization Assay that is able to discriminate between immune and vulnerable healthy individuals, together with the role of enforcement to prevent interactions involving infected but asymptomatic agents. I find that isolating symptomatic individuals has a large effect at delaying and reducing the pick of infections. The combination of this policy with a PCR test is likely to represents only a negligible improvement in the absence of enforcement, whereas with full enforcement there is an additional delaying and reduction in the pick of infections. Social distancing alone cannot achieve similar effects without incurring in enormous output losses. I explore the combined effect of social distancing at early stages of the epidemic with a following period of tests and find that the best outcome is obtained with a light reduction of human interaction for about three months together with a subsequent test of the population over 40 days.

I incorporate quarantine, contact tracing, and random testing in the basic SEIR model of infectious disease diffusion. A version of the model that is calibrated to known characteristics of the spread of COVID-19 is used to estimate the transmission rate of COVID-19 in the United States in 2020. The transmission rate is then decomposed into a part that reflects observable changes in employment and social contacts, and a residual component that reflects disease properties and all other factors that affect the spread of the disease. I then construct counterfactuals for an alternative employment path that avoids the sharp employment decline in the second quarter of 2020, but also results in higher cumulative deaths due to a higher contact rate. For the simulations a modest permanent increase of quarantine effectiveness counteracts the increase in deaths, and the introduction of contact tracing and random testing further reduces deaths, although at a diminishing rate. Using a conservative assumption on the statistical value of life, the value of improved health outcomes from the alternative policies far outweighs the economic gains in terms of increased output and the potential fiscal costs of these policies.

The incidence of COVID-19 has systematically decreased households’ use of cash as means of payment as well as the average size and frequency of cash withdrawals. We argue that the structure of Baumol–Tobin type inventory theoretical models and their extensions can be used to separate the confounding factors, such as the desired level of consumption and the choice of the fraction of consumption paid in cash, from the cash management behavior, i.e. the size and frequency of cash withdrawals. Using this insight we argue that the observed cash management is consistent with COVID-19 increasing the fixed cost of withdrawing cash. We use detailed data on ATM cash disbursements in Argentina, Chile, and the US to estimate how much the pandemic has changed the transaction cost of using cash. This estimation shows that if the intensity of the virus doubles in a county, cash transaction cost increases by approximately 2%. The results from Argentina, Chile, and the US are remarkably similar and robust to several forms of measurement error and endogeneity.

I present a model where work implies social interactions and the spread of a disease is described by an SIR-type framework. Upon the outbreak of a disease reduced social contacts are decided at the cost of lower consumption. Private individuals do not internalize the effects of their decisions on the evolution of the epidemic while the planner does. Specifically, the planner internalizes that an early reduction in contacts implies fewer infectious in the future and, therefore, a lower risk of infection. This additional (relative to private individuals) benefit of reduced contacts implies that the planner’s solution feature more social distancing early in the epidemics. The planner also internalizes that some infectious eventually recover and contribute further to a lower risk of infection. These mechanisms imply that the planner obtains a flatter infection curve than that generated by private individuals’ responses.

The large economic costs of full-blown lockdowns in response to COVID-19 outbreaks, coupled with heterogeneous mortality rates across age groups, led to question non-discriminatory containment measures. In this paper we provide an assessment of the targeted approach to containment. We propose a SIR-macro model that allows for heterogeneous agents in terms of mortality rates and contact rates, and in which the government optimally bans people from working. We find that under a targeted policy, the optimal containment reaches a larger portion of the population than under a blanket policy and is held in place for longer. Compared to a blanket policy, a targeted approach results in a smaller death count. Yet, it is not a panacea: the recession is larger under such approach as the containment policy applies to a larger fraction of people, remains in place for longer, and herd immunity is achieved later. Moreover, we find that increased interactions between low- and high-risk individuals effectively reduce the benefits of a targeted approach to containment.

We use an accounting framework to evaluate the aggregate impact of a common lockdown policy for 85 countries. We find that poorer countries devote more labor to essential activities that are unaffected by the lockdown, while richer countries can more easily substitute non-essential employment with work from home. The lockdown generates an employment response that is U-shaped in income: it drops by 32% in the poorest quintile of the distribution, by 36% in the middle quintile, and by 31% in the richest quintile. Annualized GDP declines by 39% in the bottom three quintiles and by 31% in the richest quintile. Agriculture, an essential sector, is key in sustaining employment and economic activity in poorer countries.

Social distancing is a matter of individuals’ choices as well as of regulation. We analyse weekly panel data on such behaviour for English Upper Tier Local Authorities (UTLAs) from March to July 2020, paying attention to the influence of poverty, as measured by free school meals provision. Panel regressions suggest that, although more stringent regulation and slightly lagged local cases of infection increase social distancing, both effects are weaker in UTLAs with higher levels of poverty, in part because of poor housing, and also because shortage of money has forced the poor to keep working. Thus motivated, we develop a two-class (rich/poor) model, in which a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium arises from individual choices in a regulatory regime with penalties for non-compliance. The model yields results in keeping with the empirical findings, indicating the desirability of generous measures to furlough workers in low-paid jobs as a complement to the stringency of general regulation.

Using high-frequency proxies for economic activity over a large sample of countries, we show that the economic crisis during the first seven months of the COVID-19 pandemic was only partly due to government lockdowns. Economic activity also contracted severely because of voluntary social distancing in response to higher infections. Furthermore, we show that lockdowns substantially reduced COVID-19 cases, especially if they were introduced early in a country’s epidemic. This implies that, despite involving short-term economic costs, lockdowns may pave the way to a faster recovery by containing the spread of the virus and reducing voluntary social distancing. Finally, we document that lockdowns entail decreasing marginal economic costs but increasing marginal benefits in reducing infections. This suggests that tight short-lived lockdowns are preferable to mild prolonged measures.

Between the months of February and April of 2020, average weekly market hours in the U.S. dropped by 6.25, meanwhile 36% of workers reported switching to remote work arrangements. In this paper, we examine implications of these changes for the time allocation of different households, and on aggregate. We estimate that home production activity increased by 2.65 h a week, or 42.4% of lost market hours, due to the drop in market work and rise in remote work. The monthly value of home production increased by $39.65 billion – that is 13.55% of the concurrent $292.61 billion drop in monthly GDP. Although market hours declined the most for single, less educated individuals, the lost market hours were absorbed into home production the most by married individuals with children. Adding on the impact of school closures, our estimate of weekly home production hours increases by as much as 4.92 h. The increase in the value of monthly home production between February and April updates to $73.57 billion. We also report the estimated impact of labor markets and telecommuting on home production for each month in 2020.

We develop a microfounded macroeconomic model that embeds the key features of the Greek economy. After calibrating the model to Greek data over 1995–2019, we assume that the economy is initially in the year 2019 and then quantify the adverse economic impact of the lockdown measures taken to control the spread of the pandemic, as well as the implications of the various policy measures (at national and EU level) taken to cushion the impact of the economic hit. We give quantitative answers to questions like: What will be the size and duration of the economic downturn? What are the implications of the national fiscal stimulus? What will be the role of the fiscal transfers coming from the European Recovery Fund? Our results imply that the national fiscal stimulus package adopted so far is helpful but, for the Greek economy to enter an era of sustainable growth, a mix of policies is also needed that combines: (i) a growth-enhancing fiscal mix (ii) product market deregulation (iii) a socially productive use of the resources coming from the Recovery Fund.

The policy response to the COVID-19 shock included regulatory easing across many jurisdictions to facilitate the flow of credit to the economy and mitigate a further amplification of the shock through tighter financial conditions. Using an intraday event study, this paper examines how stock prices – a key driver of financial conditions – reacted to regulatory easing announcements in a sample of 18 advanced economies and 8 emerging markets. It finds that regulatory easing announcements contributed to looser financial conditions but effects varied across sectors and tools. News about regulatory easing led to lower valuations for financial sector stocks, mainly in jurisdictions with relatively lower capital buffers. These results stand in stark contrast with valuations of non-financial sector stocks, which increased in response to regulatory relief announcements, particularly in industries that are more dependent on bank financing. The effects also differed across tools. Valuations declined and financial conditions tightened following announcements related to easier bank capital regulation while equity valuation rose and financial conditions loosened after those about liquidity regulation.